

The Internationalization of Security Sector Gender Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries

Laura Huber
Emory University

Sabrina Karm
Cornell University

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Abstract

With the passing of several UN Security Council Resolutions related to Women, Peace and Security (WPS), gender balancing security sector reforms (SSR)—or policies that ensure the equal participation of women in the security sector—have received increased global attention over the past two decades. However, to date, there is no explanation for variation in their adoption. This paper examines the internationalization of SSR gender reform, arguing that the presence of a peacekeeping mission within a post-conflict country affects the state's resources and political will to adopt gender balancing reforms. We explore the effect of multidimensional peacekeeping using an original dataset on SSR in post-conflict countries, the Security Sector Reform Dataset (SSRD), from 1989 to 2012. We find that peacekeeping missions increase the probability that a state adopts gender balancing reforms in SSR. As the first cross-national quantitative examination of gender balancing reforms, these findings also shed light on the conditions under which states adopt security sector reforms more generally.

Key Words: Security Sector Reform, Gender, Conflict, Post-Conflict

Word Count: 7,463

Introduction

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed the groundbreaking Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS).¹ With the passing of this Resolution, the Security Council identified women as vital agents in conflict and security,² launching a wave of gender-focused security sector reforms. In the past fifteen years, gender reforms in security institutions have been increasingly advocated as vital to security sector reform (SSR). However, despite the increase in implementation, especially in post-conflict states, states vary in their adoption of gender-focused security sector reforms. This paper explores the variation in gender balancing reforms in post-conflict countries.³ These reforms aim to increase the number of women relative to men in the security sector, so that women and men are equally represented (Mazurana, Raven-Roberts & Parpart 2005). Specifically, this study considers multiple SSR gender balancing policies, including security sector gender quotas, female-focused recruitment campaigns, the removal of restricted gender security roles, appointments of women to high-level security positions and the adoption of National Action Plans for UNSCR 1325 (NAPs).⁴

Given the considerable literature that demonstrates that security sectors dominated by men and patriarchy can be harmful to the security of women (Cohen & Nordås 2014; Karim 2016*c*; Karim & Beardsley 2013, 2016; Nordås & Rustad 2013),⁵ and the consistent evidence that gender equality promotes peace (Bjarnegård & Melander 2011; Caprioli 2000, 2003, 2005; Caprioli & Boyer 2001; Hudson & Den Boer 2002; Hudson et al. 2013; Melander 2005*a,b*), understanding how to achieve gender equality in security is an important task. Increasing women's representation in the security sector could dismantle the power structures that contribute to violence against women and may also contribute to improving gender equality more broadly (Karim

& Beardsley 2017). Yet, despite the importance of gender balancing and the growing WPS literature, the motivations for states to adopt SSR gender balancing policies and the reasons for gender policy variation are understudied.

We contend that variation in gender balancing adoption occurs primarily because states vary in resources and political will to implement costly gender reforms. Therefore, we propose that the presence of a UN multidimensional peacekeeping mission reduces both economic and political costs for adopting gender balancing reforms. Using the new and original Security Sector Reform Dataset (SSRD), we find that post-conflict states with peacekeeping missions are significantly more likely to adopt gender balancing reforms.

Security Sector Reforms and Gender Balancing

SSR, or the restructuring of the security sector, is a vital component in the reconstruction of post-conflict states. SSR refers to changes to the state's security sector activities (Karim 2016*a*), usually undertaken by a state and its partners to improve the provision of safety, security and justice to its citizens.⁶ Post-conflict states are often weak and require state building, such as SSR (Lake 2016). SSR also assists in preventing conflict resurgence. For example, Toft (2010) argues that SSR is necessary to enforce peace agreements and thus assists in conflict prevention.

Gender balancing is one type of security sector reform. The goal of gender balancing is to increase the proportion of women relative to men in all parts of the security organization. There are at least five types of gender balancing. First, states may adopt quotas for women in the security sector. For example, Liberia adopted a 15% quota for women in its police force in 2005, which it later expanded to a 30% quota in 2012. Quotas are increasingly popular, with several post-conflict countries, such as Kosovo and

Sierra Leone, establishing quotas in their police and militaries. Second, states also implement female-focused recruitment drives that target women for recruitment into the security sector. As an example, Bangladesh's Police Strategic Plan (2008-2011) helped recruit 3,000 female police officers. During these recruitment drives, states may create all-female units or female-focused institutions, such as female police stations.

States may also remove restrictions of women from certain security roles or permit them to enter previously male-only institutions. For example, in 1993, the Philippines allowed women to join military academies, and in 2006, Senegal first permitted women to enter the Gendarmerie. Furthermore, gender balancing may be achieved through the promotion of women into high ranking positions. For instance, in Azerbaijan, Natavan Mirvatova was promoted to major general, the third highest military rank in the state and the highest position to which a female has been elevated in the country.⁷ Finally, states may adopt NAPs for UNSCR 1325, which detail how the Resolution will be implemented and provide a national framework for gendered SSR. Despite doubts of NAP's facilitation of gender balancing (Basini & Ryan 2016), these plans demonstrate state awareness of these policies.

Gender balancing is not the only type of gender reform in SSR. Gender mainstreaming is also cited as a way to transform the security sector by integrating a gender perspective in all security operations. Gender mainstreaming, as defined by the UN, refers to "the integration of the gender perspective into every stage of policy processes—design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation—with a view to promote gender equality" (A/52/3/Rev.1 1997, 27). While gender mainstreaming policies are important, policymakers and scholars have struggled to interpret how to conceptualize and implement mainstreaming policies (Arat 2015; Karim 2017). As a result, the focus of this study is on gender balancing only, as there is more clarity in its definition and because states have been particularly proactive in its implementation.

Gender Balancing in Post-Conflict Countries

Security sectors hold deeply gendered norms, hierarchies and policies (Enloe 1989, 2000; Sjoberg & Via 2010). Security has long been viewed as a male domain, while women are portrayed as the benefactors of security or the innocent victims of security lapses (Elshtain 1987; Goldstein 2003). Moreover, the militarized environment of the security sector is often hostile to women (Higate & Henry 2004, 2009; Karim & Beardsley 2017; Sjoberg & Via 2010). As a result of gender roles and this masculinized culture, women's participation in security remains low (Goldstein 2003).

The masculine nature of security institutions often results in policies misrepresenting, overlooking or mishandling women's (and men's) security. For example, as discussed by "Enforcement of Sexual Violence Law in Post-Civil Conflict Societies," in post-conflict states women commonly suffer from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Highly patriarchal security institutions may be unwilling or ill-equipped to address SGBV (Hendricks 2011). These security institutions are sometimes even the perpetrators of sexual violence and exploitation (Cohen & Nordås 2014; Karim & Beardsley 2016, 2017; Nordås & Rustad 2013). Patriarchal security sectors, thus sometimes, jeopardize the physical security of the state and the population, while also reinforcing harmful gender norms.

The end of a conflict provides a unique opportunity to create entry points for gender-focused security sector reforms. First, women's experiences during and after conflict may shift gender roles and norms to challenge male control of the security sector. As discussed by "The Effect of Sexual Violence on Negotiated Outcomes in Civil Conflicts," women's roles during and after conflict may differ markedly from their traditional role in society. Most prominently, this change occurs when women participate as combatants. Shattering feminine ideals that women are inherently peaceful, innocent, and nonviolent, as described by Sjoberg's article, women's participation in combat

directly demonstrates their agency to act violently, serve within a militarized organization and “protect” their families. This experience and their visibility as combatants may challenge gender norms that women are not suitable for the security sector.

Less dramatic displays of women’s agency within conflict also weaken traditional gender norms. For example, women often have to fill male roles as breadwinners for families, economic laborers, protectors of the family and mediators of inter-personal conflicts while men are recovering from injuries or killed (Carpenter 2005). “The Social Origins of Female Combatants” explains that in gender equitable states, women are more likely to participate in rebel groups. Similarly, after conflict, traditional gender norms may be weakened, allowing women’s access to the security sector. Further, scholars have found that gender equality increases after wars (Melander 2016).


Second, after conflict, the population may distrust the security sector, because it was implicated in much of the violence that occurred during the war, including sexual violence (Cohen & Nordås 2015; Eck & Hultman 2007). Certain reforms such as SSR gender reforms could increase the legitimacy of the security sector and attempt to break from past transgressions (Karim 2016*a*). Moreover, as discussed by Haglund and Richards’ article, while conflict may challenge gender roles, it also has negative effects on women as they are displaced, suffer from physical, emotional, or mental ailments, lack access to resources and institutions, and suffer from SGBV. Therefore, gendered security sector reforms may attempt to ameliorate the post-conflict insecurity of women by increasing women’s access to, comfort with and trust of security institutions.

Finally, as explored further below, after conflict, new actors may gain influence over state policymaking. In states with new or restored governments, inter-governmental organizations, such as the UN and peacekeeping missions, non-governmental organizations and other states may help govern the state to prevent conflict resurgence and assist in rebuilding efforts and SSR. These “new” actors largely shape the post-war

environment and influence the types of reforms adopted.

In these ways, the post-conflict environment offers a unique opportunity for successful SSR gender reforms. Among post-conflict states, we might expect to see widespread gender balancing. Yet, variation exists. Figure 1 shows the variation in SSR gender balancing across post-conflict states from 1989 to 2012. States in dark gray represent post-conflict states that have adopted at least one gender balancing reform, light gray post-conflict states are those which have not adopted any gender balancing reforms and states in white are either non-conflict or active conflict states.

Gender Balancing Reforms in Post Conflict States



Given limited resources, states must prioritize gender balancing sufficiently to warrant committing limited resources to it. In other words, states must have the willpower to make gender reforms a priority. Not all states possess this willpower,

particularly ones that have rigid gender norms about women's participation in security. Moreover, policymakers may fear opposition and backlash from committing resources to gender reforms over other reforms that are perhaps more oriented toward civilian protection. Further, security forces may be resistant to gender reform because of the security sector's traditional links to masculinity (Carreiras 2006).

One way to increase financial resources and the willpower of states to implement gender balancing is to involve third parties in SSR. International third parties, particularly multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions, play a significant role in peace and state building efforts in post-conflict countries. Since "An Agenda for Peace," in 1992, multidimensional peacekeeping missions have included a state building component in their mandates, which includes operations such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers (DDR), security sector reform, human rights and women's rights reforms, election monitoring and other development programs (Call & Cousens 2008; Doyle & Sambanis 2006).⁸ This change brought new resources to state building, which is funded by the UN or donor countries.⁹ While various third parties or other types of peacekeeping missions, such as observer missions, may influence state building, multidimensional peacekeeping missions are particularly influential as they often provide resources and an on-the-ground presence.

Peacekeeping missions may influence states' decisions to adopt gender balancing reforms in two ways. First, they bring additional funds and personnel to the state so that it has more resources to spend on SSR, which reduces the direct cost to the state of gendered SSR. Yet added resources do not guarantee that states will use the resources on gender balancing reforms. Thus, perhaps more importantly, peacekeeping missions may directly or indirectly influence states' decisions to adopt gender balancing reforms, because such reforms are in accordance with the international WPS agenda. Similar to a "second image reversed" approach (Pevehouse 2005), where international orga-

nizations influence state behavior by offering carrots and sticks (Hafner-Burton 2008) or through direct state building (Lake 2016), peacekeeping missions may incentivize states to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms.

Importantly, peacekeeping missions fund and implement certain types of institutions. The UN relies on donor country contributions, which requires it to prioritize policy changes desired by the donors, who, in aggregate, ascribe to international norms. Thus, the type of institutions that peacekeeping missions help build closely aligns to international policy agendas (Barnett & Finnemore 1999). Currently, the international community has increasingly prioritized the WPS agenda, and gender reforms in the security sector represent an avenue through which states can comply with this agenda. Thus, the UN encourages SSR gender reforms as a key component of national and international security. Consequently, UN peacekeeping missions are likely to facilitate the adoption of gender balancing reforms, due to the international community's and the UN's own expressed commitment to security sector gender equality.¹⁰ Specifically, peacekeeping missions may facilitate gender balancing through the mission's mandate or the actions of individual peacekeepers. When included in the mandate, peacekeepers are required to institute gender reforms in the mission and the host country. Currently, almost all peacekeeping missions have gender balancing mandates (Karim & Beardsley 2013). Furthermore, peacekeepers, particularly female peacekeepers, often take further initiative to encourage SSR gender reforms (Karim & Beardsley 2017).¹¹

As international influence increases, the state feels more pressure to comply with the demands of the international community, especially as its reputation and resources become tied with international favor. Peacekeeping missions are strong manifestations of international influence (Bush 2011). Given the state's recent conflict and likely damaged political system, infrastructure, economy and legitimacy, post-conflict states are highly dependent on and influenced by peacekeeping missions to rebuild and shape

state policymaking.

Finally, for states where gender norms are rigid, peacekeeping missions may provide political cover to implement contentious gender reforms as government officials place responsibility on the peacekeepers.¹² In other words, governments can shift blame onto the peacekeeping mission for enacting controversial policies. Because peacekeeping missions play a vital role in designing, resourcing and implementing SSR in post-conflict states, including gender balancing, and explicitly identify gender balancing as a priority, the presence of a peacekeeping mission may lead to the adoption of security sector gender balancing reforms.

Research Design

This analysis relies on data on post-conflict states from the new Security Sector Reform Dataset (Karim, Wagstaff & Huber n.d.). The SSRD is a country-year dataset containing variables on all post-conflict states between 1989 and 2012 with a total of 824 observations. A country enters the dataset at the end of a civil war—defined as more than 25 battle deaths in a country-year—and remains in the dataset until 2012. We examine only post-conflict states that experienced civil conflict, because these states are the most likely to undergo SSR. Summary statistics can be found in Table 1.

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable, *Gender Balance*, is a dichotomous indicator of whether a security sector gender balancing reform was adopted by the state in the country-year. As an aggregate measure, *Gender Balance* is coded as 1 if any of the following gender balancing policies are adopted: gender quotas, female-focused recruitment campaigns, the removal of restricted gender roles, appointments of women to high level security

positions, NAPs for UNSCR 1325, or a gender-focused policy that promotes the recruitment of women. Although the use of an aggregate measure obscures some variability within types of gender reform, it allows for a wide analysis of general gender balancing policies. Moreover, we choose to use a dichotomous measure, rather than a count of the number of reforms passed, to account for whether peacekeeping missions have any effect on SSR gender balancing rather than the magnitude of that effect.¹³ In total, 10.4% of state-years include gender balancing reforms. We use logistic regression with state-clustered standard errors to correct for autocorrelation.

The main independent variable is operationalized as the presence of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission. The variable, *Peacekeeping*, is a dichotomous measure of whether there was a multidimensional peacekeeping mission deployed in the country-year.¹⁴ In the sample, 8.6% of state-years have a peacekeeping mission.

Although multidimensional peacekeeping missions can occur within active conflict states, we limit our sample to post-conflict countries since our proposed causal mechanism may operate differently in conflict states. If a state is experiencing conflict, a peacekeeping mission may focus its resources and attention toward more traditional SSR reform to directly combat the fighting, rather than toward gender reforms. Therefore, while the conflict environment may also create opportunities for gender reform, both the peacekeeping mission and the government may be less likely to focus their attention and resources on gender reforms. Instead, gender balancing reforms may be adopted through other causal pathways, such as mobilization demands.¹⁵ Given our theoretical mechanisms, this study focuses on post-conflict gender balancing reforms, but future studies may examine the conditions under which conflict states adopt gender balancing reforms.

Control Variables

We use a number of control variables to account for alternative mechanisms that may promote or inhibit gender balancing.

To account for a state's existing commitment to women's rights, we include several controls for societal gender equality. First, we control for the number of years since the state ratified the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as recorded by the UN Treaty Collection Database. Adopted by the UN in 1979, CEDAW calls for gender equality through women's equal opportunities in public life. States that ratify CEDAW are legally bound to protect the rights of women, including in the security sector. Although CEDAW does not have an enforcement mechanism and its success at promoting women's rights is dependent upon the state's structural and cultural characteristics (Cole 2012), states are required to submit national reports on their compliance with CEDAW, which increases the state's and international community's attention to women's rights within the country. Further, as discussed by Haglund and Richards' article, CEDAW also proxies, albeit somewhat weakly, for domestic women's rights organizations (WRO), which may lobby for SSR gender reform since CEDAW has been shown to increase domestic mobilization around women's rights (Simmons 2009).¹⁶ Therefore, the longer a state has ratified CEDAW, the more likely that it should adopt SSR gender balancing reforms.¹⁷ The average number of years that CEDAW has been ratified is slightly less than 16.

Next, to account for women's political power, *Legislature Female* is the percentage of the national legislature that is female according to the World Bank and the Paxton, Green & Hughes (2008) data. As discussed by Haglund and Richards' article, female legislators may lead to favorable policies towards women's issues. Although women's descriptive representation cannot guarantee substantive representation, it is commonly linked to policy changes, which appear to reflect more 'feminine' values, such as more

concern for women's issues and less aggression (Bratton & Haynie 1999; Koch & Fulton 2011; Pitkin 1967). Therefore, female legislators may be more likely to encourage SSR gender balancing. This effect may be especially strong in post-conflict states since female legislators may gain unprecedented representation within the legislature as a result of shifting gender norms and a lack of qualified male politicians.¹⁸ On average, women constitute 13% of the legislature in post-conflict states.

Similarly, we control for *Legislative Quota* – whether the state has a legally mandated legislative gender quota or reserved seats as recorded by the *Quota Project*. Many states adopt legislative quotas to increase women's political representation. However, while gender quotas may increase female legislative representation and represent previous experience with gender balancing, they may not represent the female legislators' political power.¹⁹

Further, *Sexual Violence* is a continuous measure of the level of sexual violence which occurred during the last year of the conflict by all parties as determined by the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset (Cohen & Nordås 2014). As discussed by Chu and Braithwaite's article, sexual violence during conflict may lead the government to feel pressured to offer concessions to redeem its legitimacy. While Chu and Braithwaite's article examines negotiations with rebel groups to end a conflict, it is also possible that after a conflict, a government may feel obligated to make amends for sexual violence committed by implementing SSR gender reforms. By addressing gendered grievances, states may signal that they are not abusive or repressive. Moreover, states may hope to restore the protection gap and signal that it can protect its citizens through the implementation of reforms. Although the SVAC uses country-actor-year units of analysis, this study aggregates the observations to the country-year. The SVAC level of sexual violence in the last year of the conflict is repeated for all post-conflict years. While the variable ranges from 0 (limited sexual violence) to 2 (massive sexual

violence), in this sample, all states fall between 0 and 1 with a mean of 0.07.

Female Labor Ratio is the one-year lagged measure of the female labor force participation rate, or the percent of women between the ages of 15 to 24 in the labor force from the World Bank. Labor force participation indicates women's economic empowerment and proxies for women's participation in the public sphere to capture state-level gender equality. While economic equality may promote more security gender balancing as women and men demand that their equal economic representation be mirrored in the security sector, it may also decrease the need for gender balancing policies if the security sector already reflects the increased levels of female representation.²⁰ This variable reflects previous studies, which have used lagged measures of labor force participation to test for gender equality (See Caprioli (2003); Karim & Beardsley (2013, 2016); Melander (2005a)).

No Peace Agreement is a dichotomous indicator of whether a peace agreement exists between the main parties to the conflict, according to the University of Notre Dame's Peace Accord Matrix (Joshi & Darby 2013). *No Peace Agreement* is coded as 1 when there is no formal peace agreement between the main parties. Conflicts settled through a peace agreement represent a different type of conflict than ones that are settled through victory or are at low scale conflict (or ceasefire). Additionally, peace agreements may include provisions for SSR. Thus, when there is no peace agreement, states may be less likely to implement SSR, including gender balancing. Slightly less than half, 46.2%, of the states do not have a peace agreement.

Gender Peace Agreement is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether a peace agreement that specifically adopts a gendered perspective exists according to Bell (2015)'s Women and Peace Agreements Database (PA-X Women). Mentions of gender in a peace agreement may increase the probability of gender-based reforms.²¹ About 24% of state-years have a gendered peace agreement.

The variable *1325* indicates whether the observation occurs after the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000. UNSCR 1325 was the first official recognition that women's participation in security is vital to international and national peace, and therefore, gender balancing policy adoption becomes more probable after 2000 as the UN and its member states become obligated to promote women's participation in security.

GDPPC is a measure of state gross domestic product per capita. Wealthier states not only tend to have higher levels of gender equality, but also may have greater capacity to adopt SSR gender reforms. However, since wealthier states may have higher levels of gender equality, they may not require SSR gender balancing reforms. *GDPPC* comes from the World Bank and is lagged by one year.

Democracy is the Unified Democracy score (UDS) indicating the state regime type in the country-year (Pemstein, Meserve & Melton 2010). A state's regime type will likely influence the adoption of gender balancing policies, with democracies more willing to adopt them due to international norms and the observed relationship between democracy and gender equality (Bjarnegård & Melander 2011). *Democracy* is also lagged by one year.

Further, *Dem Transition* is a dichotomous variable of whether the state regime changed to a democracy in the year. Post-conflict states are apt to change the government regime, which may spur gender balancing as laws and security sectors are reformed. *Dem Transition* is coded as 1 if the UDS increased from less than 0.16 to 0.16 or greater from the previous year.

Moreover, *Time* is a count measure of the years since the last gender balancing policy was adopted. Since SSR gender balancing policies are highly interrelated, the adoption of one policy is likely to be correlated with the the adoption of other such policies. We use the approach by Carter & Signorino (2010) who use a cubic polynomial, which captures the hazard rate of the adoption of a new gender reform. More

specifically, it captures any hazard shape that is recovered by common parametric duration models such as a Weibull or log-logistic model. This approach avoids problems associated with time variable dummies and interpreting splines.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Peacekeeping	824	0.086	0.281	0	1
Gender Balance	824	0.10	0.31	0	1
CEDAW Years	777	15.67	7.55	0	35
Legislature Female	771	12.965	9.769	0.00	56.30
Legislative Quota	824	0.20	0.40	0	1
Sexual Violence	713	0.07	0.15	0.00	1.00
Female Labor Ratio	794	66.06	22.15	12.90	108.10
No Peace Agreement	824	0.46	0.50	0	1
Gender Peace Agreement	824	0.24	0.43	0	1
1325	824	0.67	0.47	0	1
GDPPC	800	3,345.35	6,544.25	50.04	41,567.40
Democracy	810	0.07	0.64	-1.63	2.00
Dem Transition	809	0.04	0.20	0	1
Time	824	6.964	5.52	0	24
Time ²	824	78.90	104.07	0	576
Time ³	824	1,092.03	1,992.34	0	13,824

Results and Discussion

The results support our hypothesis that peacekeeping missions should increase the probability of security sector gender balancing reforms. As seen in Table 2, Model 1 demonstrates that UN multidimensional peacekeeping missions have a strong, positive and statistically significant relationship with security sector gender balancing. Substantively, when a peacekeeping mission is present in a post-conflict state, that state is 22% more likely to adopt a security sector gender balancing policy, as seen in Figure 1.²² Without a peacekeeping mission, a state has a 51% probability of adopting a

gender balancing reform, whereas a state with a peacekeeping mission has a 73% likelihood. Therefore, peacekeeping missions are strongly correlated with gender balancing, increasing the probability of adoption by almost a quarter compared to states without missions.

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results – Peacekeeping and Security Gender Balancing

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Gender Balance
Peacekeeping	0.96*** (0.30)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.03)
Legislature Female	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.39 (0.40)
Sexual Violence	3.17*** (0.71)
Female Labor Ratio	0.001 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.24 (0.39)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.63 (0.39)
1325	0.50 (0.50)
GDPPC	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.22** (0.47)
Democracy	0.45 (0.32)
Time	-0.68*** (0.17)
Time ²	0.09*** (0.02)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.75*** (0.65)
Observations	619
R ²	0.20
χ ²	62.80*** (df = 15)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 State-clustered standard errors.

Further, several control variables merit discussion. First, the level of sexual violence in the last year of the conflict has a strong association with security sector gender balancing. This indicates that when sexual violence occurs during conflict, the post-war government may feel obligated to incorporate more women and gender reforms into the security sector. Further, states that are transitioning to a democracy are also

more likely to adopt security sector gender balancing reforms, as expected.

In contrast, other possible mechanisms to promote gender balancing, primarily CEDAW ratification and female legislative representation, do not influence security sector gender balancing. This means that although states may have political will (by ratifying CEDAW) to advocate for security sector gender balancing policies, gender issues may not be a priority area or they may lack the necessary resources to implement reforms. Further, women's legislative representation does not have a statistically significant relationship with the adoption of security sector gender balancing. This suggests that security sector gender balancing may be qualitatively distinct from other women's issues and highlights how descriptive representation does not guarantee substantive representation with security sector gender reforms.




Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities Plot: Peacekeeping Missions and Gender Balancing

Overall, these findings demonstrate the importance of international influence in the promotion of security sector gender balancing in post-conflict states. This is because peacekeeping missions may provide resources and influence the political will of post-conflict states so that they are more likely to implement such reforms. Although SSR is a domestic process, it may be deeply influenced by international pressure, norms and interests, especially when they correspond to increased resources. Therefore, while internal actors, policies and phenomena, such as CEDAW ratification, female political representation, gendered peace agreements, regime type and state wealth, may influence SSR, these mechanisms are not as strong as international factors when it comes to security sector gender balancing reforms. The international community, and the UN in particular, has prioritized security gender reforms as a primary step towards international peace, and this study demonstrates that the UN is not engaging in cheap talk or false promises when promoting gender balancing, but actively facilitates security sector gender balancing in post-conflict states.

Robustness Checks

Our finding that peacekeeping influences the adoption of gender balancing policies is robust to several alternative model specifications and samples. The results of all robustness checks can be found in the Appendix. First, we created a sample of both conflict and post-conflict states. In this full sample, peacekeeping continues to have a positive, significant effect. However, when the sample is limited to only conflict states, peacekeeping loses significance. This conforms to our argument that during conflict, peacekeeping missions may prioritize other forms of SSR over gender reforms.

The findings are also robust to various specifications of the dependent variable. To ensure that no single type of gender balancing reform drives the results, five different measures of the dependent variable were created with each type of gender balancing

reform removed from the measure. In other words, a new coding of the dependent variable was created for gender balancing without gender quotas, without NAPs for 1325 and so on. Regardless of these changes, the results remain robust.

Also, the findings remain significant with the use of GDP instead of GDPPC, Polity II scores rather than UDS, the removal of these variables and the legislative quota control, and the removal of state-clustered standard errors. Also, the results remain consistent when a dummy is used for whether the state has adopted a NAP for UNSCR 1325 instead of *CEDAW Years*. Additionally, the results hold with alternative controls for gender equality, including female-to-male secondary school enrollment and fertility rates. Moreover, the results do not change with interaction models between *Legislature Female* and *Legislative Quota* and with the use of the average level of sexual violence during the conflict. Further, the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for cultural and social factors, including whether the state had a Muslim majority, a communist regime, the CIRI individual empowerment index (Cingranelli, Richards & Clay 2014), regional controls and WRO presence (Murdie & Peksen 2015).

Finally, to examine whether peacekeeping effects the *number* of gender policies adopted, we ran a negative binomial regression model with a newly operationalized count dependent variable. The results remain consistent, indicating that peacekeeping missions increase the number of SSR gender balancing policies adopted. This suggests that not only do peacekeeping missions influence the adoption of security sector reforms, but also affect the number of gender balancing reforms—with peacekeeping presence, post-conflict states adopt more gender balancing policies. As above, this may occur because they reduce the costs for adopting policies and provide political will and cover, increasing the overall number of policies adopted.

Conclusion

Gender balancing is key to ensuring equal representation in the security sector (Mazurana et al. 2005, DCAF 2011). These reforms have become increasingly prioritized as scholars and policymakers have become aware of the harmful effects of highly patriarchal security sectors on gender equality, SGBV and national/international security. This study is the first of its kind to examine state motivations to adopt SSR gender balancing. Our findings overwhelmingly support the importance of international influence in facilitating SSR gender balancing, with peacekeeping missions increasing the probability of gender balancing by 22%.

These findings hold important implications for post-conflict SSR, general policy adoption and institutional design. Importantly, they demonstrate that while domestic politics play an important role, external influence may be a key component in defining different types of post-conflict institutional reform, primarily as it provides dual incentives: increased resources and increased pressure that may shift state willpower.

States must possess both the resources and the willpower to adopt gender balancing reforms. Peacekeeping missions bring resources to the post-conflict country, enabling it to implement a higher number of reforms. Additionally, peacekeeping missions also influence the types of reforms that are implemented. These reforms are largely based on international priorities such as good governance, democratization, civilian protection and WPS. Peacekeeping missions also provide political cover for governments that might face backlash when certain reforms are implemented.

Although the finding that peacekeeping promotes security sector gender reform represents a positive benefit of peacekeeping missions, it may also reflect the dominant, and perhaps overly powerful, influence of external actors and donors in SSR that may overshadow local actors. As local ownership of SSR is increasingly advocated as key for

success, this raises concerns about the sustainability and success of gender balancing reforms if they are implemented due to international pressure and not domestic political will. Therefore, while SSR gender balancing is facilitated by peacekeeping, it is vital that there is also internal demand to create sustainable practices.

Moving forward, there are a number of important policy-oriented and theoretical research avenues that must be explored. First, while our findings support the claim that the post-conflict environment opens the door to gender balancing, to fully test this claim, further investigation is needed to examine the motivations for gender balancing in conflict states. Second, while this study examines gender balancing adoption as an aggregate measure, a more refined examination of what types of policies are most facilitated by internal and external actors will improve our understanding of how these two forces interact. Third, while we find robust support for the influence of peacekeeping missions on gender balancing, peacekeeping missions may vary in the degree of their support. Therefore, future studies may examine the influence of peacekeeping mission sex composition and gendered mandate on gender balancing reforms.

Further, gender balancing is only one type of SSR gender reform. Future analyses may wish to examine SSR gender mainstreaming. Since gender mainstreaming is a less concretely defined concept, it may be influenced by different factors than gender balancing. Additionally, future studies may want to examine non-gender SSR policies.²³ Moreover, now that we understand why states adopt SSR gender balancing, we can turn to studying the outcomes of these reforms, specifically whether they improve national security. Lastly, post-conflict states are not the only states to adopt SSR gender balancing. Many non-post-conflict states have also adopted gender balancing policies. Given our finding that peacekeeping missions are the primary driver of gender balancing in post-conflict states and the lack of these missions in non-post-conflict states, additional research is needed to understand why these states adopt such policies.

Notes

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²The Security Council has adopted six additional WPS resolutions (UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122) and international security organizations such as NATO and the African Union have adopted similar policies.

³While the reforms that we examine are primarily female balancing reforms, we use gender balancing because it is the accepted label used by the United Nations and other organizations.

⁴National Action Plans for 1325 are state-level initiatives adopted by state governments, which detail how UNSCR 1325 will be implemented in the country and provide a national framework for ensuring women's security representation.

⁵See also feminist IR literature such as Enloe (1989), Enloe (2000), Tickner (1992), Pettman (1996), and Wibben (2010) among others.

⁶Although security sector institutions vary by country, generally, they consist of all the organizations that have the authority to use force to protect individuals and the state. Common security institutions include the armed forces, police forces, border and immigration agents, intelligence services, correctional facilities and customs agencies. The 'security sector' refers to the state's security apparatus, including all civil and military personnel (Jacob 2009; Meharg 2010)

⁷While the promotion of a single woman to high-level positions may not lead to large-scale change, it works to balance female-male representation where it is often the most disproportionate.

⁸These mandates are unique to multidimensional missions, rather than observer missions.

⁹See, for example, the UN Peace Building Fund <http://www.unpbf.org/>

¹⁰The theory that third parties influence state behavior has also been used to explain the adoption of legislative gender quotas (Bush 2011).

¹¹For example, in Liberia, UN Women, in conjunction with the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), helped fund and initiate a female-focused recruitment drive in the Liberian National Police.

¹²For similar arguments see Vreeland (2003) and Hawkins et al. (2006).

¹³The dependent variable is recreated as a count of the number of reforms adopted and used with a negative binomial regression model in Appendix Table 13. Peacekeeping retains its positive, significant relationship, although the statistical significance weakens to the 10% level.

¹⁴The variable was coded based on the mandate of the mission.

¹⁵About 131 gender balancing reforms were adopted by conflict states and 86 were adopted by post-conflict states, meaning that 13.2% of conflict and 10.4% of post-conflict years witnessed gender balancing reforms, which is a statistically significant difference in means.

¹⁶While ideally a specific measure of WROs would be used, for example, Murdie & Peksen (2015)'s measure of WRO presence, data limitations prevent the use of this measure as current data only extends through 2005.

¹⁷Another proxy for a state's commitment to international gender norms is the adoption of a NAP for UNSCR 1325. This is used as a robustness check in Appendix Table 8.

¹⁸For example, after the genocide in Rwanda, women increased their legislative representation and since 2008 has had the world's only female-dominated legislature.

¹⁹Local and state-level quotas and mandatory and voluntary party quotas are not included as

positive observations.

²⁰While female labor participation is not the only indicator of gender equality, we believe that it is the best measure for this analysis as it is less likely to be directly correlated to our independent variable. As a robustness check, we use several alternative measures for gender equality, including female-to-male primary and secondary school ratios and fertility rates.

²¹Peace agreements were coded as 1 if they adopted a gender perspective or advocated for gender reforms. This includes mentions of the differing impact of conflict on women and the specific needs of women. However, the coding excludes mentions of gender or women as only passing references.

²²Marginal effects can be found in the appendix.

²³See Karim (2016*b*)

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Appendix

Table 3: Marginal Effects of Model 1

	dF/dX
Peacekeeping	0.089** (0.038)
CEDAW	-0.001 (0.002)
Legislature Female	0.002 (0.001)
Legislative Quota	-0.023 (0.022)
Sexual Violence	0.205*** (0.052)
Female Labor Ratio	0.0001 (0.001)
No Peace Agree	0.016 (0.026)
Peace Gender	0.047 (0.022)
1325	0.030 (0.028)
GDPPC	-0.00001 (0.000001)
Dem Transition	0.126* (0.071)
Democracy	0.029 (0.02)
Time	-0.044*** (0.012)
Time ²	0.006*** (0.002)
Time ³	-0.0002*** (0.0001)
Observations	619
R ²	0.20
χ^2	62.80*** (df = 15)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 4: Robustness Check: Conflict and Post-Conflict Sample and Conflict Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Gender Balancing	
	(1)	(2)
	Conflict And Post-Conflict	Conflict Only
Peacekeeping	0.87*** (0.31)	1.43 (0.89)
CEDAW	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Legislature Female	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)
Legislative Quota	0.07 (0.34)	0.88** (0.43)
Sexual Violence	0.46 (0.44)	-1.29 (0.93)
FemLaborRatio	0.001 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
No Peace Agree	0.18 (0.32)	0.64 (0.68)
Peace Gender	0.31 (0.36)	-0.17 (1.22)
1325	0.28 (0.33)	0.23 (0.50)
GDPPC	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	0.53 (0.42)	-0.48 (1.28)
Democracy	0.51** (0.25)	0.78* (0.42)
Conflict	0.36 (0.28)	
Time	-0.42*** (0.14)	-0.02 (0.20)
Time ²	0.04** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
Time ³	-0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-2.07*** (0.48)	-2.23** (0.89)
Observations	987	368
R ²	0.12	0.19
χ^2	61.75*** (df = 16)	39.62*** (df = 15)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 5: Robustness Checks: GDP and GDPPC Removed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Gender Balancing	
	(1)	(2)
Peacekeeping	0.91** (0.45)	0.90*** (0.30)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.40 (0.39)	-0.38 (0.37)
Sexual Violence	3.19*** (0.88)	3.20*** (0.71)
Female Labor Ratio	0.0001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.25 (0.39)	0.24 (0.39)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.66 (0.42)	0.65* (0.39)
1325	0.54 (0.45)	0.55 (0.50)
GDP	-0.0000 (0.0000)	
Dem Transition	1.22** (0.52)	1.24*** (0.48)
Democracy	0.41 (0.31)	0.43 (0.30)
Time	-0.69*** (0.19)	-0.69*** (0.17)
Time ²	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.02)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.71*** (0.74)	-2.77*** (0.66)
Observations	619	627
R ²	0.20	0.20
χ^2	62.80*** (df = 15)	63.69*** (df = 14)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 6: Robustness Checks: Polity II, UDS Score Removed, and Legislative Quotas Removed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Gender Balancing		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Peacekeeping	0.88*** (0.29)	32.52*** (1.88)	0.96*** (0.31)
CEDAW Years	-0.01 (0.03)	-1.71*** (0.09)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.02 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.30 (0.39)	4.28*** (1.06)	
Sexual Violence	2.91*** (0.67)	6.12*** (2.22)	3.07*** (0.70)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.0000 (0.01)	0.47*** (0.03)	0.003 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.17 (0.39)	32.08*** (1.76)	0.21 (0.38)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.69* (0.40)	-7.62*** (1.87)	0.55 (0.35)
1325	0.46 (0.51)	36.58*** (1.95)	0.50 (0.48)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.002*** (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.30*** (0.48)	13.67*** (1.93)	1.22*** (0.46)
Polity2		2.21*** (0.15)	
Democracy			0.39 (0.32)
Time	-0.69*** (0.18)	-8.32*** (0.62)	-0.67*** (0.18)
Time ²	0.09*** (0.02)	1.75*** (0.10)	0.09*** (0.02)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.07*** (0.004)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.67*** (0.64)	-86.14*** (4.16)	-2.80*** (0.68)
Observations	619	73	619
R ²	0.19	1.00	0.20
χ^2	61.12*** (df = 14)	50.46*** (df = 15)	61.86*** (df = 14)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 7: Robustness Checks: Alternative Gender Equality Measures

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gender Balancing			
Peacekeeping	0.93*** (0.29)	0.95*** (0.30)	1.54** (0.69)	1.08*** (0.29)
CEDAW Sign Years		-0.02 (0.03)		
CEDAW Years			-0.05 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female Legislature		0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota		-0.37 (0.40)	-0.86* (0.47)	-0.31 (0.48)
Sexual Violence		3.22*** (0.72)	4.54*** (1.37)	3.26*** (1.01)
Female Labor Ratio	0.001 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)		
Female-to-Male Secondary Ratio			0.82 (0.91)	
Fertility Rates				0.02 (0.11)
No Peace Agreement	0.03 (0.34)	0.30 (0.42)	0.47 (0.50)	0.29 (0.42)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.65* (0.37)	0.68* (0.40)	0.97* (0.52)	0.51 (0.39)
1325	0.55 (0.37)	0.53 (0.51)	-0.06 (0.58)	0.35 (0.45)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.11*** (0.39)	1.22** (0.48)	0.27 (0.77)	1.04** (0.48)
Democracy	-0.02 (0.29)	0.46 (0.32)	0.78* (0.46)	0.39 (0.32)
Time	-0.50*** (0.18)	-0.68*** (0.17)	-1.03*** (0.24)	-0.79*** (0.18)
Time ²	0.06** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)
Time ³	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.01*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.22*** (0.62)	-2.79*** (0.61)	-2.83*** (1.05)	-2.36*** (0.68)
Observations	756	619	357	533
R ²	0.13	0.20	0.22	0.19
χ ²	51.82*** (df = 11)	62.95*** (df = 15)	41.34*** (df = 15)	54.66*** (df = 15)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 8: Robustness Checks: WROs, Regional Dummies, Muslim Majority

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Gender Balancing		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Peacekeeping	1.17*** (0.30)	0.91*** (0.34)	0.93*** (0.31)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.05** (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.49 (0.40)	-0.34 (0.39)	-0.36 (0.41)
Sexual Violence	3.03*** (0.72)	2.68*** (0.80)	3.27*** (0.71)
Female Labor Ratio	0.0004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.02)	0.0001 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.30 (0.37)	0.41 (0.47)	0.23 (0.39)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.57 (0.36)	0.99* (0.52)	0.61 (0.40)
1325	0.38 (0.50)	0.41 (0.51)	0.53 (0.51)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0001* (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.00* (0.52)	1.23** (0.48)	1.23*** (0.47)
Democracy	0.59* (0.32)	0.56 (0.40)	0.42 (0.33)
WROs	-0.52** (0.22)		
East Europe		-1.41 (1.04)	
Latin America		-2.20** (1.03)	
Africa		-1.77 (1.24)	
Asia		-2.21 (1.50)	
MENA		-1.76 (1.26)	
Muslim Majority			-0.19 (0.30)
Time	-0.67*** (0.18)	-0.66*** (0.17)	-0.68*** (0.17)
Time ²	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-1.40* (0.84)	-0.86 (1.19)	-2.63*** (0.64)
Observations	600	619	619
R ²	0.21	0.21	0.20
χ^2	65.52*** (df = 16)	66.23*** (df = 20)	63.05*** (df = 16)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 9: Robustness Checks: Communist, Individual Empowerment Index, and Average Sexual Violence Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Gender Balancing			
Peacekeeping	0.90*** (0.29)	1.02*** (0.29)	0.96*** (0.30)	0.84* (0.46)
CEDAW Years	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)
Female Legislature	0.03 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.42 (0.40)	-0.37 (0.41)	-0.87 (0.75)	-0.50 (0.41)
Sexual Violence	3.03*** (0.72)	3.22*** (0.74)	3.18*** (0.71)	
Sexual Violence Average				2.97*** (0.90)
Female Labor Ratio	0.003 (0.01)	0.0001 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.29 (0.39)	0.18 (0.39)	0.25 (0.38)	0.20 (0.39)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.66* (0.40)	0.55 (0.38)	0.60 (0.39)	0.73* (0.41)
1325	0.44 (0.50)	0.49 (0.52)	0.52 (0.49)	0.37 (0.45)
GDPPC	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.25*** (0.47)	1.16** (0.48)	1.19** (0.48)	1.16** (0.52)
Democracy	0.35 (0.32)	0.42 (0.43)	0.46 (0.33)	0.34 (0.35)
Communist	-6.31*** (1.17)			
Individual Empowerment		0.003 (0.06)		
Time	-0.68*** (0.17)	-0.66*** (0.17)	-0.68*** (0.18)	-0.69*** (0.19)
Time ²	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.10*** (0.03)
Time ²	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Female Legislature*Legislative Quota			0.03 (0.05)	
Constant	-2.86*** (0.66)	-2.61*** (0.88)	-2.69*** (0.66)	-2.75*** (0.65)
Observations	619	599	619	619
R ²	0.20	0.19	0.20	0.20
χ ²	64.82*** (df = 16)	60.38*** (df = 16)	63.37*** (df = 16)	62.80*** (df = 15)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 10: Robustness Check: NAP for UNSCR 1325 Instead of CEDAW Years

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Gender Balancing
Peacekeeping	0.79*** (0.24)
NAP UNSCR 1325	1.19** (0.50)
Legislature Female	0.01 (0.03)
Legislative Quota	-0.35 (0.39)
Sexual Violence	2.71*** (0.72)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.0004 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.27 (0.36)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.57 (0.36)
1325	0.17 (0.39)
GDPPC	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.21*** (0.46)
Democracy	0.37 (0.30)
Time	-0.62*** (0.17)
Time ²	0.08*** (0.02)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.44*** (0.63)
Observations	648
R ²	0.19
χ^2	63.39*** (df = 15)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 11: Robustness Checks: State Fixed Effects and State Clustered SE's Removed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Gender Balancing	
	(1)	(2)
Peacekeeping	0.55 (0.62)	0.96** (0.45)
CEDAW Years	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-1.05 (0.91)	-0.39 (0.40)
Sexual Violence	2.80** (1.14)	3.17*** (0.88)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.01 (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	1.09* (0.66)	0.24 (0.39)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.91 (0.78)	0.63 (0.41)
1325	0.84 (0.61)	0.50 (0.45)
GDPPC	-0.0001** (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	0.80 (0.49)	1.22** (0.52)
Democracy	1.10 (0.71)	0.45 (0.35)
Time	-0.24*** (0.08)	-0.68*** (0.19)
Time ²	0.04*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.03)
Time ³	-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-6.12*** (1.39)	-2.75*** (0.73)
State Fixed Effects	X	
State Clustered SEs		X
Observations	619	619
R ²	0.34	0.20
χ^2	128.79*** (df = 49.76584)	62.80*** (df = 15)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 12: Robustness Checks: Disaggregated DV

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Gender Balancing_No Quota (1)	Gender Balancing_No Recruit (2)	Gender Balancing_No Open (3)
Peacekeeping	0.91*** (0.33)	0.67* (0.37)	1.21** (0.48)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.03 (0.02)	0.04* (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Legislative Quota	-0.42 (0.38)	0.21 (0.40)	-0.60 (0.48)
Sexual Violence	3.17*** (0.67)	2.91*** (0.78)	2.51** (0.98)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.45 (0.39)	-0.15 (0.44)	0.18 (0.45)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.79** (0.39)	0.30 (0.50)	0.46 (0.42)
1325	0.57 (0.51)	0.13 (0.54)	1.80** (0.78)
GDPPC	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000** (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.35** (0.52)	1.02 (0.69)	0.81 (0.53)
Democracy	0.47 (0.33)	0.03 (0.36)	0.13 (0.45)
Time_No Quota	-0.63*** (0.16)		
Time_No Quota ²	0.09*** (0.02)		
Time_No Quota ³	-0.003*** (0.001)		
Time_No Recruit		-0.76*** (0.20)	
Time_No Recruit ²		0.09*** (0.03)	
Time_No Recruit ³		-0.003*** (0.001)	
Time_No Open			-0.27 (0.19)
Time_No Open ²			0.03 (0.02)
Time_No Open ³			-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	-2.72*** (0.67)	-1.80** (0.71)	-5.08*** (1.18)
Observations	619	619	619
R ²	0.18	0.17	0.21
χ^2 (df = 15)	54.22***	43.04***	54.30***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 13: Robustness Checks: Disaggregated DV

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Gender Balancing_No Promotion (1)	Gender Balancing_No Nap1325 (2)
Peacekeeping	0.67* (0.40)	0.98*** (0.32)
CEDAW Years	0.005 (0.02)	-0.0002 (0.03)
Female Legislature	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.41 (0.35)	-0.48 (0.41)
Sexual Violence	3.12*** (0.68)	2.90*** (0.62)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.0003 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.24 (0.35)	0.30 (0.36)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.58* (0.35)	0.52 (0.44)
1325	0.32 (0.47)	0.43 (0.50)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.66*** (0.50)	1.52*** (0.48)
Democracy	0.38 (0.31)	0.47 (0.34)
Time_No Promotion	-0.73*** (0.19)	
Time_No Promotion ²	0.10*** (0.03)	
Time_No Promotion ³	-0.003*** (0.001)	
Time_No Nap1325		-0.67*** (0.16)
Time_No Nap1325 ²		0.09*** (0.02)
Time_No Nap1325 ³		-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.80*** (0.54)	-2.49*** (0.71)
Observations	619	619
R ²	0.19	0.18
χ^2 (df = 15)	60.43***	55.62***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 14: Robustness Check: Female Legislature and Sexual Violence Removed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Gender Balance		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Peacekeeping	0.84*** (0.28)	0.97*** (0.31)	0.92*** (0.30)
CEDAW Years	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Legislature Female		0.01 (0.02)	
Legislative Quota		0.01 (0.39)	
Sexual Violence	2.59*** (0.80)		
Female Labor Ratio	0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.23 (0.36)	-0.11 (0.38)	-0.04 (0.37)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.56 (0.37)	0.62 (0.42)	0.63 (0.40)
1325	0.42 (0.44)	0.53 (0.51)	0.46 (0.45)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.23*** (0.42)	1.27*** (0.42)	1.24*** (0.39)
Democracy	0.28 (0.31)	0.03 (0.34)	-0.07 (0.30)
Time	-0.60*** (0.20)	-0.57*** (0.18)	-0.51*** (0.19)
Time ²	0.08*** (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Constant	-2.79*** (0.60)	-2.69*** (0.73)	-2.66*** (0.67)
Observations	648	692	722
R ²	0.17	0.17	0.15
χ^2	56.40*** (df = 13)	59.31*** (df = 14)	55.11*** (df = 12)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 15: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Gender Balance Count
Peacekeeping	0.92* (0.49)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.03)
Legislature Female	0.03 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	-0.35 (0.41)
Sexual Violence	3.42*** (0.92)
Female Labor Ratio	-0.01 (0.01)
No Peace Agreement	0.17 (0.38)
Gender Peace Agreement	0.35 (0.42)
1325	1.04** (0.45)
GDPPC	0.0000 (0.0000)
Dem Transition	1.26** (0.54)
Democracy	0.42 (0.35)
Time	-0.66*** (0.19)
Time ²	0.08*** (0.03)
Time ³	-0.003*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.02*** (0.72)
Observations	619
Log Likelihood	-273.61
θ	0.21*** (0.05)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	579.22

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01