

Sisters in Security: Female Peacekeepers and Women's Representation in Domestic Security Sectors

Laura Huber *
Sabrina Karim †

September 28, 2018

*Draft Version. Please do not cite without the authors' permission.
All comments and suggestions welcome.*

Abstract

Under what conditions does gender equality in security institutions improve in post-conflict countries? There is a growing body of literature that suggests that gender equality improves after conflict due to opportunity structures that open up for women after wars end. We build on this research and suggest that female peacekeepers facilitate gender reforms in the domestic security sectors of post-conflict countries. Using the framework of bureaucratic representation, female peacekeepers might passively represent local women by inspiring them to join domestic security forces, or they may actively represent local women by advocating for female ratio balancing and/or gender mainstreaming reforms. Using a unique dataset on female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming security sector reforms in post-conflict states between 2009 and 2016, we find that increases in the representation of female peacekeepers leads to increases in the likelihood that the host country will adopt female ratio balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms. As the first cross-national, quantitative study to examine the direct role that female peacekeepers play in local security sector gender reform, this study advances our understanding both of how international actors promote gender equality in post-conflict countries and also about how theories of political representation may apply in the context of international security.

*PhD Candidate, Emory University

†Assistant Professor, Cornell University

Introduction

Under what conditions does gender equality in security institutions improve in post-conflict countries? There is a growing body of literature that suggests that gender equality improves after conflict due to opportunity structures that open up for women after wars end (Tripp 2015). Yet, there has been less attention on the role that peacekeepers play in promoting gender equality in post-conflict countries. And, there is less work on the factors that promote gender equality in the security sectors in post-conflict countries. However, peacekeeping missions may play a key role in promoting gender equality and have a unique opportunity to advocate for gender reform in the security sector. For example, peacekeeping missions increase the likelihood that host states will adopt reforms to increase the number of women in their security forces (Huber and Karim 2018). Our study builds off of this earlier work and posits that higher proportions of female peacekeepers in peacekeeping operations, increases the probability that the host state will adopt reforms to promote women's representation and a gender equal culture in the domestic security sector. In order to make changes that favor women in different institutional contexts, particularly ones that are male dominated, the presence of women may be a necessary condition.

Enhancing both women's representation and gender equality within domestic security sectors is important for a number of reasons. First, the UN and a number of scholars have argued that women's integration into security forces make them more able to respond to the needs of women and also improve operational effectiveness (Egnell 2014). Karim et al. (2018) finds that in Liberia, increases of women in the security forces help increase unit cohesion. Moreover, Karim (2017c) finds that female police officers in Liberia help improve perceptions of police and Karim (N.d.) finds that women improve perceptions of policing when they engage in community policing. Second, changing the gendered culture of security institutions facilitates an environment that is more conducive to different types of security needs (Kronsell 2012). Promoting women's representation and gendered cultural change in *specifically post-conflict security sectors* is particularly important because of the failure of the security sector

before and during the war. The security sectors of countries that have experienced internal conflict have lower levels of trust as the security forces were both unable to protect the population and were perhaps implicated in committing atrocities against the population. Additionally, security sectors often become highly masculinized during conflict, which can lead to increased aggression and violence against civilians (Goldstein 2003, Whitworth 2005). Thus, women's integration into the security forces provides an avenue through which to demonstrate that the security forces are "new and improved." Women either serve as signals of change (Karim 2017c) or changes in the gendered culture of the organization make violence against civilians less likely (Karim and Beardsley 2017). These types of changes compliment broader security sector reforms that are needed to ensure long-term peace (Toft 2010).

In order to understand the role that female peacekeepers play in facilitating gender reforms, we use the framework of bureaucratic representation (Keiser et al. 2002, Meier 1993). Female peacekeepers may passively represent local women by inspiring them to join the security forces or they may actively represent local women by advocating for reforms that both increase women's representation (female ratio balancing reforms) or that change the culture of the security forces (gender mainstreaming reforms). Female ratio balancing reforms seek to increase women's representation relative to men in the security sector through actions such as female-focused recruitment campaigns, the creation of a gendered or all-female unit, the removal of barriers to women's participation (such as combat bans), the appointment of a woman to a high-ranking position for the first time, and the adoption of a National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1325. Gender mainstreaming reforms include a wider range of policies as they not only attempt to increase women's physical presence within the institution, but also seek to change the culture, norms, and behavior of the institution. Gender mainstreaming reforms include, but are not limited to, gender sensitization training, the adoption of sexual harassment policies, the creation of female-appropriate facilities and uniforms, and the strengthening of the institution's ability to respond to violence against women. Female peacekeepers may

be more likely than male peacekeepers to advocate for female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms because they might better understand the importance of such policies for security institutions. Just like women in politics often advocate for policies that benefit women through legislation (Reingold 2003), women in the security sector might advocate for policies that benefit women in the security sector.

While female peacekeepers may try play an important role in advocating for reforms, there is also reason to be cautious about the amount of success they might have in achieving their goals. Recent work on female peacekeepers suggests that there are many barriers within peacekeeping missions that might thwart their ability to reach their full potential. Karim (2017*b*) finds that female peacekeepers are often prevented from even interacting with locals and that there are barriers that limit their roles and success in peacekeeping missions. Moreover, Karim and Beardsley (2017) also suggest that peacekeeping missions lack a culture that is amenable for female peacekeepers' success. This means that even though female peacekeepers might attempt to advocate for reforms, they might not be successful due to peacekeeping culture.

In order to assess the degree to which female peacekeepers passively or actively represent local women's interests in domestic security institutions, we use an original dataset on female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in post-conflict states between 2009 and 2016. We find strong support that increases in the representation of female peacekeepers lead to increases in the likelihood that the host country will adopt female ratio balancing reforms and moderate support that it increases the likelihood of gender mainstreaming reforms. The findings imply that female peacekeepers do help shape the domestic security sectors of post-conflict countries, but they may be limited in their power to shape the cultures of them.

Our research contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, it demonstrates how the representation of women at the international level can shape policies at the domestic level. In other words, it adds to the "second image reversed" literature in demon-

strating how women in international organizations affect outcomes in domestic institutions. Second, it highlights how representation in the security sector is just as important as representation in politics, especially in the context of post-conflict countries. Further, the findings also adds to the literature that attempts to understand how opportunities for women open up after a war ends. It does so by showing how women in international security institutions also facilitate roles for such openings. Finally, we constructed an original dataset on female ratio balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms, which can be used by scholars trying to understand the evolution of gender equality in post-conflict states.

In the following sections, we first introduce the changes that have occurred at the international level concerning gender and security, including the move to increase the number of female peacekeepers globally. We then demonstrate how these changes are important for understanding how state building occurs in post-conflict countries, specifically how they might contribute to opening up opportunities for gender equality. Next, we use the framework of bureaucratic representation to demonstrate the mechanisms through which female peacekeepers might facilitate changes in the domestic security sector. We then provide a research design and discuss the results. We conclude by suggesting that more work should address how state building could change norms in post-conflict countries.

Growing Norms for Women in International Security

On January 1, 2017, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres's five-year term began. In his remarks as Secretary-General, he has repeatedly stated the importance of increasing women's representation within the United Nations, and in particular in peacekeeping operations. These calls echo the growing trend in international security about the importance of including women in security duties (Egnell 2014). In particular, the UN suggests that female peacekeepers help missions build stronger relationships with communities and gain more access to information than all-male contingents can deliver. They serve as role mod-

els, inspiring women in host countries to enter the security services themselves.¹ The UN also argues that female peacekeepers are critical to preventing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping forces that causes tremendous suffering for its victims and diminishes the credibility UN peace operations globally.²

The proportion of women in peacekeeping missions has been growing steadily over the past few decades (See Figures 1 and 2). It increased sharply after the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which institutionalized a women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda for the first time.³ The WPS agenda has been an integral part of UN Department of Peacekeeping (UN DPKO) policy since the adoption of UNSC 1325 in October of 2000, which legally mandated peacekeeping operations to include women in decision-making roles in all aspects of the peacekeeping and peace building process. Additionally, UN Member States were called upon to increase women’s representation in their domestic security forces. UNSC 1325 was the product of a broad coalition of NGOs, social movements, and states that worked together to convince member states that “women as victims of war” and “women as creators of peace” should be systematically involved in peacekeeping and peace building operations. The Resolution’s adoption is considered by many to be a historic milestone since it marked the first time that the UN Security Council dealt specifically with gender issues and women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations and recognized women’s contribution to conflict resolution and prevention. Subsequent resolutions since UNSC 1325, such as UNSC 1820 (2008), UNSC 1888 (2009), UNSC 1889 (2009), UNSC 1960 (2010), UNSC 2106 (2013), UNSC 2122 (2013), and UNSC 2242 (2015), also affirm that gender should be an integral part of peacekeeping operations globally.

The Resolution(s) coincided with changes in peacekeeping operations, which after the Brahimi Report was issued in 2000, included broader peacekeeping mandates, such as organizing elections, disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating soldiers, engaging in security

¹Former UN website.

²These instrumental justifications for women’s inclusion are critiqued in Karim and Beardsley (2017).

³Herein called the “WPS agenda.”

Figure 1: Female Peacekeepers (Police and Military) by Mission





Figure 2: Average Female Peacekeepers (Police and Military) Worldwide



sector reform, establishing rule of law, promoting good governance, and protecting human rights. These new tasks also opened the door for women as the UN argued that women were needed to fulfill new mandate requirements.

Due to these opportunities to incorporate gender into a security framework, gender is now mentioned in almost every mandate authorizing peacekeeping missions (Karim and Beardsley 2013). However, the mandates vary in their scope of mentioning gender, as some only prohibit the sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of peacekeepers, while others mention specific objectives such as promoting women's participation in politics or protecting women from sexual violence. Since UNSC 1325, the UN DPKO points to a number of successes when it comes to gender balancing and gender mainstreaming. According to the Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping, peacekeeping missions are helping to implement policies on the ground that promote the UNSC 1325 agenda and have established gender focal points and gender unit to help guide members of the military and police in implementing UNSC 1325. The UN has deployed its first female Force Commander to the UN Mission in Cyprus, (UNFICYP) in 2014. Additionally, Women's Protection Advisers (WPAs), mandated by the Security Council in 2009, have been deployed to countries with evidence of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).

These changes mean that now more than ever women in security institutions have a larger role to play in state building efforts. In particular, female peacekeepers are positioned to represent the interests of local women. Not only did normative changes at the international level allow increases in female peacekeepers, it also allowed for opportunities to shape the development of institutions in the host country in a more gender equal way.

Opportunities for Gender Equality in Post-Conflict States

While civil wars and armed conflict in any society should be avoided at all costs, scholars have recently found that they sometimes could lead to positive outcomes for society (Tripp 2015). Countries that have experienced armed conflict might be more open to gender equal norms due to the disruption of traditional gender norms during conflict, women's mobilization during and after conflict, and the increased pressure these states may face from internal and external sources to protect women after conflict (Huber N.d.). While these improved opportunities for women most often occur through gains in women's political representation, conflict also disrupts and alters security sector gendered cultures, traditions, and reform priorities, potentially allowing for gender reform. As a result, it is also possible that women's representation may increase in the security sector and also the cultures of security organizations may change to be more gender equal after conflict. Increased representation of women in the security sector and more gender equal environments in them are important for security in the post-conflict country period and are important for legitimizing security institutions that might otherwise have a very negative reputation.

There is now a consistent literature that finds that armed conflicts lead to improved social outcomes. In particular, scholars have found that those that experienced violence are more likely to be prosocial in Nepal (Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2014), more politically active and cooperative in Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2009), and display increased political participation in Uganda among child soldiers (Blattman 2009). In accordance with this literature, Tripp (2015) finds that in the 1990's after the end of several African civil conflicts, women's rights and political representation increased. She finds that this relationship is particularly the case after intense conflicts such as ones with high battle related deaths and that are longer in duration. She posits that there are two ways that women's political rights might increase in the aftermath of wars. First, women's political rights might be included in peace accords. The resulting increases in women's representation reduces the risk of conflict recurrence because female office holders may be more likely to spend

money on social welfare rather than the military and because they improve perceptions of the political process (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). Second, political liberalization after conflict allows for the growth of women’s movements and the spread of new norms related to women’s equality. Broadly, she makes the case that wars create opportunities for women’s participation in politics.

We borrow this logic of “opportunity structures” and suggest that it not only applies to political participation and representation, but that the time period after a conflict also opens the possibility for transformation within security institutions. Security sector reform is one of the most important pathways to prevent conflict recurrence (Toft 2010). Moreover, international state builders have become increasingly involved in shaping the security sectors of weak, post-conflict countries because of their concerns of security sector failure leading to transnational conflict (Fukuyama 2011, Lake 2016). This means that the process of re-building the security sectors of post-conflict countries are often shaped by international actors, including UN peacekeeping missions. For example, there has been a trend to incorporate security sector reforms into peace accords (Joshi and Darby 2013), and consequently, peacekeeping mandates include security sector reform as well. Thus, most post-conflict country’s security sectors are subject to transformation after wars end.

International involvement in re-building the security sectors means that peacekeepers have a large role in the way that they re-build institutions. Because gender equality has become an international norm, institutionalized through Resolutions that require consideration of a gender perspective, female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming have become a part of peacekeeping mandates. This is evidenced by the fact that Huber and Karim (2018) find that peacekeeping missions lead to a twenty percent increase in the probability that the domestic security sector will adopt a female ratio balancing reform. In this paper, we find similar evidence that peacekeeping missions lead to the adoption of female ratio balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms, but we suggest that female peacekeepers are key for such adoption.

While the importance of women’s representation in politics in post-conflict societies is self-evident, the importance of women’s representation and changes in gendered culture within security organizations may be less obvious. Yet, there is ample evidence to suggest that the inclusion of women in the domestic security sector and more gender equitable security sectors are important for state building processes. Using Liberia as a case study, several studies show the importance of integrating women into the police force. In Monrovia, female police officers improved the perception of the Liberian National Police (Karim 2017*c*) and unit cohesion of the police (Karim et al. 2018). The potential improvements in operational effectiveness caused by these reforms mean that the security forces are better able to respond to security concerns, which could reduce the probability of conflict recurrence. In rural counties, Karim (N.d.) finds that women improve perceptions of policing when they engage in community policing. As Shair-Rosenfield and Wood (2017) suggest, improvements in the perceptions of institutions is highly important for peace. Improvements in the perceptions of the security forces might be particularly important in post-conflict countries because of the negative stigma attached to the security forces due to their participation in the war. Enhanced legitimacy of the security sector is important for long-term peace. Moreover, promoting a culture of equality within security institutions means that they may be more focused on human security and therefore able and willing to address a wider range of security needs (Karim and Beardsley 2017). These types of changes compliment broader security sector reforms that are needed to ensure long-term peace (Toft 2010).

Bureaucratic Representation in Security Organizations

While prior research has shown that peacekeeping missions are important for increasing the likelihood that gender reforms will be adopted by the host country (Huber and Karim 2018), here, using a framework of bureaucratic representation, we posit that beyond the presence of any peacekeeping mission, the increased representation of female peacekeepers within

missions leads to increases in women in the host country's security sector and also improvements in the domestic security sector's culture with respect to gender equality. In doing so, we show that while peacekeeping missions may be important for creating opportunities for gender reform adoption, it is really female peacekeepers who play a vital role in ensuring their adoption and implementation.

In order to use a framework of bureaucratic representation, we equate peacekeeping missions with the bureaucracy. While they are international state builders, they include numerous divisions and units that can individually be considered bureaucracies because they provide services to the local, host population. Peacekeeping missions are composed of civilians, military, and police from countries around the world. On average, women make up 2.8% of the military officers and 9.5% of police officers in peacekeeping missions between 2006 and 2016. Women in peacekeeping missions could theoretically represent the interests of local women. Nevertheless, there are numerous reasons to believe that this might not be possible. Chief among them is the idea that the category of women is heterogeneous and it is unclear which women's interests would be represented (Reingold 2003).⁴ For example, using Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) as an example, we can consider how female peacekeepers may engage with local women. How could foreign women represent the interests of Liberian women? Female peacekeepers, coming from different cultural and political contexts, may have different priorities, interests, and needs than local women. For example, Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) find that international women's advocacy can interrupt local women's movements and they posit that this may occur due to a mismatch between the priorities of local and international women's agendas. We argue that Liberian women's interests can be represented by foreign women, but only when the reforms are limited to representation and promoting a culture of equality. There is a common understanding that Liberian women are also working towards those goals. Thus, female

⁴Additionally, one could question what issues are "women's issues" and whether women's integration into the security sector is a "women's issue." In this context, we define gendered security sector reforms as women's issues since the UN and scholars have argued that it is the right of women to participate in the security sector where they are underrepresented.

peacekeepers are complimenting the policy goals of Liberian women. In this sense, female peacekeepers' representation of women's interests is limited to those commonly expressed goals of gender equality in general.

There are two ways that female peacekeepers can represent local women: they can passively represent them or they can actively represent them. Passive representation exists where a bureaucracy's demographic composition matches that of its constituency (Keiser et al. 2002, Meier 1993, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). It occurs because it incites a reaction in the constituent that would not be possible without the shared demographic characteristic. Here, the presence of female peacekeepers could inspire local women to join the security forces. Without females in peacekeeping, local women may not have considered joining the security sector as a career option.⁵ When asked, female peacekeepers in Liberia mentioned that they believed they play this "passive" representational role (Karim 2017*b*, Karim and Beardsley 2017). Yet, there is not much direct evidence to support this idea. In surveys conducted in Monrovia, Karim (2017*b*) finds that local women barely have any interactions with female peacekeepers. Thus, it is unclear exactly how they might passively represent local women.

Another possibility is that female peacekeepers actively represent local women. Active representation occurs when bureaucrats consciously act on behalf of the groups they demographically represent (Keiser et al. 2002, Meier 1993, Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). For female peacekeepers, this would mean pursuing, advocating for, and implementing reforms that increase women's representation in the security forces and that change its culture. There are two types of reforms they could pursue. They could advocate for female ratio balancing reforms, which are policies that seek to increase women's physical representation within security institutions and include policies such as female-focused recruitment campaigns, the creation of a new unit that is either staffed entirely by women or is tasked with gendered responsibilities, such as domestic violence, the removal of barriers to participation by women

⁵It should be noted that women may also gain this inspiration from female fighters during the conflict and future research should investigate this relationship.

in certain security roles, such as the removal of combat bans, the promotion of a woman to a high-ranking position for the first time, and the adoption of a NAP for UNSC 1325, or they could pursue gender mainstreaming reforms that seek to not only increase women's physical participation within security institutions, but also attempt to alter the gendered culture and norms of the institution to promote gender equality through actions such as training sessions on gender issues and sexual harassment or gender equality policies. Both of these types of reforms are goals of UNSC 1325 and included in peacekeeping mandates. Some have argued that female ratio balancing reforms are easier to implement because they are more concrete and easily measurable (Karim 2017*a*). Thus, it might be easier for female peacekeepers to implement female ratio balancing policies over gender mainstreaming ones. We observe this in Liberia where female peacekeepers were instrumental in advocating for quotas for women in the Liberian National Police. There is a 30% quota currently. Female peacekeepers were also instrumental in ensuring that the LNP adopt a gender unit and a women and children's protection unit, as well as a sexual harassment policy. Studies suggest that the reason female peacekeepers might engage in championing these types of reforms is because they believe it is their job to do so (Karim 2017*b*, Karim and Beardsley 2017). While male peacekeepers may also support these reforms, women may feel that they are particularly responsible for, expected to, or skilled at promoting gendered security sector reform

Despite the fact that female peacekeepers believe it is their duty to represent local women in the security sector, there are significant barriers that might prevent them from achieving this goal. Several studies show that female peacekeepers do not necessarily end up in peacekeeping missions where representation might be most necessary such as places with high levels of sexual violence (Karim and Beardsley 2013, 2017). As a result, we do not expect that female peacekeepers are present in higher numbers in peacekeeping missions already dedicated to gender reform as there is a disconnect between where female peacekeepers are needed and where the most gender reform is needed. Moreover, when they do end up in missions, a gender protection norm prevents them from interacting with local women and

leaving the base and they are often relegated to menial tasks such as administration (Karim and Beardsley 2017). This means that despite the desire to implement gender reforms, female peacekeepers might be unable to do so.

Regardless of the barriers, we posit that female peacekeepers are the vehicles through which most gender reforms are adopted and implemented in the domestic security sectors of host countries.⁶ This leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: Increases in the proportion of female peacekeepers leads to an increased probability of female ratio balancing in the domestic security sector

H2: Increases in the proportion of female peacekeepers leads to an increased probability of gender mainstreaming in the domestic security sector

Research Design

To examine the effect of female peacekeepers on gender reform in the security sector, we primarily rely on country-year data between 2009 and 2016, which includes all country-years in which a country reasonably could have received female peacekeepers and remains in the dataset until 2016. Countries were defined as having a reasonable opportunity of receiving female peacekeepers if they experienced an intrastate or interstate conflict with a contiguous neighboring state with at least 25 battle deaths within 16 years of 2006, the median length of a UN peacekeeping mission (Gleditsch et al. 2002).⁷ Additionally, all states which had peacekeeping missions in 2006 were included in the dataset, even if their conflicts had not occurred within the past 16 years. The resulting dataset includes about 871 observations across 83 countries.⁸ Summary statistics of all variables can be found in Table 1.

⁶While this study examines specifically the adoption of gender reforms, future analysis will also examine the implementation of these reforms.

⁷Other samples used as robustness checks include other operationalizations of having a “reasonable” opportunity of receiving female peacekeepers, including limiting the sample to only those states which have received a peacekeeping mission.

⁸A list of countries and their years in the dataset can be found in the appendix

Dependent and Independent Variables

Data on the adoption of gender reforms in the security sector comes primarily from the Security Sector Reform Dataset (Karim, Wagstaff and Huber n.d.) and the Security Sector Gender Reform Dataset (SSRGD)(Huber N.d.). The SSRD is a country-year dataset containing data on female ratio balancing reforms in all civil war post-conflict states between 1989 and 2012. This data was supplemented with the Huber (N.d.) dataset, which updates the data to 2016 in all countries and includes a security sector gender mainstreaming variable. Two main dependent variables on gender reform in the security sector are used. First, *Female Ratio Balance*, is a dichotomous indicator of whether a security sector female ratio balancing reform was adopted by the state in the country-year. Female ratio balancing reforms were defined as the adoption of a recruitment target or quota for female personnel, the hosting of a female-focused recruitment campaign, the creation of an office or unit with gendered implications, the removal of barriers to women’s participation in certain security roles, the promotion of women to a high-ranking security position for the first time, and the creation of a NAP for UNSC 1325.⁹

This indicator varies from year to year, recording a positive instance of female ratio balancing only if a female ratio balancing reform was adopted *in that year*. In other words, a state may adopt a female ratio balancing reform in one year, but not the next year. This distinguishes the adoption of these reforms from the simple existence of them. States may adopt a female ratio balancing reform that will be implemented for many years. However, the adoption of the female ratio balancing reform would only be recorded on the year it was adopted, rather than its tenure of existence.¹⁰ The use of a dichotomous indicator allows for an examination of whether the experience of conflict has *any* effect on security sector gender reform, rather than the magnitude of the effect. Additionally, we operationalize this

⁹Reforms were largely recorded based on newspaper articles or country SSR gender mainstreaming guides or performance reviews, such as those country reports published by the UN or NGOs.

¹⁰This coding not only allows for an examination specifically of adoption patterns, but also is more reliable since it is difficult to determine how long most gender policies are in place.

indicator as a count of the number of reforms passed in the year to also examine whether female peacekeepers have an effect on the relative number of female ratio balancing reforms adopted, rather than the probability that any reform is adopted.¹¹ Female ratio balancing reforms were relatively rare in the sample, occurring in about 25% of state-years. The most female ratio balancing reforms adopted in one state-year is 3 with states adopting up to 11 reforms across the years in the dataset.

The second dependent variable, *Gender Mainstream* is also a dichotomous variable indicating that the state adopted a gender mainstreaming policy in the security sector in the year. A positive instance of gender mainstreaming was defined as any government led or approved reform or program to increase gender equality within the security sector, increase security forces' awareness of, sensitization to, and response to gendered issues, or create a welcoming environment for all genders and sexualities in the security sector either as personnel or as recipients of security.¹² All reforms included within the *Female Ratio Balance* variable are also included within this variable, in addition to other reforms, such as gender sensitization trainings, SGBV training, sexual harassment policies or gender equality policies, the building of female facilities or equipment, and policies, procedures, or manuals for gendered crimes or violence, such as SGBV, human trafficking, and domestic violence. *Gender Mainstream* also varies from state-year and is coded as 1 on the state-year in which a policy is first adopted. As to be expected, *Gender Mainstream* is slightly more common than *Female Ratio Balance* with 39% of state-years observing the adoption of a gender mainstreaming reform.¹³ As above, we also operationalize this variable as a count of the number

¹¹We note the possibility for bias within the dependent variable if states which are relatively more gender equitable or have more equitable security sectors may adopt less gender reforms due to a decreased need for them. While this is a possibility, initial analyses of the data do not appear to indicate that there is a strong correlation between how gender equitable a security sector is and its adoption of further gender reforms. However, pending the collection of further data, future studies should examine the overall gender reformed status of the security sector and how it impacts reform adoption.

¹²This coding excludes programs supported entirely by NGOs without the government's direct support and collaboration. This was done to ensure that the variable only recorded programs that were directly supported by the government, rather than programs that are done independently from or without the active involvement of the government.

¹³It should be noted that instances of gender mainstreaming are likely to be underreported compared to female ratio balancing since they are often less controversial, notable, or understood. However, there does

of gender mainstreaming reforms adopted by the state in the year. While the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms remain relatively rare, with an average of 0.5 reforms per year, the range of the number of reforms added *within* a state-year is between 0 and 9.¹⁴

The main independent variables in this analysis are measures of women’s presence within the military and police components of a peacekeeping mission. The main analysis shown below uses an aggregate country-year indicator of women’s representation, as a percentage, of total police and military personnel combined (Karim and Beardsley 2016a, 2017, Narang and Liu N.d., Perry and Smith N.d.).¹⁵ Women’s participation includes their participation as individual police officers, part of formed police units, troops, and military experts. While the average female participation rate across all types of peacekeeping roles is included in the main analysis, robustness checks are also run separating women’s participation in the police and military and with the maximum and minimum ratio of women recorded in the peacekeeping mission-year. This variable is lagged by one year to account for autocorrelation. On average, women represent 4.8% of total peacekeepers of established peacekeeping missions and in the sample, the average representation of female peacekeepers within all countries is around 1%.

When testing the relationship between female peacekeepers and the dichotomous indicators of gender reform, we use logistic regression with state-clustered standard errors and for the count dependent variables, we use negative binomial regression with state-clustered standard errors.¹⁶

not appear to be any systematic differences across countries in the degree of underreporting.

¹⁴The correlation between *Female Ratio Balance* and *Gender Mainstream* is 0.83. The high correlation is expected given that female ratio balancing reforms are part of gender mainstreaming reforms and because it is likely that states that adopt female ratio balancing reforms are also more likely to adopt gender mainstreaming reforms.

¹⁵In some rare cases, there were several peacekeeping missions occurring in a state-year. When this was the case, the missions were aggregated together.

¹⁶Distributions of the count dependent variables can be found in the appendix.

Control Variables

We use a number of control variables to account for alternative mechanisms that may promote or inhibit the adoption of female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in the security sector. All controls are lagged by one year to account for autocorrelation.

To account for a state's existing commitment to women's rights, we include several controls for societal gender equality. First, to account for other groups and individuals within the country that may advocate for gendered security sector reform, we include a count of the number of women's international nongovernmental organizations (WINGOs) within the country, as recorded by Hughes et al. (2017).¹⁷ As demonstrated by Murdie and Peksen (2015), WINGOs can successfully use a number of naming and shaming tactics to pressure states into improving women's rights. Additionally, WINGOs may attempt to partner with female peacekeepers to specifically advocate for gender reforms within the security sector. Therefore, we may expect that as the number of WINGOs increases, states will be more likely to adopt gender balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms. On average, there are about 43 WINGOs present in a country-year.¹⁸

Next, to account for women's political power, *Legislature Female* is the percentage of the national legislature that is female according to the World Bank and the Paxton, Green and Hughes (2008) data. Theories of descriptive representation argue that female legislators may advocate for and pass policies favorable towards women's issues (Pitkin 1967). While the strength of the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation is still debated, various studies find that women's representation in politics is linked to policy changes that appear to favor women or reflect women's interests (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Koch and Fulton 2011, Pitkin 1967, Shair-Rosenfield and Wood Forthcoming). Therefore, female legislators may encourage the adoption of security sector gender reform. On average,

¹⁷While Hughes et al. (Forthcoming, 2017) contains counts of the number of WINGOs in five year increments, we use interpolation to fill in the missing years using an assumption of linearity.

¹⁸We use Hughes et al. (2017)'s imputed count of WINGOs.

women constitute 17% of the legislature in the sample.¹⁹

Sexual Violence is a measure of the level of sexual violence which occurred during the last year of the conflict by all parties as determined by the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) Dataset (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Proponents of security sector gender reform often point to sexual violence during conflict (often committed by state security forces)²⁰ as a justification and motivation for gender reform. Additionally, sexual violence during conflict represents a striking example of the failure of the state to protect civilians and therefore, the state may hope to restore the protection gap and signal that it can protect its citizens through the adoption of gender reforms. Although the SVAC uses country-actor-year units of analysis, this study aggregates the observations to the country-year. The SVAC level of sexual violence in the last year of the conflict is repeated for all post-conflict years. While the variable ranges from 0 (limited sexual violence) to 2 (massive sexual violence), in this sample, all states fall between 0 and 1 with a mean of 0.34.

We also control for several variables specific to the peacekeeping mission. First, *Multidimensional* is a dichotomous indicator of whether the mission’s mandate calls on the mission to perform a wide range of duties, including protection of civilians, reform of state institutions, human rights protection, and many more. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions are more likely than other types of missions to directly advocate for and assist in security sector reform and as shown by Huber and Karim (2018), increase the likelihood that female ratio balancing reforms will be adopted in post-conflict states. About 50% of state-years in the sample have multidimensional missions present. Similarly, we also control for the number of male peacekeepers, *Total Male Peacekeepers*, as larger missions may be more likely to employ female peacekeepers and may be more able to prompt security sector gender reform.²¹

¹⁹It should be noted that in many states, especially post-conflict states, women’s representation in the legislature is legally mandated through a legislative quota. We also run the model using a control for the presence of a legislative quota the results remain consistent

²⁰See Cohen and Nordås (2014), Nordås and Rustad (2013)

²¹Note that this variable has a large right hand skew. Unfortunately, we cannot log transform the variable as there are 0 observations. As a robustness check, we use alternative operationalizations of this variable in case there is any induced bias.

Further, although peacekeepers may be sent to states experiencing both inter- or intra-state conflict and gendered security sector reform may happen in either situation, civil conflicts may be systematically more likely to adopt these reforms. First, civil wars may require greater mobilization of society into the security forces than an interstate conflict since the population is internally divided. Second, peacekeepers may be more likely to encourage gendered security sector reform after civil war since the security sector's participation in violence against its own people and often civilians damages its reputation and professionalization (Karim and Beardsley 2016b). Finally, countries experiencing civil war may receive larger contingents of peacekeepers and greater pressure from international actors, such as the UN, to adopt favored state-building reforms, such as gendered security sector reforms.

Further, we control for several country-level characteristics that may impact state's willingness or ability to adopt gender reforms in the security sector. *GDP per capita* measures the state gross domestic product per capita. Wealthier states not only tend to have higher levels of gender equality, but also may have greater capacity to adopt security gender reforms. However, since wealthier states have higher levels of gender equality, they may not require gender reforms. *GDP per capita* comes from the World Bank and is log transformed.

Democracy is the one year lagged Polity II score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al. 2015) indicating the state regime type in the country-year. *Democracy* ranges from -10 to 10, with -10 indicating complete authoritarianism and 10 representing a strong democracy. The sample average is 2.9, indicating the average regime is in a transitional state and a very weak democracy.²² Democracies are likely more willing to adopt security sector gender reforms to conform with international norms. Further, democracies are also more likely to be gender equitable (Bjarnegård and Melander 2011).

Finally, to account for autocorrelation in the logistic regression models, *Time Female Balance* and *Time Gender Mainstream* are count measures of the years since the previous female ratio balancing or mainstreaming reform was adopted, respectively. Gender main-

²²A state is a democracy when it has a Polity II score of 6 or higher (Marshall et al. 2015).

streaming and female ratio balancing reforms are likely to be highly interrelated across years and therefore, the adoption of one gender reform in one year is likely to be correlated with other such policies in later years. The cubic polynomial approach by Carter and Signorino (2010) is used in the logistic regression models to capture the hazard rate, including those commonly estimated by parametric duration models, of the state adoption of a new gender reform. The average number of years between gender balancing reforms is about 2.2 and between gender mainstreaming reforms is 1.8. Further, to account for autocorrelation with the count dependent variables, instead of cubic polynomials of the time since the last reform was adopted, year fixed effects are included.²³

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Female Ratio Balance	871	0.253	0.435	0	1
Gender Mainstream	871	0.362	0.481	0	1
Female Balance (Count)	871	0.307	0.580	0	3
Gender Mainstream (Count)	871	0.512	0.856	0	9
% Female Peacekeepers	550	0.011	0.025	0.000	0.185
WINGOS	823	43.129	25.429	8.000	127.000
Legislature Percent	836	17.171	10.763	0.000	63.800
Sexual Violence	808	0.340	0.658	0	3
Multidimensional Mission	871	0.146	0.353	0	1
Civil War	871	0.813	0.390	0	1
Total Male Peacekeepers	550	1,061.873	3,352.291	0.000	20,608.400
GDP per Capita, ln	750	7.697	1.245	5.140	10.925
Polity 2	829	2.899	6.879	-10.000	41.100
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	873	2.247	2.504	0	10
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)	873	1.757	2.234	0	10

Several models are presented. We run analyses on two samples: all conflict and post-conflict states and only conflict and post-conflict states that have an actively deployed peacekeeping mission.²⁴ These two analyses allow us to examine the effects of female peacekeepers with respect to different comparison categories. First, we will examine the effect of female

²³The results remain consistent when Time Since Adoption variables are included instead of fixed effects

²⁴This includes all types of UN peacekeeping missions, such as observation missions, traditional missions, and multidimensional missions.

peacekeepers compared to any conflict-affected state before examining female peacekeepers' impact on the adoption of gendered reforms within states with peacekeeping missions. To test whether female peacekeepers increase the likelihood of the adoption of any gender reform, Table 2 presents the logistic regression results of the relationship between female peacekeepers and the adoption of any female ratio balancing reform (in Models 1 and 2) and gender mainstreaming reform (Models 3 and 4). Next, Table 3 tests whether female peacekeepers influence the relative number of security sector gender reforms adopted. Finally, Table 4 presents the results of female peacekeepers on the adoption of female ratio balancing reforms in only states with a peacekeeping mission.

Results

Female peacekeepers may promote the adoption of female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms in the host country's security sector in a number of ways, including through directly advocating for the reforms and assisting in the adoption and implementation of them and through inspiring local women and changing gender norms regarding women's role in security. As shown below, as the representation of female peacekeepers within police and military forces increase, the host country becomes more likely to adopt both female ratio balancing reforms and gender mainstreaming reforms overall and adopt relatively more of these reforms than states with fewer female peacekeepers.

Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression models for the full conflict and post-conflict state sample, which test whether female peacekeeper representation influences the likelihood that any security sector gender reform is adopted. As can be seen, the representation of female peacekeepers has a consistent positive and significant relationship with the adoption of these reforms, however, the strength of this relationship appears to be stronger with female ratio balancing reforms. As female peacekeeper representation increases by one percent, the likelihood of adopting a female ratio balancing reform increases from 50% to

Table 2: Logistic Regression Results, All Conflict States

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Ratio Balance		Gender Mainstream	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Female Peacekeepers	6.99** (3.39)	16.36** (7.99)	3.44 (3.14)	13.59* (7.72)
WINGOs		0.01** (0.005)		0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent		-0.003 (0.01)		-0.001 (0.01)
Sexual Violence		0.06 (0.14)		-0.001 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission		-0.08 (0.40)		-0.11 (0.50)
Civil War		0.54* (0.32)		0.65* (0.34)
Total Peacekeepers Male		-0.0000 (0.0000)		-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln		-0.04 (0.11)		-0.05 (0.09)
Polity 2		-0.05** (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption	-0.16 (0.22)	0.03 (0.28)	-0.13 (0.23)	0.003 (0.30)
Time Since Adoption ²	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption ²	0.002 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-0.76*** (0.18)	-1.41 (1.06)	-0.19 (0.16)	-0.67 (0.91)
Observations	550	369	550	369
R ²	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.11

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors




Figure 3: Logistic Regression (Model 2) Predicted Probabilities Plot

84%, as can be seen in Figure 3. As the average state adopts 1.7 reforms, this represents a significant increase. This relationship is highly significant. Similarly, an increase of female peacekeepers increases the likelihood of the adoption of a gender mainstreaming reform from 50% to 80%, and this relationship is only significant at the 10% level.

A similar pattern to those identified in Table 2 is found in Table 3, which examines the relationship between female peacekeepers and the *number* of reforms adopted by the host country. As the average representation of female peacekeepers stationed within the host country increases, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship with the adoption of female ratio balancing reforms, as seen in Models 5 and 6. Substantively, as female peacekeeper representation moves from zero percent to its maximum of 18%, states adopt two more reforms in the country-year. The relationship between female peacekeepers and the number of reforms adopted can be seen in Figure 4. Further, this relationship retains its direction and significance when examining the adoption of gender mainstreaming

reforms, leading an additional two reforms to be adopted in the state-year. In other words, as female peacekeeper presence increases, the host state increases its adoption of both female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms by almost 150%, increasing a predicted adoption of less than one policy per year to more than two per year.

Finally, several control variables should be discussed. As expected, the number of WINGOs present within a country is positively and significantly associated with the adoption of female ratio balancing reforms (although the significant relationship does not hold with gender mainstreaming reforms). This builds upon previous literature that finds that WINGOs are successfully able to campaign for increased women's rights and access to public offices (Murdie and Peksen 2015). Second, as expected, countries which have experienced a civil war are significantly more likely to adopt a gender reform than countries which are experiencing an inter-state conflict. Since civil wars often lead to greater disruption of traditional gender norms and may allow for women's mobilization and political liberalization, they made provide greater opportunity for gender reform in the security sector.

Finally, Table 5 presents the influence of female peacekeepers when the sample is limited to states with an active peacekeeping mission.²⁵ In these models, the type of female peacekeeper is further subdivided into female police officers and female military personnel.²⁶ As can be seen, both female military and police personnel have a positive correlation with the adoption of gender balancing reforms.²⁷ While these results should be interpreted cautiously given the small sample size, they provide suggestive evidence that while female peacekeepers promote the adoption of gendered security sector reforms compared to all conflict-affected states, even within peacekeeping missions, they continue to have a unique impact.

These results are robust to a number of alternative model specifications, including examining female police and military officers separately, using the maximum and minimum

²⁵Note that the control for whether the conflict was a civil war was removed as due to limited variation within the sample.

²⁶This was done to further distinguish between the roles that female peacekeepers play as well as to alleviate problems arising from the small sample size.

²⁷Female police and military personnel do not have a significant relationship with the adoption of gender mainstreaming reforms in this sub-sample.

Table 3: Negative Binomial Regression Results, All Conflict States

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count)		Gender Mainstream (Count)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Female Peacekeepers	7.27*** (2.31)	13.98*** (4.94)	6.04*** (2.17)	9.11** (4.51)
WINGO		0.01 (0.005)		0.01 (0.004)
Legislature Percent		-0.01 (0.01)		-0.005 (0.01)
Sexual Violence		0.05 (0.15)		-0.06 (0.14)
Multidimensional Mission		-0.24 (0.42)		0.21 (0.32)
Civil War		0.37 (0.30)		0.38 (0.27)
Total Peacekeepers, Male		0.0000 (0.0000)		-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln		-0.04 (0.10)		-0.08 (0.08)
Polity		-0.03 (0.02)		-0.004 (0.02)
Constant	-1.23*** (0.08)	-1.50 (0.93)	-0.71*** (0.07)	-0.53 (0.78)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	631	367	631	367
Log Likelihood	-460.05	-254.80	-621.82	-353.47
θ	2.92 (1.86)	10.42 (24.84)	1.49*** (0.39)	2.39** (1.13)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	924.10	539.61	1,247.63	736.95

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 4: Negative Binomial (Model 6) Predicted Probabilities Plot

percentage of female peacekeepers rather than the average,²⁸ the use of ordinary least squares regression (with year and country fixed effects and clustered standard errors), the removal of standard errors, the use of year and country fixed effects with the logistic regression and negative binomial models²⁹, and the inclusion of controls for the fertility rate, the female labor force participation rate, the missions status³⁰, the political terror scale, a dummy for democratic transition, the presence of a legislative gender quota, and the number of years since CEDAW ratification.³¹

While female peacekeepers may have a positive influence on the adoption of all types of security sector gender reform, they appear to have a stronger effect on the adoption of

²⁸It should be noted that logistic regression gender mainstreaming models lose significance with maximum female presence

²⁹It should be noted these models suffer from singularity and therefore, their results must be interpreted with caution.

³⁰However, the logistic and negative binomial regression female ratio balancing models lose significance.

³¹While in some of the models with additional controls, the independent variable loses significance, the overall pattern remains.

Table 4: Peacekeeping Mission Sub-sample: Logistic Regression Results

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balancing	
	(1)	(2)
Female UN Police	4.74* (2.76)	
Female UN Military		18.16* (10.97)
Multidimensional Mission	-3.29 (2.80)	-1.72*** (0.44)
WINGOs	-0.04 (0.04)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.07* (0.04)	0.09*** (0.02)
Sexual Violence	-0.14 (0.62)	-0.01 (0.26)
Total Male Peacekeepers	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001** (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.94 (0.93)	-0.27*** (0.09)
Polity	0.17 (0.16)	0.05 (0.05)
Time Since Adoption	3.29 (2.14)	1.81* (0.97)
Time Since Adoption ²	-1.26 (0.88)	-0.58 (0.42)
Time Since Adoption ³	0.11 (0.08)	0.05 (0.04)
Constant	-8.20 (5.64)	-1.81** (0.77)
Observations	55	91
R ²	0.29	0.27

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

female ratio balancing reforms. This is not surprising given that much of the United Nations and international community's emphasis has been on female ratio balancing. Further, as discussed by Karim (2017a), female ratio balancing reforms are relatively more easily measured and concrete compared to gender mainstreaming reforms often in both their design, implementation, and evaluation. Additionally, while peacekeeping missions themselves have often undergone female ratio balancing within missions to increase the presence of female peacekeepers, as discussed, female peacekeepers often continue to face barriers and limitations due to the remaining gendered culture of these missions and therefore, their ability to promote more general gender mainstreaming reforms in the host country's institutions may be hampered when the bureaucracy in which they operate continues to suffer from the same issues. However, while the success of female peacekeepers in promoting the adoption of these reforms merits celebration, the emphasis on female ratio balancing reforms also merits caution. As has been argued by several feminist scholars, female ratio balancing re-

forms are necessary, but not sufficient to change an institution's gendered norms (Whitworth 2005). Therefore, while these findings highlight progress toward gender reform within the host state's security sector, further emphasis is needed on gender mainstreaming efforts to ensure that female peacekeepers' success to bring more women into the institution is not limited to changes in descriptive representation alone.

Conclusion

Within the past twenty years, the number of female peacekeepers has increased rapidly, however, they still fall far below parity with male peacekeepers. Further, female peacekeepers continue to face barriers as a result of traditional, masculine gender norms and cultures within peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has pledged to promote gender equality within peacekeeping missions and to encourage the adoption of gender reforms with the domestic security sectors of host countries. While all peacekeeping missions may increase the adoption of security sector gender reform in some ways, female peacekeepers play a vital role in the adoption of these reforms. Specifically, female peacekeepers can advocate for these reforms through passive representation, in which they can inspire local women to join the security by demographically representing them in the bureaucracy and through active representation in which they work with local security sectors to adopt and implement female ratio balancing and gender mainstreaming reforms.

Using a unique dataset on gender reform within the security sector and data on women's representation within peacekeeping missions, this analysis demonstrates that female peacekeepers have a unique influence on domestic security sector reform that acts independently of other peacekeeping mission dynamics. As the proportion of female peacekeepers within a mission increases, the host country becomes more likely to adopt any female ratio balancing reform or gender mainstreaming reform in general and becomes more likely to adopt relatively more of these reforms in the country year. However, while female peacekeepers

increase the likelihood of either type of reform being adopted, they appear to have slightly more influence increasing the adoption of female ratio balancing reforms rather than gender mainstreaming reforms. This may indicate that female peacekeepers' influence is only successful at promoting demographic change within the security sector due to obstacles outside of their control or may indicate that female peacekeepers themselves do not advocate as urgently for gender mainstreaming reforms that are not focused directly on increasing women's physical presence in the security sector.

This study has several important theoretical and policy implications. First, this analysis contributes to theories on post-conflict state building by demonstrating how international actors can influence domestic policy changes and reforms. Further, it emphasizes that not all international security actors have the same interests and priorities and that some actors, such as female peacekeepers, are more likely to successfully advocate for security sector gender reforms. Further, this study extends theories of descriptive representation beyond women's political participation to examine how women in security roles may advocate for women's issues in other sectors. Lastly, this study adds further clarity into the mechanisms through which the UN and other international security institutions can promote gender equality in local contexts and provides further support for the need to include more women in peacekeeping operations. Further, beyond gender, this consideration can be extended into other types of diversity, such as class and ethnicity.

While this study examines the influence of female peacekeepers on gendered security sector reform, several other research questions stem from this analysis. First, this study examines two types of aggregate gender reforms and therefore, future analysis may want to examine the specific types of possible gender-oriented reforms to see if female peacekeepers prioritize some reforms over others. Second, this study only examines the adoption of these reforms and therefore, future research should examine whether these adopted reforms are successfully implemented and whether these reforms alter the operational effectiveness of security institutions. Further, if female peacekeepers are willing to advocate for gender

reforms in the host country's security sector, they may also continue to promote these reforms in their own countries when they return and therefore, scholars may want to examine how returning female peacekeepers may influence the gendered nature of their own institutions. Additionally, while female peacekeepers may advocate for women's issues and gender reform in the security sector, they may also have other security sector interests, such as children's protection or civilian protection. Finally, the passive and active representation demonstrated here may also be present for other types of peacekeepers, including religious and ethnic diversity, and therefore, future studies may want to examine whether these dynamics are also present with other under-represented groups in peacekeeping missions and post-conflict security institutions.

References

- Bellows, John and Edward Miguel. 2009. "War and local collective action in Sierra Leone." *Journal of Public Economics* 93(11):1144–1157.
- Bjarnegård, Elin and Erik Melander. 2011. "Disentangling Gender, Peace and Democratization: The Negative Effects of Militarized Masculinity." *Journal of Gender Studies* 20(2):139–154.
- Blattman, Christopher. 2009. "From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda." *American Political Science Review* 103(2):231–247.
- Bratton, Kathleen A. and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics* 61(03):658–679.
- Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. 2010. "Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data." *Political Analysis* 18:271–292.
- Cohen, Dara Kay and Ragnhild Nordås. 2014. "Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989–2009." *Journal of Peace Research* 51(3):418–428.
- Egnell, R. 2014. *Gender Effectiveness, and Organizational Change. The Swedish Model*. Palgrave MacMillan.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The origins of political order: From prehuman times to the French Revolution*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gilligan, Michael J, Benjamin J Pasquale and Cyrus Samii. 2014. "Civil war and social cohesion: Lab-in-the-field evidence from Nepal." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(3):604–619.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. 2003. *War and Gender*. Springer.
- Huber, Laura. N.d. "Buying Women's Rights: The Role of International Actors and Conflict in the Adoption and Implementation of Gender Reform."
- Huber, Laura and Sabrina Karim. 2018. "The Internationalization of SSR Gender Balancing in Post-Conflict States." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* .
- Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook and Pamela Paxton. 2015. "Transnational Women's Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas." *International Studies Quarterly* pp. 357–372.
- Hughes, Melanie M., Pamela Paxton, Sharon Quinsaat and Nicholas Reith. Forthcoming. "Does the Global North Still Dominate the International Women's Movement? A Network Analysis of Women's International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1978–2008." *Mobilization* .
- Hughes, Melanie M., Pamela Paxton, Sharon Quinsaat, Nicholas Reith and Nicholas Reith. 2017. "Women's International Nongovernmental Organizations, 1950–2013."

- Joshi, Madhav and John Darby. 2013. "Introducing the Peace Accords Matrix (PAM): A database of comprehensive peace agreements and their implementation, 1989–2007." *Peacebuilding* 1(2):256–274.
- Karim, Sabrina. 2017a. *Gender and Women in Military Affairs: A Comparative Study*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Karim, Sabrina. 2017b. "Reevaluating Peacekeeping Effectiveness: Does Gender Neutrality Inhibit Progress?" *International Interactions* 43(5):822–847.
- Karim, Sabrina. 2017c. "Restoring confidence in post-conflict security sectors: Survey evidence from Liberia on female ratio balancing reforms." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–23.
- Karim, Sabrina. N.d. "United Nations Peacekeeping Bias in State Building: Experimental Evidence on Local Effects with the Liberian National Police." . Forthcoming.
- Karim, Sabrina, Andrew Wagstaff and Laura Huber. n.d. "Internal Security Forces Dataset." .
- Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2013. "Female Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token Gestures or Informed Policymaking?" *International Interactions* 39(4):461–488.
- Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2016a. "Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions: The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1):100–115.
- Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2016b. "Explaining sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping missions The role of female peacekeepers and gender equality in contributing countries." *Journal of Peace Research* 53(1):100–115.
- Karim, Sabrina and Kyle Beardsley. 2017. *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.
- Karim, Sabrina, Michael Gilligan, Robert Blair and Kyle Beardsley. 2018. "International Gender Balancing Reforms in Post-Conflict Countries: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence from the Liberian National Police." *International Studies Quarterly* .
- Keiser, Lael R, Vicky M Wilkins, Kenneth J Meier and Catherine A Holland. 2002. "Lipstick and logarithms: Gender, institutional context, and representative bureaucracy." *American political science review* 96(3):553–564.
- Koch, Michael T. and Sarah A. Fulton. 2011. "In the Defense of Women: Gender, Office Holding, and National Security Policy in Established Democracies." *The Journal of Politics* 73(01):1–16.
- Kronsell, Annica. 2012. *Gender, sex and the postnational defense: Militarism and peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.
- Lake, David A. 2016. *The Statebuilders Dilemma: Legitimacy, Loyalty, and the Limits of External Intervention*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Marshall, Gurr Monty G., Ted Robert and Ketih Jagers. 2015. "Polity IV Project Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015 Dataset Users' Manual."
- Meier, Kenneth J. 1993. "Representative bureaucracy: A theoretical and empirical exposition." *Research in public administration* 2(1):1–35.
- Meier, Kenneth J and Jill Nicholson-Crotty. 2006. "Gender, representative bureaucracy, and law enforcement: The case of sexual assault." *Public Administration Review* 66(6):850–860.
- Murdie, Amanda and Dursun Peksen. 2015. "Women's rights INGO shaming and the government respect for women's rights." *The Review of International Organizations* 10(1):1–22.
- Narang, Neil and Yanjun Liu. N.d. "Are Peacekeeping Units with More Females More Effective? Evaluating the Impact of Female Peacekeepers on Post-Conflict Outcomes and Behavior." . Forthcoming.
- Nordås, Ragnhild and Siri CA Rustad. 2013. "Sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers: Understanding variation." *International Interactions* 39(4):511–534.
- Paxton, Pamela, Jennifer Green and Melanie Hughes. 2008. "Women in Parliament, 1945-2003: Cross-National Dataset." . ICPSR24340-v1.
- Perry, Chris and Adam Smith. N.d. "Trends in Uniformed Contributions to UN Peacekeeping: A New Dataset, 19912012."
- Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press.
- Reingold, Beth. 2003. *Representing women: Sex, gender, and legislative behavior in Arizona and California*. Univ of North Carolina Press.
- Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah and Reed M Wood. 2017. "Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace." *The Journal of Politics* 79(3):000–000.
- Shair-Rosenfield, Sarah and Reed Wood. Forthcoming. "Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace." *Journal of Politics* .
- Toft, Monica Duffy. 2010. *Securing the peace: the durable settlement of civil wars*. Princeton University Press.
- Tripp, Aili Mari. 2015. *Women and power in post-conflict Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Whitworth, Sandra. 2005. *Critical Security Studies in World Politics*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Appendix


Table 5: Countries and Peacekeeping Missions in Dataset

Country	Mission
Afghanistan	UNAMA
Burundi	ONUB BINUB
Central African Republic	MINURCAT
Chad	MINURCAT
Columbia	UNMC
Cyprus	UNFICYP
DR Congo	MONUC MONUSCO
East Timor	UNMIT
Eritrea	UNMEE
Ethiopia	UNMEE
Georgia	UNOMIG
Haiti	MINUSTAH
India	UNMOGIP
Iraq	UNAMI
Israel	UNDOF
Ivory Coast	UNOCI
Kosovo	UNMIK
Lebanon	UNIFIL
Liberia	UNMIL
Mali	MINUSCA
Morocco	MINURSO
Nepal	UNMIN
Pakistan	UNMOGIP
Sierra Leone	UNIOSIL
Somalia	UNTSO
South Sudan	UNMISS
Sudan	UNAMID UNISFA
Syria	UNDOF

Table 6: Countries and Years in Dataset

Country	Entry Year	Country	Entry Year
Afghanistan	2006	Lesotho	2006
Algeria	2006	Liberia	2006
Angola	2006	Libya	2011
Armenia	2006	Macedonia	2006
Azerbaijan	2006	Malaysia	2013
Bangladesh	2006	Mali	2006
Bosnia & Herzegovina	2006	Mauritania	2010
Cambodia	2006	Mexico	2006
Burundi	2006	Moldova	2006
Cameroon	2006	Morocco	2006
Central African Republic	2006	Mozambique	2006
Chad	2006	Myanmar	2006
China	2008	Nepal	2006
Columbia	2006	Nicaragua	2006
Comoros	2006	Niger	2006
Congo	2006	Nigeria	2006
Croatia	2006	Pakistan	2006
Cyprus	2006	Papua New Guinea	2006
Djibouti	2006	Peru	2006
DR Congo	2006	Philippines	2006
East Timor	2006	Russia	2006
Ecuador	2006	Rwanda	2006
Egypt	2006	Saudi Arabia	2006
El Salvador	2006	Serbia	2006
Eritrea	2006	Senegal	2006
Ethiopia	2006	Sierra Leone	2006
Georgia	2006	Somalia	2006
Guatemala	2006	South Sudan	2011
Guinea	2006	Spain	2006
Guinea-Bissau	2006	Sri Lanka	2006
Haiti	2006	Sudan	2006
India	2006	Syria	2006
Indonesia	2006	Tajikistan	2006
Iran	2006	Thailand	2006
Iraq	2006	Trinidad and Tobago	2006
Israel	2006	Turkey	2006
Ivory Coast	2006	Uganda	2006
Kenya	2015	Ukraine	2014
Kosovo	2006	Uzbekistan	2006
Kuwait	2006	Venezuela	2006
Laos	2006	Yemen	2006
Lebanon	2006		

Number of Female Ratio Balancing Reform Adoptions



Number of Gender Mainstreaming Reform Adoptions




Table 7: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression with Proportion Female Military and Police

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)	Female Ratio Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
% Female Military	20.66** (8.43)	19.50** (7.98)	-5.34** (2.11)	-7.30*** (2.39)
% Female Police			0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	0.13 (0.17)	0.13 (0.17)
Sexual Violence	0.06 (0.13)	0.001 (0.16)	0.65 (0.44)	0.64 (0.58)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.02 (0.37)	-0.08 (0.48)	1.02** (0.49)	1.26** (0.50)
Civil War	0.66** (0.33)	0.81** (0.36)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.10)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.03 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.06** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Polity 2	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.13 (0.31)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.04 (0.28)		0.004 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.04 (0.09)		-0.0003 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.003 (0.01)			
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		0.02 (0.30)		-0.09 (0.33)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.08 (0.10)		-0.04 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)		0.003 (0.01)
Constant	-1.57 (1.05)	-0.90 (0.90)	-1.87 (1.31)	-1.14 (1.01)
Observations	369	369	337	337
R ²	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.13
χ ² (df = 12)	20.26*	33.52***	17.22	33.89***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 8: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Proportion Female Military and Police

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)	Female Balance (Count) (3)	Gender Mainstream (Co (4)
% Female Military	16.64*** (4.89)	13.57*** (4.61)		
% Female Police			-4.89 (3.88)	-8.92* (4.66)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.01 (0.01)	0.003 (0.005)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.04 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)	0.01 (0.17)	-0.02 (0.15)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.11 (0.39)	0.24 (0.30)	0.38 (0.49)	0.81** (0.35)
Civil War	0.45 (0.31)	0.51* (0.28)	0.72* (0.42)	1.10*** (0.41)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.02 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Constant	-1.68* (0.94)	-0.79 (0.78)	-2.13** (1.08)	-1.51 (0.92)
Observations	369	369	337	337
Log Likelihood	-253.83	-352.18	-222.89	-305.79
θ	12.22 (32.94)	2.60** (1.30)	8.71 (19.57)	2.77* (1.56)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	537.66	734.37	475.78	641.58

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<

Table 9: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Minimum and Maximum Proportion of Female Peacekeepers

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)	Female Ratio Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
Maximum % Female Peacekeepers	11.70* (6.83)	9.29 (6.52)	14.49 (9.12)	10.73 (9.29)
Minimum % Female Peacekeepers				
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.04 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.08 (0.40)	-0.11 (0.49)	-0.03 (0.37)	-0.06 (0.47)
Civil War	0.49 (0.32)	0.60* (0.34)	0.41 (0.32)	0.53 (0.34)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.03 (0.28)		0.03 (0.28)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.04 (0.09)		-0.04 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.003 (0.01)		0.003 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		-0.001 (0.30)		-0.001 (0.30)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.10)		-0.07 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-1.26 (1.04)	-0.53 (0.89)	-1.13 (1.06)	-0.40 (0.92)
Observations	369	369	369	369
R ²	0.07	0.11	0.06	0.10
χ^2 (df = 12)	17.24	30.02***	15.73	28.90***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 10: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Maximum and Minimum Female Peacekeepers

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)	Female Balance (Count) (3)	Gender Mainstr (4)
Maximum % Female Peacekeepers	11.13*** (3.80)	7.73** (3.61)		
Minimum % Female Peacekeepers			15.23** (6.26)	9.00 (5.90)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.01 (0.004)	0.01* (0.005)	0.01 (0.00)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.02 (0.15)	-0.08 (0.14)	0.03 (0.15)	-0.0 (0.14)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.18 (0.41)	0.22 (0.31)	-0.15 (0.41)	0.24 (0.31)
Civil War	0.34 (0.30)	0.37 (0.27)	0.26 (0.29)	0.28 (0.26)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.00 (0.00)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.10)	-0.1 (0.08)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X		
Constant	-1.48 (0.92)	-0.53 (0.77)	-1.38 (0.93)	-0.3 (0.78)
Observations	369	369	369	369
Log Likelihood	-255.18	-354.09	-256.34	-355
θ	9.13 (18.99)	2.37** (1.12)	7.10 (11.90)	2.25** (
Akaike Inf. Crit.	540.36	738.18	542.68	740.5

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.0

Table 11: Robustness Check: OLS Regression with Year Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Female Ratio Balance (2)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (3)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (4)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemale	6.45*** (1.98)	3.60** (1.49)	4.26*** (1.33)	3.17* (1.65)
WINGOs	0.003 (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)		0.002 (0.001)
Legislature Percent	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.0003 (0.002)		0.0005 (0.002)
Sexual Violence	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)		0.02 (0.04)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.11 (0.13)	-0.003 (0.10)		0.02 (0.11)
Civil War	0.12 (0.10)	0.10 (0.07)		0.13 (0.08)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)		-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)		-0.01 (0.02)
Polity 2	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.004)		0.002 (0.005)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	367	367	631	367
R ²	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03
Adjusted R ²		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.58 (df = 352)	0.44 (df = 352)	0.85 (df = 629)	0.49 (df = 352)
F Statistic	1.53* (df = 14; 352)	1.14 (df = 14; 352)	10.25*** (df = 1; 629)	0.86 (df = 14; 352)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table 12: Robustness Check: OLS Regression with State Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)	Female Ratio Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemale	9.02** (4.52)	16.78*** (6.09)	4.13 (3.42)	7.09* (3.62)
WINGOs	-0.003 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.67 (0.73)	0.95 (0.98)	0.16 (0.55)	0.27 (0.58)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.14 (0.78)	-0.25 (1.05)	0.09 (0.59)	-0.04 (0.62)
Civil War	-0.39 (0.90)	-0.33 (1.21)	-0.10 (0.68)	0.30 (0.72)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.08 (0.26)	0.37 (0.35)	0.06 (0.20)	0.13 (0.21)
Polity 2	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	367	367	367	367
R ²	0.25	0.30	0.23	0.29
Adjusted R ²	0.06	0.12	0.04	0.11
Residual Std. Error (df = 292)	0.57	0.77	0.43	0.46
F Statistic (df = 74; 292)	1.30*	1.66***	1.19	1.58***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Model suffers from degree of freedom problem. Interpret with caution.

Table 13: Robustness Check: OLS Regression with State and Year Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)	Female Ratio Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemale	9.29** (4.54)	17.04*** (6.15)	4.34 (3.44)	7.01* (3.66)
WINGOs	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.0003 (0.02)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.34 (0.79)	0.77 (1.06)	0.01 (0.59)	0.24 (0.63)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.25 (0.79)	-0.37 (1.07)	0.04 (0.60)	-0.05 (0.64)
Civil War	-1.21 (1.22)	-0.72 (1.65)	-0.43 (0.92)	0.19 (0.98)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.14 (0.29)	0.47 (0.39)	0.10 (0.22)	0.14 (0.23)
Polity 2	0.03 (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
State Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X
Observations	367	367	367	367
R ²	0.26	0.30	0.24	0.29
Adjusted R ²	0.05	0.11	0.03	0.09
Residual Std. Error (df = 287)	0.57	0.77	0.43	0.46
F Statistic (df = 79; 287)	1.27*	1.55***	1.14	1.47**

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model suffers from degree of freedom problem. Interpret with caution.

Table 14: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression with No Clustered Standard Errors

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	16.36** (7.50)	13.59* (7.53)
WINGOs	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.06 (0.20)	-0.001 (0.19)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.08 (0.49)	-0.11 (0.45)
Civil War	0.54 (0.39)	0.65* (0.38)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.11)
Polity 2	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.03 (0.32)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.04 (0.10)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.003 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		0.003 (0.29)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-1.41 (1.18)	-0.67 (1.09)
Observations	369	369
R ²	0.07	0.11
χ^2 (df = 12)	18.22	30.94***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Logistic Regression with Year Fixed Effects and Clustered Standard Errors

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	18.11** (8.53)	15.49* (8.28)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.001 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.11 (0.16)	0.09 (0.19)
Multidimensional Mission	0.07 (0.45)	0.12 (0.58)
Civil War	0.50 (0.37)	0.63 (0.40)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.11)
Polity 2	-0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Observations	369	369
R ²	0.06	0.05
χ^2 (df = 14)	16.11	13.72

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Clustered Standard Errors

Table 16: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression State Fixed Effects

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	15.84* (9.14)	16.91** (7.60)
WINGOs	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.04)
Legislature Percent	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Sexual Violence	-19.87 (46,404.93)	1.03 (1.84)
Multidimensional Mission	-20.84 (46,404.93)	0.70 (1.89)
Civil War	19.81 (46,404.93)	-1.24 (2.30)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0002)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.27 (0.97)	0.92 (0.76)
Polity 2	0.12 (0.11)	0.04 (0.08)
State Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-0.75 (6.98)	-5.48 (5.42)
Observations	369	369
Log Likelihood	-208.26	-289.48
θ	7,193.98 (68,174.54)	7,389.42 (75,369.64)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	566.52	728.96

Note: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression with Gender Equality Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)	Female Ratio Balance (3)	Gender Mainstream (4)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	16.45* (8.98)	13.26 (8.79)	16.06** (8.09)	13.03 (8.01)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.09 (0.14)	0.03 (0.16)	0.09 (0.15)	0.08 (0.18)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.06 (0.39)	-0.15 (0.50)	-0.06 (0.38)	-0.14 (0.51)
Civil War	0.56* (0.32)	0.73** (0.36)	0.57* (0.33)	0.70* (0.37)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.01 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.18)	-0.11 (0.14)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.003 (0.03)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.11 (0.29)		0.11 (0.29)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.07 (0.09)		-0.07 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		-0.03 (0.34)		-0.02 (0.34)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.11)		-0.07 (0.11)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)		0.01 (0.01)
Female Labor Force Ratio	0.002 (0.01)	-0.0004 (0.01)		
Fertility Rate			0.01 (0.12)	-0.08 (0.12)
Constant	-1.68 (1.56)	-0.81 (1.27)	-1.61 (1.88)	-0.04 (1.53)
Observations	342	342	342	342
R ²	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.13
χ ² (df = 13)	17.73	32.46***	17.70	32.93***

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 18: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Gender Equality Controls

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Female Balance (Count) (1)	Gender Mainstream (Count) (2)	Female Balance (Count) (3)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	14.95*** (5.27)	11.76** (4.87)	14.53*** (4.93)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.01 (0.005)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.07 (0.15)	-0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.14 (0.40)	0.11 (0.32)	-0.15 (0.40)
Civil War	0.37 (0.31)	0.41 (0.29)	0.39 (0.31)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.02 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.10)	0.04 (0.13)
Polity 2	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Female Labor Force Participation	0.003 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
Fertility Rate			0.04 (0.09)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X	
Constant	-2.02* (1.22)	-1.25 (1.00)	-2.23 (1.43)
Observations	342	342	342
Log Likelihood	-239.87	-325.11	-239.83
θ	7.28 (12.66)	2.32** (1.12)	7.46 (13.30)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	511.73	682.23	511.66

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<

Table 19: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression with Mission Status Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	18.59 (12.37)	19.04* (10.92)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.07 (0.14)	0.02 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.03 (0.41)	0.02 (0.51)
Civil War	0.50 (0.35)	0.55 (0.36)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.05 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.03 (0.28)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.04 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.003 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		0.004 (0.30)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.08 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Mission Status	-0.09 (0.30)	-0.23 (0.26)
Constant	-1.30 (1.14)	-0.38 (0.98)
Observations	369	369
R ²	0.07	0.11
χ^2 (df = 13)	18.31	31.50***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 20: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Mission Status Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	16.12** (7.17)	9.16 (6.48)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.01 (0.004)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.05 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.14 (0.43)	0.18 (0.34)
Civil War	0.34 (0.31)	0.41 (0.28)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.04 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.08)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)
Mission Status	-0.07 (0.24)	0.05 (0.21)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-1.52 (0.96)	-0.66 (0.81)
Observations	369	369
Log Likelihood	-254.83	-353.76
θ	10.19 (23.44)	2.41** (1.14)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	541.66	739.53

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 21: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Political Terror Scale Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	14.86* (7.95)	13.59* (7.72)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.05 (0.15)	-0.001 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.05 (0.39)	-0.11 (0.50)
Civil War	0.58* (0.33)	0.65* (0.34)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.05 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.12 (0.29)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.08 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.01 (0.01)	
Political Terror Scale	0.11 (0.14)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		0.003 (0.30)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-1.92 (1.32)	-0.67 (0.91)
Observations	342	369
R ²	0.08	0.11
χ^2	18.08 (df = 13)	30.94*** (df = 12)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered standard errors

Table 22: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Political Terror Scale Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	12.73** (5.06)	8.03* (4.80)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	-0.001 (0.17)	-0.14 (0.15)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.14 (0.40)	0.16 (0.32)
Civil War	0.40 (0.31)	0.45 (0.29)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.01 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Political Terror Scale	0.15 (0.13)	0.18 (0.11)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-2.29** (1.11)	-1.33 (0.93)
Observations	342	342
Log Likelihood	-239.32	-324.28
θ	10.93 (27.71)	2.49* (1.28)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	510.64	680.55

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 23: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Democratic Transition Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	14.22* (8.00)	11.32 (8.07)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.004)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.09 (0.14)	0.05 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.03 (0.35)	-0.13 (0.48)
Civil War	0.39 (0.39)	0.51 (0.40)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.05 (0.13)	-0.08 (0.10)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.03)	0.0005 (0.03)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.16 (0.29)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.10 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.01 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		-0.02 (0.34)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.08 (0.11)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Democratic Transition	-7.72*** (0.51)	-1.13 (1.20)
Constant	-1.05 (1.30)	-0.30 (1.05)
Observations	335	335
R ²	0.09	0.13
χ^2 (df = 13)	20.91*	33.15***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 24: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression Legislative Gender Quota Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	16.05* (8.22)	15.01* (8.19)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.005 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.06 (0.14)	0.004 (0.16)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.09 (0.40)	-0.07 (0.47)
Civil War	0.52 (0.34)	0.70* (0.37)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.04 (0.11)	-0.04 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.03 (0.28)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.04 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.003 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		-0.01 (0.30)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.10)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Legislative Quota	0.07 (0.32)	-0.32 (0.28)
Constant	-1.38 (1.08)	-0.82 (0.91)
Observations	369	369
R ²	0.07	0.11
χ^2 (df = 13)	18.28	32.33***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 25: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Legislative Gender Quota Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	14.37*** (4.91)	12.23*** (4.55)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.005)	0.01 (0.004)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.04 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.13)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.18 (0.40)	0.24 (0.31)
Civil War	0.35 (0.30)	0.47* (0.27)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.03 (0.10)	-0.06 (0.08)
Polity 2	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.004 (0.02)
Legislative Quota	0.04 (0.22)	-0.42** (0.19)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-1.56* (0.94)	-0.83 (0.78)
Observations	369	369
Log Likelihood	-254.86	-351.29
θ	9.99 (22.63)	2.69** (1.36)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	541.72	734.59

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 26: Robustness Check: Logistic Regression CEDAW Ratification Years Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance (1)	Gender Mainstream (2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	14.82* (8.42)	12.94 (8.21)
WINGOs	0.01** (0.005)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.08 (0.14)	0.03 (0.15)
Multidimensional Mission	0.01 (0.40)	-0.13 (0.52)
Civil War	0.62** (0.31)	0.74** (0.35)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	-0.02 (0.12)	-0.04 (0.10)
Polity 2	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.002 (0.03)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.11 (0.29)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.07 (0.09)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.01 (0.01)	
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		-0.03 (0.34)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.07 (0.11)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Constant	-1.35 (1.22)	-0.78 (1.01)
Observations	342	342
R ²	0.08	0.12
χ^2 (df = 13)	18.31	32.53***

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 27: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression CEDAW Ratification Years Control

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemaleIag	12.83** (5.00)	9.15* (4.72)
WINGOs	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.005)
Legislature Percent	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Sexual Violence	0.05 (0.16)	-0.06 (0.14)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.07 (0.41)	0.18 (0.32)
Civil War	0.46 (0.32)	0.49* (0.29)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.01 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.09)
Polity 2	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
CEDAW Years	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-1.61 (1.01)	-0.59 (0.85)
Observations	342	342
Log Likelihood	-239.22	-325.15
θ	8.06 (15.31)	2.31** (1.12)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	510.43	682.29

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 28: Robustness Check: Peacekeeping Mission Subset

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Ratio Balance	Gender Mainstream
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemalelag	11.46** (4.59)	8.81* (4.86)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.49 (0.30)	-0.21 (0.38)
Civil War	0.61* (0.33)	0.53 (0.37)
Time Since Adoption (Balance)	0.61 (0.40)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ²	-0.22* (0.13)	
Time Since Adoption (Balance) ³	0.02 (0.01)	
Total Peacekeepers, Male		-0.0000 (0.0000)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream)		0.22 (0.34)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ²		-0.11 (0.11)
Time Since Adoption (Mainstream) ³		0.01 (0.01)
Constant	-1.53*** (0.33)	-0.89** (0.40)
Observations	168	168
R ²	0.08	0.06
χ^2	9.15 (df = 6)	7.84 (df = 7)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-clustered Standard Errors

Table 29: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Peacekeeping Subset

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemaleIag	8.11** (3.51)	7.00** (3.52)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.37 (0.35)	-0.10 (0.32)
Civil War	0.50 (0.34)	0.36 (0.32)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-1.35*** (0.42)	-0.53 (0.36)
Observations	168	168
Log Likelihood	-132.69	-175.80
θ	5.60 (10.39)	1.28** (0.55)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	287.39	373.60

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 30: Robustness Check: Negative Binomial Regression Peacekeeping Mission Subset

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Female Balance (Count)	Gender Mainstream (Count)
	(1)	(2)
Total_Peacekeepers_AverageFemaleIag	16.52** (6.76)	9.15 (5.82)
WINGOs	0.004 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Legislature Percent	0.02 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)
Sexual Violence	0.21 (0.32)	0.23 (0.28)
Multidimensional Mission	-0.39 (0.49)	0.14 (0.40)
Civil War	0.55 (0.64)	0.86 (0.59)
Total Peacekeepers, Male	0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0000)
GDP per Capita, ln	0.02 (0.20)	0.15 (0.17)
Polity 2	0.06 (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)
Year Fixed Effects	X	X
Constant	-2.75 (1.97)	-2.47 (1.73)
Observations	97	97
Log Likelihood	-73.90	-102.28
θ	6,371.81 (113,404.50)	4.10 (4.50)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	177.79	234.56

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01