

Peacekeeping as Coup-Proofing? Evidence from United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions

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This is a draft version. Please contact the authors with any questions or comments.

Abstract

The threat of coups often motivates leaders across the world to limit the ability of the military to seize power. These “coup-proofing” measures include separating the military into multiple branches or increasing the number of paramilitary forces. Recent work has started to explore the relationship between peacekeeping contributions and coups. This paper contributes to this discussion by examining the use of peacekeeping contributions as a coup-proofing mechanism; we argue that contributing military and police personnel to peacekeeping operations is another way of coup-proofing the security sector. We test these predictions using two common measures of coup-proofing: increasing the size of the state’s paramilitary and increasing the number of organizations to rival the army. We find that states engaged in both coup-proofing mechanisms are significantly more likely to send police to UN peacekeeping missions in the following year. However, leaders increasing the size of their paramilitaries are less likely to send troops, whereas leaders increasing the number of effective organizations are more likely to send troops. These results demonstrate that the use of UN peacekeeping contributions as a form of coup-proofing is multifaceted, and underscore the importance of the police as a key actor in peacekeeping and internal security.

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1 Introduction

Do states use peacekeeping personnel contributions as a means of coup-proofing their security sector? While coups d'état, or illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites to unseat the sitting executive, are relatively rare, coups remain a large security concern for many states, especially democratizing states (??).¹ Common means of coup-proofing, or reducing the ability of elites to carry out a coup, include dividing up the military into parallel or competing branches (??), removing militaries from domestic affairs by having them focus on external missions (??), or purging elites from the military (?). Contributing to international peacekeeping operations provides an opportunity to engage in coup-proofing as well: leaders can choose to remove members of the security apparatus and place them out of the country, disrupting this ability to plan and execute a coup.

Past research has demonstrated a positive relationship between failed coups and troop contributions to peacekeeping operations (?). Likewise, there is recent work demonstrating that those states that contribute peacekeepers, especially those with small military budgets, are less likely to experience a future coup (?). However, these works leave remaining questions about the role of peacekeeping contributions and coup-proofing. Most states that are increasingly contributing peacekeepers are weak democracies, and many come from former military regimes (??). The relationship between past coups and peacekeeping may then reflect the nature of which countries are contributing peacekeepers, regardless of coup concerns. Likewise, the negative correlation between peacekeeping contributions and future coups may be evidence of the active use of contributing as a peacekeeping mechanism.

We expand on that work by developing a theory of contributing peacekeepers as a coup-proofing measure, and empirically test the relationship between coup-proofing measures and peacekeeping personnel contributions. Leaders have a number of coup-proofing tactics to use, many of which are mutually reinforcing, but can also require additional efforts to maintain

¹According to forecasting models, states generally have less than a 4% likelihood of experiencing a coup in a given year (?)

the country's security and the loyalty of the security sector. We argue that when choosing to counterbalance, leaders face a choice of sending personnel abroad or keeping them at home. Further, we explore how the use of peacekeeping deployments as coup-proofing may differ across different members of the security sector, including ground troops, police, and military elites.

Our paper is a contribution in two key ways. First, we devise and test a theory of peacekeeping as coup-proofing prior to an actual coup. If peacekeeping is an active attempt to coup-proof a regime's security apparatus, then we should expect to see changes in contributions when there are other such attempts occurring. This expands on previous scholarship that examines failed coups as an indication that coup-proofing should occur as a result (?). However, coup-proofing may be occurring even in the absence of a coup. In fact, successful coup-proofing may prevent a failed coup, which may confuse the observed relationship highlighted in previous scholarship of peacekeeping as coup-proofing. Moreover, given that the empirical record on whether or not coup-proofing reduces coup threat is mixed (e.g., ???), it is important to test for evidence of peacekeeping as coup-proofing before a coup has occurred.

Second, we evaluate three types of peacekeeping contributions - police, troops, and observers - making ours the first to assess the relationship between coup-proofing and peacekeepers across the entire range of contribution options. Because all three types of personnel consist of members of the security apparatus, they should all be viable options of coup-proofing. In other words, members of the police, troops and military observers are both potential sources of coup threats and options to counterbalance coup threats and as a result, all three types may be influenced by coup-proofing either directly or indirectly. Although the military is often viewed as the primary coup-threat, the police often act as an important counterbalance to military power and may be used strategically by government elites to prevent coups.

Using a cross-national analysis, we examine how coup proofing, measured as the number

of parallel ground combat troops that divide and counter the fighting power of the army and as the ratio of the relative sizes of the paramilitary forces in the country to the military forces, influences police and military contributions to UN peacekeeping missions. We find that as the number of rival ground-combat organizations increases, so too do UN troop contributions, police contributions, and observer contributions. However, and contrary to initial expectations, we find that as the size of the paramilitary relative to the total number of armed personnel in the country increases, troop contributions decrease. As predicted, as the number of paramilitary members increase, so too does police contributions. We argue that these results can be explained through two potential avenues.

First, for those that increase the size of their paramilitary, this latter finding could demonstrate that peacekeeping is not a coup-proofing measure, but is rather evidence of a substitution effect: the reduced number of troops and observers is a result of other coup-proofing efforts such as purging, and the increased number of police is an attempt to ensure a continued financial gain from peacekeeping operations.

However, these results could also indicate that in some settings, peacekeeping operations are used to coup-proof regimes. These results indicate that when leaders coup-proof, they also increase the number of police contributed to peacekeeping operations. Qualitative evidence suggests that many formed police units contributed during the time period studied include paramilitary groups (?). This, combined with literature on the role of paramilitary groups in coup-proofing, suggests that leaders contribute more paramilitary personnel as UN police in an attempt to ensure better compensation and training (??). Such benefits work to keep the regular military weaker than the paramilitary, and reward loyalist paramilitary personnel.

However, the opposing results on troop contributions suggest that the two counterbalancing strategies examined here - increasing the number of rival organizations versus increasing the size of the paramilitary - are different strategies that may not always co-occur. Those leaders that choose to invest in many rival organizations seem to take advantage of the

external-facing missions of peacekeeping operations. However, those leaders that choose to create large paramilitaries actually reduce the number of troops that they send, perhaps to keep those troops weaker than the paramilitary.

2 Why Contribute Peacekeepers?

Peacekeeping can be a costly endeavor for troop contributing countries as states expose their own troops and police to security threats, while decreasing the number of security agents domestically to protect national security interests. However, in the past year, 64% of UN Member States provided troops or police to UN peacekeeping missions, but the range of contributions varies widely from 1 to over 7,500 police or troops sent at one time from a single country.² There are three predominant explanations for why states choose to contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations: for normative or humanitarian reasons, to profit economically, or out of security concerns.

First, states may contribute peacekeeping operations out of normative concerns. The UN itself motivates many of its modern and robust peacekeeping mandates with the need to protect civilians and to encourage human rights. Liberal democracies that value individual welfare and human rights may be motivated to contribute to peacekeeping operations as a means of ameliorating the abuse of these values in other countries; indeed, between 1993 and 2001, the United Nations relied on such democracies to contribute personnel to its operations (?). Likewise, more democratic states and states that offer more political rights to women are more likely to contribute female peacekeepers, suggesting a normative benefit (?). Finally, newly democratizing states may participate in peacekeeping operations in order to signal a commitment to democratic values and the international community. For example, recently democratized Argentina explicitly contributed peacekeepers to signal to the international community its commitment to human rights and a democratic character

²Data from the UN Troop and Police Contributors Data, available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>

(?). In discussing its role in the United Nations, President Menem stated that “the Argentine Armed Forces would be in any part of the world where peace is threatened” (?, 2). This language - in combination with a significant contribution of personnel (40% of the country’s commissioned officers served in a peacekeeping operation in the years between 1992 and 1996) - was a concerted effort to demonstrate changing national values (?). Thus, contributing to UN peacekeeping can demonstrate a state’s commitment to liberal and democratic values, and in doing so, increase its perceived legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Additionally, countries may hope that by participating in UN peacekeeping, they will gain increased normative influence that will translate into increased power within the UN (?).

In addition to the normative benefits of contributing personnel to peacekeeping operations, states have an economic incentive to participate. Most peacekeeping personnel remain employed by their country, rather than by the UN (?). Moreover, not all peacekeepers are compensated equally. Military observers, staff officers, and individual police officers (IPOs) continue to receive their national salary and are given a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) by the United Nations. The United Nations does not provide MSAs for formed police units (FPUs) or for military troops. Instead, those personnel continue to receive their national salary, and the contributing country is reimbursed at a base compensation rate (??). These states are also compensated for weapons and equipment, and can access additional compensation for providing specialist. As of July 2017, countries are compensated 1,410 USD per contingent member per month (?). It is up to the contributing country to determine how much - if any - of that to distribute to its personnel. Moreover, states receive monthly compensation for contingent-owned equipment (COE).

This compensation may then incentivize poorer states to contribute greater numbers of troops and FPUs, which is supported by a consistently negative relationship between GDP per capita and personnel contributions (????). For those states that pay their troops and police less than the compensation rate, income can be generated by contributing to peacekeeping operations. This ability to profit off of peacekeeping operations, however,

has limits: it has been found to be most relevant for those countries that contribute a large percentage of their armed forces, those with smaller military budgets, and those who have easy access to inexpensive equipment to loan to the United Nations (?). Despite scope conditions, it is clear that some states can profit from peacekeeping. For example, Bangladesh received \$1.28 billion in compensation for its participation in UN peacekeeping operations from 2001 to 2010 (?). Likewise, as of 2014, Fiji had earned \$300 million during the lifetime of its peacekeeping contributions (?).

Finally, a number of security concerns have been found to motivate peacekeeping contributions. Refugee flows between neighbors can prompt militarized conflict, and strain the resources of the receiving country. In an attempt to overcome this risk, states are more likely to contribute peacekeepers to a conflict when they are at risk of facing refugees from that conflict (?), as well as when there are larger numbers of displaced people (?). Likewise, conflict spillover may be prompted when insurgents cross state borders (?), when states pursue such groups across borders (?), or when there is external sponsorship of insurgencies (?). As such, states have an incentive to contribute more peacekeepers when they have greater geographical proximity to the conflict (?). States engaged in an interstate rivalry are also more likely contribute to peacekeeping operations, as the profits generated from peacekeeping can bolster military budgets (?). Further, states with relatively poorer trained military or police forces may hope to outsource the costs of training and professionalization of their own troops to the UN to ensure a more efficient and effective force.

Moreover, features of the peacekeeping operation may alter a state's calculation about whether or not to send personnel. As missions become more dangerous, the shortfall between the mandated number of personnel and the actual number of personnel deployed increases (?). This risk aversion is also seen in how contributing states respond to peacekeeper fatalities; increased fatalities is associated with a reduction in personnel contributions, especially amongst wealthier countries (?).

3 Coup-Proofing

There is a growing literature that links peacekeeping operations and coups. States with a smaller military budget are less likely to experience a military coup as their peacekeeping contributions increase (?), although case studies of Bangladesh and Fiji argue that contributing to peacekeeping operations may contribute to coup likelihood (?). States that have experienced a failed coup are more likely to increase their troop contributions than those that have not; although this relationship dissipates with time, there is initial evidence to suggest that states view peacekeeping contributions as a viable coup-proofing measure (?).

Coup-proofing measures are those taken by a leader in an attempt to prevent the military or other political elites to replace her regime (e.g., ???), and can include ethnic stacking of the military (???), rotation of military officers (?), and strategic purges of personnel (?). Some scholars have suggested that rewarding the military can be an effective way of retaining civilian control over it; militaries can be kept in check by providing it with increased material benefits (?). By ensuring a steady stream of goods, the leader can reduce officer grievances, a common trigger of coups (?). However, increasing benefits such as equipment and compensation to the military may enable coup coordination by providing tools and weapons that may later be used against the leader (?). Such “spoiling” may also increase the resources that can increase likelihood of coup success (??).

Others argue that a better way to coup-proof is to weaken the military, rather than spoiling it. A common strategy of coup-proofing is to “counterbalance” the regular military with additional military branches, which acts as a check against any one branch’s ability to gain enough resources to overthrow the incumbent (??). These additional branches can take the form of distinct armies, specialized branches and units, or paramilitary forces such as gendarmeries or presidential guards (??).

These forces are often taken from the extant security structures and shifted into new branches, or stocked by party loyalists or co-ethnics (??). For example, Haitian President

Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier closed the national military academy and created the Volontaires de la Securite National (VSN) to “bulwark against overthrow by the...Army” (? , 214). The VSN was double the size of the regular military, and often used to spy on or assassinate military leaders (?). During the reign of the junta in Haiti from 1991 to 1994, another paramilitary group, the Front Pour l’Avancement et le Progres De Haitien (FRAPH) was created from the former members of the VSN, police, and soldiers (?).

In addition to being stocked with loyalists or shifted from extant military forces, paramilitary forces tend to receive better pay and equipment than their regular counterparts (??).

As such, counterbalancing may work to undermine coups, as dividing the military may make coordination more difficult (?) or because it creates incentives for those separate branches to resist a coup (?). The empirical record on the effect of counterbalancing on coup attempts is mixed; some scholars argue that counterbalancing increases the likelihood of a future coup (??), whereas others argue that it decreases future coup attempts (?). Others provide nuance to the relationship, showing that counterbalancing reduces coup attempts by elite military officers (?) and that after a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations, there is a positive association between counterbalancing and coup attempts (?). There is some evidence that while counterbalancing may have a mixed record in preventing coups, it does have a better record at reducing the likelihood of a successful coup (??).

There is also contradicting empirical evidence as to what level of coup risk prompts counterbalancing. Coup risk is the likelihood of an attempted coup occurring within a given state, and is typically conceived of as the structural factors that motivate an elite’s willingness and ability to attempt a coup, such as past coups, regime legitimacy and democracy, the extant role of the military in the regime, and economic wealth (??). These structural factors do not include coup “triggers,” or the “short-term crises that precipitate a coup,” which, in the absence of structural causes, may not prompt a coup attempt (? , 598). Some scholars have argued that when many of these structural factors are present, leaders are more likely

to engage in coup-proofing (??). More recent work suggests that at high levels of coup risk, efforts to reduce the military's ability to engage in a coup can actually prompt the military into launching a coup; because of this, leaders should coup-proof at low or moderate levels of coup risk. (??).

In sum, coup-proofing can take many forms. While some scholars have suggested spoiling the military to incentivize obedience and loyalty, others have demonstrated that weakening the military can be an effective means of reducing coup likelihood. One common way of weakening the military is to “counterbalance” it with other organizations, by dividing the military into smaller, separate factions, or by creating parallel organizations that can act as a check against the military.

4 Theory: Peacekeeping as Coup-Proofing

When deciding to engage in counterbalancing, leaders have a choice of whether to divide the military into smaller, separate units or to create new rival organizations. Both are choices to weaken the military, but keep it operating internally. We argue that a third way of counterbalancing the military is by sending personnel abroad. By physically removing military personnel out of the country, the size of the domestic military forces has been reduced, while preventing an increase in recently unemployed and dissatisfied former military members that may occur from other initiatives to reduce the size of the military, such as purging. This can make coordinating a coup more difficult, as members of the security personnel have been removed from the country and are likely to have reduced communication. Moreover, in contributing personnel to peacekeeping operations, potential coup-plotters are further away from the regime and less involved with domestic politics, reducing the likelihood of coup opportunity. Contributing members of the security apparatus, therefore, can be a viable way of splintering the military and reducing its ability to plan a coup.

However, leaders may not want to counterbalance all types of security personnel equally.

In sending personnel abroad as peacekeepers, those peacekeepers may receive better quality training and experience, as well as compensation and status, as compared to the domestic counterparts (????).³ Peacekeepers from Bangladesh make roughly \$1000 per month abroad, compared to about \$180 domestically (?). This may enable those peacekeepers to gain the capabilities and resources that may make a coup more likely (??). Moreover, the increased effectiveness via foreign training that is associated with contributing peacekeeping personnel (???) may increase the likelihood of a coup (??). Indeed, military officers involved in the 1987, 2000 and 2006 coups in Fiji all served as commanders in peacekeeping operations (??), and the leader of the 2007 coup in Bangladesh was a commander in the operation in Rwanda. Therefore, in contrast to current scholarship and expectations, peacekeeping may at times serve as a platform to facilitate coups.

Thus, leaders face a trade-off. On one hand, deploying personnel to peacekeeping missions may increase their training, which could increase coup-risk. On the other hand, deployments ensure a crucial continued source of income. As previously explained, the United Nations provides monthly compensation to states for each personnel member they provide; this additional income may be crucial to leaders who are choosing to create new military organizations to counter the army, or who need income to reward loyalists. One solution to this problem is for states to strategically choose which members of the security sector to deploy and which to keep at home. How, then, do leaders decide which personnel to send abroad?

We assume that leaders have two goals with respect to coup-proofing. First, they want to prevent coordination by any would-be coup plotter. Second, leaders want to prevent these would-be coup plotters from gaining the skills or resources that will increase the likelihood of future coups.

Elites in the military have to coordinate with one another to launch a coup, and typically

³Whether peacekeeping participation is associated with improved status and training may be dependent upon the quality and culture of the national security forces. However, given that most troop contributing and police contributing countries are from democratizing and less economically prosperous countries, it is likely that peacekeeping deployments are seen as a rewarding experience.

do not rely on mass force or violence to coup (?). Rank and file soldiers coordinate with other to coup as well, but larger numbers are needed to successfully plan a coup. Likewise, these coup plotters often need to rely on mass force to capture the regime (?). So, elites need comparatively fewer resources to coordinate a coup. By sending higher-ranking officials to a peacekeeping operation, they continue to grow the skills and training that might make them more dangerous coup-plotter in the future. This makes officials more dangerous to send, as they face fewer obstacles to coordination. With lower extant costs of coordination and increased effectiveness, these elites pose a greater threat after deploying to peacekeeping operations. Moreover, these higher-ranking military officers are fewer in number, which makes domestically monitoring their actions easier.

While sending the rank and file to peacekeeping operations may also increase their ability to coup via increased training, these soldiers are not likely to be as skilled or effective as their higher ranking counterparts. Therefore, the marginal benefit of additional training is less dangerous on rank and file soldiers. Likewise, this group of personnel already face sufficiently large coordination costs due to the number of personnel and resources required to coup. This coordination cost is increased by deploying the rank and file to peacekeeping operations, as they are now further removed from their fellow potential coup-plotters. Additionally, monitoring the rank and file is more difficult, due to the larger number of this type of personnel.

Leaders should therefore be more willing to deploy the rank and file members of the military to peacekeeping operations, rather than those of higher positions. Higher ranking military elites are more likely to be deployed as military observers; considered experts on missions, the United Nations requires that its military observers hold at least the rank of Major or Captain, but accepts ranks as high as Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel (?). These standards do not apply to troop contributions. Those personnel that form up the peacekeeping troops are therefore rank and file soldiers. Based on this logic, leaders engaging in coup-proofing should be more likely to increase troop contributions and decrease observer

contributions. This leads to hypotheses 1 and 2:

Hypothesis 1: As coup-proofing efforts increase, troop contributions increase.

Hypothesis 2: As coup-proofing efforts increase, observer contributions decrease.

Next to consider is how leaders will manipulate police contributions in the wake of coup-proofing. Police are a viable component of the security apparatus, and can play a crucial role in paramilitary organizations. Forming paramilitary groups is often a key counterbalancing strategy (??), and most paramilitary groups are “specialist forces supposed to perform a particular domestic security function” (204 ?), such as gendarmeries or national guards, and are often made up of party loyalists or coethnics (??). This loyalty, then, reduces the threat of coup from within the paramilitary. One way to continue to ensure both higher quality paramilitary personnel and their continued loyalty is to privilege the paramilitary with the rewards of peacekeeping. By contributing paramilitary members to peacekeeping operations, leaders ensure that they receive better training and higher pay than the regular military, maintaining the divide between the two. Again, the threat of the paramilitary using this compensation and training in a future coup is reduced due the likelihood of the paramilitary being comprised of loyalists.⁴

The United Nations has indeed recently seen a rise in the contribution of paramilitary personnel serving in its missions, which typically serve in formed police units (?), and has been criticized for its selection of paramilitary group members that have been associated with pro-government repression (??). It may be that this increase in the contribution of paramilitary personnel is an attempt to reward those special forces used to the balance reg-

⁴A potential concern could be that while abroad, the paramilitary becomes ingrained with, and perhaps loyal to, the military. For this to be the case, however, troop and police contributions from the same country would have to be 1) located at the same base, and 2) spending sufficient time together. We argue that this is not likely due to the greater distribution of UN troops subnationally. There are a greater number of peacekeeper bases that host troops than there are peacekeeper bases that host police. Thus, troops are more likely to be distributed across the country, reducing the likelihood that a contributed police officer is with any given soldier. Because it seems that paramilitary deploy as police (?), it seems that paramilitary have a reduced likelihood of being clustered with their troop counterparts.

ular armed forces. While not all police contributions from leaders engaging in coup-proofing may be of the paramilitary variety, evidence suggests that paramilitary personnel are becoming an increasingly important part of police contributions (?). Moreover, while we cannot separate between regular police and paramilitary police contributions with the extant data, there is little theoretical motivation to expect a large increase or decrease in the number of regular police personnel, as the threat of coup from these actors is likely low. Therefore, if we see any major changes in the composition of police contributions, it is likely to be from paramilitary groups. This leads to Hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3: As coup-proofing efforts increase, police contributions increase.

5 Research Design

The expectations laid out in the previous section are tested empirically with country-year data by testing for a correlation between coup-proofing behavior and peacekeeping contribution. In the following section, we describe the variables of interest and model selection.

5.1 Outcome Variables and Model Selection

We hope to explain the choice to contribute domestic personnel from the security apparatus to peacekeeping operations. To do so, we rely on data on UN member state peacekeeping contributions from 1992 to 2010 (?). The data used are disaggregated by personnel type, indicating the total number of police, military, and observers contributed by each member-state in each month. Because we are conducting analyses at the year level, we aggregate the peacekeeping data to average the number of troops, police, and observers contributed each year; this average leads to our three dependent variables, *Yearly Troops*, *Yearly Police*, and *Yearly Observers*. Similar work using these data has instead used the number of personnel volunteer in December of each year; our results are robust to this alternative specification.

On average, a member-state will contribute 227 troops, 28 police, and 9 observers per year, although contributions can range as high as 9,847, 2,041, and 287, respectively. However, many member-states choose to not contribute peacekeeping personnel; 2,131 country-year observations do not have any type of personnel contribution. We employ ordinary least squares regression to facilitate interpretation of the results, but the results are robust to the use of negative binomial regression, as seen in the appendix.

5.2 Independent Variables

To measure the amount of coup-proofing that leaders are engaging in, we utilize two common measures from the coup literature: the number of effective rival ground force organizations and the size of the paramilitary.

First, the number of effective rival ground forces is taken from the root of Belkin and Schofer’s research on counterbalancing (??). To capture the degree of counterbalancing that leaders engage in, Belkin and Schofer combine the number of a country’s military and paramilitary organizations with the ratio of troop members across these organizations. ? improve on this measure by excluding from this index non-ground force organizations, as they argue that these organizations cannot quickly capture key institutions within the regime. They also exclude the organizations that are likely to be components of the regular military, but intended to coup proof, such as the navy and the air force. Their measure of effective organizations considers the share of personnel across the various ground-combat organizations. An effective number of one indicates that a state only has one effective ground-combat organization (i.e., that there is no counterbalancing), whereas higher values indicate that more rival organizations exist and that counterbalancing efforts have increased. We rely on Pilster and Bohmelt’s construction of the count of effective organizations, $C_{i,t}$:

$$C_{i,t} = \frac{1}{\sum_j s_{i,j}^2} \tag{1}$$

where $C_{i,t}$ shows the level of counterbalancing in country i in year t , $s_{i,j}$ is the share of personnel in organization j . This variable, labeled *Effective Number* ranges from 1 to 5.4105. Pilster and Bohmelt use “Military Balance” statistics from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) to create this measure.

Second, we consider the raw size of the paramilitary relative to the total size of the ground-combat forces. To do this, we follow other work (?) in using the following ratio to create the second key independent variable, *Paramilitary Ratio*:

$$\frac{\sum(PM_{i,t})}{\sum(PM_{i,t} + M_{i,t})} \quad (2)$$

where $PM_{i,t}$ is the number of personnel across all ground-combat paramilitary groups in country i at year t , and $M_{i,t}$ is the number of personnel across all ground-combat regular military organizations in country i at year t . Considering the size of the paramilitary is important, because while excluding non-ground-combat forces is important in eliminating organizations not intended to be part of a coup-proofing attempt, there are still some organizations included in *Effective Number* that may be missed. For example, the United States Marine Corps has a ground combat element (GCE) that would likely be included in the creation of the effective number of organizations, but it is highly unlikely that the creation of the GCE was intended to reduce the likelihood of a coup from the US Army. By considering the size of the paramilitary relative to the regular military, we can more directly examine those countries that are engaging in counterbalancing the military, getting us conceptually closer to the variable in question. We use the ratio compiled in ?; like ?, the author also collected data from the IISS to create this ratio. Data on the ratio between the paramilitary and military range stop in 2003, giving us a temporal span of 1992 to 2003 for the second set of analyses.⁵ Both independent variables are lagged by one year, as attempts to coup-proof and contribute peacekeeping personnel may not be immediate.

⁵The first set of analyses, capturing the relationship between the number of effective organizations and peacekeeping contributions, span from 1992 to 2010, as ? updated the range of their data to match that of the peacekeeping contribution data from ?.

Several controls are also included in the models. First, we control for whether or not there was a successful military or government coup in the previous year (?), as well as the years since a successful coup occurred, given that a consistent predictor of future coups is past coups (??). We use these data to separate out the dynamics between government and military coups; a history of military coups, as compared to a government coup, may make a government more wary of the military. Likewise, if the military successfully took control of power, it might face different incentives than the government in manipulating how members of the security apparatus are contributed to peacekeeping operations. Due to the important of non-linear time trends in predicting the effect of failed coups on personnel contributions in ?, we also include the squared value of the years since a successful military or government coup.

We control for features of the contributor country's military, including its total military expenditure in US dollars (?), as states with higher military expenditures may not need to contribute as many peacekeepers as compared to those who do not (?), and will have more resources to counterbalance with. We also control for the total number of personnel in the military, including the non-ground force personnel excluded from the calculation of our independent variables (?).⁶ States with larger militaries have more personnel to contribute to operations, but also face more members of the military that can launch a coup.

We also control for whether or not a country is engaged in a civil war (?), as internal conflict will reduce the opportunity to contribute peacekeepers. Likewise, we control for the natural log of GDP per capita. Developing states are increasingly contributing peacekeepers in the post-Cold War era (?), and states with lower a GDP per capita are more likely to experience coups (?). Finally, we control for the level of democracy in a given country (?),⁷ as democracies are more likely to contribute peacekeepers (??). Table 1 contains the summary statistics for the independent variables, dependent variables, and controls used.

⁶This variable was constructed using data from the World Bank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Military Balance.

⁷We conceptualize democracy as scoring a six or above on the Polity scale.

	Variable	N	Mean	SD	Max	Min
Independent Variables	Effective Number	3096	1.70	0.66	5.41	1.00
	Paramilitary Ratio	1353	0.38	0.22	0.97	0.01
Dependent Variables	N. Yearly Troops	3853	227.26	834.61	9847.42	0.00
	N. Yearly Police	3853	28.36	99.03	1804.42	0.00
	N. Yearly Observers	3853	9.54	19.50	287.58	0.00
Control Variables	Yrs Gov't Coup	3853	73.22	18.52	90.00	0.00
	Yrs Mil Coup	3853	61.69	29.41	92.00	0.00
	Gov't Coup (Dummy)	3823	0.00	0.05	1.00	0.00
	Mil Coup (Dummy)	3823	0.01	0.09	1.00	0.00
	Civil War (Dummy)	3818	0.03	0.18	1.00	0.00
	Democracy (Dummy)	3818	0.55	0.50	1.00	0.00
	lnGDP/capita	3597	8.48	1.28	11.54	4.89
	Mil. Expend	2782	8312.41	45903.80	768465.84	0.00
Mil. Size	3062	266.29	320.69	968.00	1.00	

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables

To recap, we employ ordinary least squares regression to explore the relationship between two independent variables that measure the degree of coup-proofing - the effective number of rival ground-combat organizations and the size of the paramilitary relative to the total number of ground-combat forces - on the three types of peacekeeping personnel contributions, troops, police, and observers. The temporal range for the first set of analyses, which uses the lagged effective number as the independent variable, is from 1992 to 2010; the temporal range for the second set of analyses, evaluating the lagged size of the paramilitary, ranges from 1992 to 2003. In the following section, we will present the results of these analyses.

6 Results

Interesting, the results provide consistent support for Hypothesis 2, and mixed support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. Table 2 presents the relationship between the number of effective rival organizations. In line with the predictions of Hypotheses 1 and 2, troop and police contri-


A rectangular box containing the text "troop_plot.pdf".

Figure 1: Predicted Troop Contributions by Counterbalancing Measure

butions are significantly increasing with *Effective Number*. As one additional organization is created, roughly 119 additional troops and 26 additional police are contributed to peacekeeping operations. These are sizable increases of personnel, given that the average state contributes about 227 troops and 28 police; these reflect 52% and 93% increases from the average contribution, respectively. These substantive effects can be seen in Figures 1 and 2, Panel B. However, contrary to the prediction of Hypothesis 3, Table 2 reveals a positive and significant correlation between *Effective Number* and the number of contributed observers.

Additionally, Table 2 also demonstrates a negative relationship between a history of government coups and personnel contributions; this effect dissipates with time, as indicated by the positive coefficient on *Years Since Government Coup*². Interestingly, this relationship only holds for police contributions when examining the years since a successful military coup. Likewise, there is evidence that states with smaller GDPs per capita are contributing more peacekeepers, in line with the evidence of increased burden-sharing by non-Western, developing states (?). Likewise, states with larger military budgets are more likely to contribute all types of personnel, and states with larger militaries are more likely to send troops.

Table 3 demonstrates the relationship between the size of the paramilitary relative to the total number of ground-combat forces in a country and peacekeeping contributions. In support of Hypothesis 2, *Paramilitary Ratio* is positively and significantly associated with police contributions. Contrary to the findings in Table 2, we find a lack of support for Hypothesis 1. Those states that increase their paramilitaries are significantly *less* likely to contribute troops. Although it fails to achieve statistical significance, *Paramilitary Ratio* is negatively associated with observer contributions, in line with Hypothesis 3.

Again, these results show an initial negative relationship with a history of successful

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		
	Troops (1)	Police (2)	Observers (3)
Effective Number Lag	118.867*** (30.143)	25.919*** (3.452)	2.583*** (0.675)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup	-29.447*** (5.070)	-3.220*** (0.581)	-0.066 (0.114)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup ²	0.264*** (0.048)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.001 (0.001)
Yrs Since Mil Coup	0.486 (3.869)	-0.948** (0.443)	-0.017 (0.087)
Yrs Since Mil Coup ²	-0.009 (0.038)	0.012*** (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.001)
Gov't Coup Lag	324.065 (390.813)	-56.825 (44.759)	1.989 (8.752)
Mil Coup Lag	-351.439 (217.084)	-26.914 (24.862)	1.449 (4.862)
Civil War Lag	-60.044 (103.388)	2.692 (11.841)	-5.980*** (2.315)
Democracy Lag	67.783 (44.209)	1.803 (5.063)	1.587 (0.990)
ln GDP/Capita Lag	-47.606** (19.410)	-8.837*** (2.223)	1.011** (0.435)
Mil. Expend	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.0005*** (0.00005)	0.0001*** (0.00001)
Mil. Size	0.253*** (0.064)	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.001)
Constant	1,079.691*** (195.432)	118.169*** (22.383)	2.452 (4.377)
Observations	2,547	2,547	2,547
R ²	0.039	0.083	0.032
Adjusted R ²	0.034	0.079	0.027
Residual Std. Error (df = 2534)	988.368	113.197	22.135
F Statistic (df = 12; 2534)	8.512***	19.156***	6.873***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: IV: Effective Number

police_plot.pdf

Figure 2: Predicted Police Contributions by Counterbalancing Measure

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		
	Troops (1)	Police (2)	Observers (3)
Para. Ratio Lag	-173.321* (97.700)	28.324*** (8.693)	-4.272 (2.896)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup	-16.759*** (5.966)	-2.023*** (0.531)	0.127 (0.177)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup ²	0.137** (0.060)	0.021*** (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)
Yrs Since Mil Cou	-1.402 (4.382)	-0.820** (0.390)	0.024 (0.130)
Yrs Since Mil Coup ²	0.011 (0.045)	0.011*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)
Gov't Coup Lag	1,389.014*** (374.887)	-19.519 (33.357)	15.463 (11.111)
Mil. Coup Lag	-221.483 (223.988)	7.797 (19.930)	13.089** (6.638)
Civil War Lag	-151.010 (93.873)	3.050 (8.353)	-7.283*** (2.782)
Democracy Lag	74.341 (45.201)	11.244*** (4.022)	0.015 (1.340)
ln GDP/Capita Lag	-83.373*** (21.676)	-7.409*** (1.929)	-0.659 (0.642)
Mil. Expend	0.023*** (0.002)	0.002*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0001)
Military Size	-0.032 (0.065)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.004** (0.002)
Constant	1,400.057*** (211.853)	99.274*** (18.850)	18.066*** (6.279)
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260
R ²	0.101	0.102	0.154
Adjusted R ²	0.092	0.093	0.146
Residual Std. Error (df = 1247)	706.057	62.823	20.926
F Statistic (df = 12; 1247)	11.667***	11.784***	18.897***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 3: IV: Paramilitary to Armed Forces Ratio

military and government coups and personnel contributions, which eventually dissipates over time. Although the long term relationship demonstrates a U-shaped relationship between a history of coups and contributions, *Government Coup Lag* shows that in the immediate year after a government coup, troop contributions increase dramatically. These results suggest a nuanced temporal relationship with peacekeeping contributions in the wake of a coup, and a relationship that is conditional on the type of actor overthrowing a regime. Moreover, given that ? find an inverted U relationship between years since a failed coup and peacekeeping contributions, our results suggest that there is a difference in strategy following successful versus failed coups.

In sum, while both measures of coup-proofing reveal an increase in police contributions, they quickly diverge in direction with respect to troop and observer contributions. Increasing the size of the paramilitary is associated with a significant decrease in the number of observers volunteered, whereas increasing the number of rival organizations is associated with an increase in both troops and observers.

7 Discussion

While the results presented in this paper provide consistent support for the use of police contributions as coup-proofing, there is mixed evidence for how troop and observer contributions are made. These results raise questions as to how leaders choose to allocate their militaries to peacekeeping operations; given that both strategies of increasing the paramilitary size and increasing the number of rival organizations results in increased police contributions, why do the two strategies return different troop contributions? Exploring a simple scatterplot with a smoothed line of best fit between the two counterbalancing measures yields some information about this puzzle.

It seems clear that at low to moderate levels of both paramilitary sizes and effective organizations, there is a positive and linear relationship between the two. However, when




Figure 3: Scatterplot of Paramilitary Ratio and N. Effective Organizations

leaders begin to engage in high levels of these actions, there is far more variation; indeed, the trend takes on a clear U shape. Moreover, very few observations take on the highest values for both types of counterbalancing action. This could be informative, then, of differential strategies of counterbalancing. Those leaders that choose to heavily invest in a large paramilitary may not need to create many effective organizations, as the paramilitary is sufficiently strong to insulate the leader from military threats. Likewise, leaders that build many rival organizations do not need the paramilitary to be stronger than the others, as each organization is sufficiently weak due to this division. If that is the case, then it could be that leaders creating many rival organizations send more peacekeeping as a means of ensuring the weakness of each branch; by sending increased numbers of troops and police, leaders are ensuring that weakness. Likewise, leaders that have a sufficiently large paramilitary do not need to send troops to ensure the military's weakness, as it is already weak.

Curiously, however, those leaders choosing to create multiple rival organizations still choose to send increased numbers of observers. As observers tend to be higher-ranking military officers, we predicted that coup-proofing leaders should send fewer observers, as these are the military personnel who may pose the greatest risk of a future coup. This contrary result may be evidence that this type of military personnel are not actually the ones engaging in coups, or that leaders have sufficient means of disincentivizing a coup from them. Perhaps sending them abroad, to receive additional compensation, is a way of ensuring their loyalty. Additionally, leaders may hope that by sending military observers abroad they can at least temporarily delay a coup while leaders are sent abroad. Thus, deploying military elites as observers may be a stalling tactic while leaders attempt to gain greater control over the military.

These results suggest that future work should continue to probe into whether creating

multiple organizations and creating large paramilitaries have a substitution effect at high levels; when and why do we see leaders engaging in both, and when and why do we see leaders choosing one over the other? Likewise, future work should see how peacekeeping contributions are related to other types of coup-proofing behavior, such as purging. Is there something unique about counterbalancing and peacekeeping, or are these relationships common across other mechanisms of protecting leaders from the military?

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we developed a theory of peacekeeping contributions as coup-proofing. Leaders have an incentive to contribute to peacekeeping operations as a way of ensuring continued income, which can fund further coup-proofing measures. Given that incentive, we argue that leaders should deploy those actors that pose the least threat to them to ensure the continued benefits of peacekeeping, and avoid sending the actors that pose the greatest threat to them to maintain a strong ability to monitor potential defectors and coup-plotters. That logic would suggest that leaders should deploy increased numbers of rank and file troops, as they face larger obstacles to coordinating a coup, and paramilitary personnel, as they tend to have greater loyalty to the regime. Coup-proofing leaders should not send the higher officials that would serve as observers, as they pose the greatest risk of a successful coup. Moreover, because peacekeeping provides training and funding opportunities to its personnel, participating in a peacekeeping operation provides direct benefits to those paramilitary members, rewarding their loyalty and possibly increasing their training relative to the domestic military. Because rank and file troops face large coordination obstacles and require great resources in order to launch a coup, the marginal benefit of the training and resources provided by peacekeepers is smaller for rank and file as compared to higher ranking officials.

We find some support for this argument. Leaders that increase the size of their paramilitaries deploy more police, but decrease the numbers of troops and observers that they

send, whereas leaders that choose to increase the number of rival military organizations send increased numbers of all types of personnel. The robust finding for police contributions suggests that it is a common tactic of coup-proofing leaders. This underscores the increased importance of police contributions to UN peacekeeping. However, the divergent findings for observers and troops may suggest competing strategies by leaders who engage in different types of coup-proofing. Thus, these findings highlight the need for continued research exploring how leaders strategically manipulate peacekeeping deployments to decide both how many peacekeepers to send, but also *who* to send and how these decisions are intricately tied with domestic security threats and politics.

This paper contributes to a nascent literature on the relationship between coups and peacekeeping operations (??). The results presented here suggest that participating in peacekeeping is not rooted in normatively values of peace and stability, but is a strategy of ensuring ideal domestic conditions. While ? suggests that the reduced likelihood of coups that follows peacekeeping contributions, we find evidence that it may be the result of successful coup-proofing. If leaders are able to successfully insulate themselves from threats, contributing to peacekeeping may at times then insulate and protect bad leaders, in line with the arguments laid out by ?. While there is often a need for increased peacekeepers on the ground (?), the means by which leaders fill that need may have troubling implications for domestic conditions.

9 Appendix

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		
	Troops (1)	Police (2)	Observers (3)
Effective Number Lag	0.173 (0.110)	0.664*** (0.088)	0.247*** (0.066)
Yrs Gov't Coup	-0.050*** (0.018)	-0.071*** (0.015)	-0.007 (0.011)
Yrs Gov't Coup ²	0.0005** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Yrs Mil. Coup	0.008 (0.014)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.007 (0.008)
Yrs Mil. Coup ²	-0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0003*** (0.0001)	0.00003 (0.0001)
Lag Gov't Coup	0.014 (1.420)	-0.872 (1.140)	-0.029 (0.853)
Lag Mil. Coup	-1.460* (0.791)	-0.945 (0.634)	-0.131 (0.474)
Civil War Lag	0.002 (0.377)	-0.067 (0.302)	-0.659*** (0.227)
Democracy Lag	0.288* (0.161)	0.0002 (0.129)	0.155 (0.097)
ln GDP/Capita Lag	-0.208*** (0.071)	-0.123** (0.057)	0.084** (0.042)
Mil. Expend.	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00001*** (0.00000)	0.00000*** (0.00000)
Mil. Size	0.0004 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.00001 (0.0001)
Constant	7.860*** (0.712)	4.430*** (0.570)	1.700*** (0.427)
Observations	2,547	2,547	2,547
Log Likelihood	-9,837.000	-7,946.000	-7,756.000
θ	0.077*** (0.002)	0.121*** (0.004)	0.218*** (0.007)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	19,699.000	15,918.000	15,537.000

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Effective Number, Negative Binomial Results

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>		
	Troops	Police	Observers
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Para. Ratio Lag	-1.230** (0.525)	1.414*** (0.398)	-0.110 (0.308)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup	-0.019 (0.032)	-0.051** (0.024)	0.004 (0.019)
Yrs Since Gov't Coup ²	0.00003 (0.0003)	0.0005** (0.0002)	-0.0001 (0.0002)
Yrs Since Mil Coup	0.024 (0.024)	-0.012 (0.018)	0.009 (0.014)
Yrs Since Mil Coup ²	-0.0003 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0001)
Lag Gov't Coup	0.917 (2.013)	-0.174 (1.527)	0.726 (1.175)
Lag Mil Coup	-0.583 (1.203)	0.457 (0.913)	0.525 (0.704)
Civil War Lag	-0.677 (0.504)	-0.277 (0.383)	-0.881*** (0.299)
Democracy Lag	0.145 (0.243)	0.144 (0.184)	-0.064 (0.143)
ln GDP/Capita Lag	-0.445*** (0.116)	-0.176** (0.088)	-0.023 (0.068)
Mil Expend	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)	0.0001*** (0.00001)
Mil. Size	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.001** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0002)
Constant	10.416*** (1.138)	4.913*** (0.864)	2.991*** (0.669)
Observations	1,260	1,260	1,260
Log Likelihood	-4,394.889	-3,697.340	-3,621.336
θ	0.070*** (0.003)	0.121*** (0.006)	0.206*** (0.010)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,815.779	7,420.680	7,268.672

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 5: Paramilitary to Military Ratio, Negative Binomial Results