From Policy to Progress: The Effect of Civil Conflict on Women's Rights Reforms

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All comments and suggestions welcome.

Abstract

How does civil conflict moderate the role of domestic and international factors in domestic policymaking? While international actors have long played a key role in the adoption of domestic policy reform by offering material incentives, the susceptibility of states to material pressure varies. This project examines how the effectiveness of international pressure in favor of women's rights is amplified in conflict and post-conflict states. Specifically, states which have experienced intrastate conflict are especially dependent upon international aid and investment. Therefore, due to the stronger effect of third party incentives, conflict-affected states may have greater political will and pressure to adopt and implement gender reform policies than non-conflict states. Using a unique cross-national dataset on the adoption of several gender reforms between 1970 and 2016, this study examines how conflict moderates the influence of international third parties on domestic policymaking. The results demonstrate that while international actors do not appear to significantly increase the adoption of women's rights policies in post-conflict countries, they do have a significant effect on improving women's rights in these countries even in the absence of these policies. This study advances our understanding of the dynamic processes that influence women's rights policy diffusion and the complex interaction between domestic and international factors in policymaking more generally.

Introduction

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), which promotes women's right to participate in security and peace processes (Anderlini 2007, Cohn 2004, Olsson and Gizelis 2013, Tryggestad 2013). With UNSCR 1325, women's rights became a matter of national and international security and sprung to the front of the international agenda. As a result, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and states increasingly pressure domestic policymakers to adopt gender reforms using a variety of tactics, including normative appeals, direct assistance, the promise of future benefits, and threats of punishment for noncompliance (Bush 2011, Hafner-Burton 2008, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016). However, despite this international pressure, a great degree of variation exists among states in the number and character of their reforms (Bush 2011, Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Hafner-Burton 2008, Huber and Karim 2018, Krook 2009, Montoya 2013, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True 2016). While the progress of individual states, institutions, or regions to promote gender equality has been increasingly documented, little is understood about gendered policy adoption cross-nationally.[1]

Scholars have long considered how international and domestic dynamics interact to affect policymaking (Waltz 1979, Jervis 1997, Chaubin et al. 2015, Gourevitch 1978, Oatley 2011, Pevehouse 2005). This paper extends theories of the moderating effect of international factors on domestic policymaking by proposing that domestic context, specifically civil conflict, primes and increases the influence of international actors. Specifically, this paper examines how international third parties promote the adoption of gender reform by offering material incentives in exchange for the adoption of women's rights policies. While all states are susceptible to material incentives, states which have experienced intrastate conflict are especially dependent upon

[1]For a survey of literature examining cross-national adoption of gender reform, see Basini (2013), Carey (2001), Charlesworth and Wood (2010), Dandeker and Segal (1996), Farr (2011), Hewitt (2016), Irvine (2013), McWilliams and Kilmurray (2015), Olsson (2001), Pupavac (2005), Wright (2016)) Further, the connection between the adoption of women's rights policies and their outcomes and impacts on gender equality is not always clear.

international aid and investment due to conflict-related destruction and decreased economic activity. Further, post-conflict states often experience unique changes in gender relations and political opportunities that may increase political will for gender reform. Therefore, due to the stronger effect of third parties in conflict and post-conflict states, conflict-affected states may have greater political will and pressure to adopt these reforms than non-conflict states.

The following section reviews literature on the relative influence of international and domestic factors in policymaking before turning to discuss the increased salience and diffusion of gender reform. Then, I examine the international and domestic factors that promote gender reform and argue that international actors offer material benefits to increase the attractiveness of gender reform. Next, I discuss how conflict acts as a catalyst to promote the adoption of gender reforms by increasing the influence of international actors. In the fourth section, I present a quantitative analysis of the impact of international actors and conflict on the adoption of gender reforms and the improvement of women's rights.

International Influence on Domestic Policymaking

While the state has long been considered the basic unit of international relations, scholars question the relative importance of domestic and systemic, international factors in world politics. As globalization has increased, most scholars acknowledge that domestic and international forces interact to influence international relations and domestic policymaking, yet the extent of this interaction and the relative influence of domestic and systemic factors remains debated.[2]

There are a number of ways in which international actors can influence domestic policymaking. First, states may adopt policies supported by international actors as a result of social pressure to conform with international trends to retain a legitimate reputation. For example, the "world polity" model argues that countries are culturally-constructed and exist within a world society that promotes modernization, which creates pressures for diffusion of "modern"

[2]See for example Boix (1998), Cerny (1995), Chaudoin, Milner and Pang (2015), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Garrett (1998), Garrett and Lange (1996), Gourevitch (1978), Kitschelt and Stephens (1999), Mosley (2000, 2003), Oatley and Danzman (2011)

policies (Strang and Meyer 1993). Therefore, states comply with norms to appear 'modern' and increase their international reputation (Bush 2011). For example, Montoya (2013) examines how IGOs, such as the EU, invoke rhetoric connecting certain desired policies with European culture, industrialization, and stablity.

Similarly, states may adopt policies as a result of learning. In other words, states may observe the beneficial results of their peers' policies and hope to share in the benefits by adopting similar policies (Balla 2001, Berry and Berry 1999, Mintrom 1997, Shipan and Volden 2008). This effect is especially strong among geographically proximate and culturally similar countries due to improved communication and enhanced generalizability (Balla 2001, Berry and Berry 1999, Mintrom 1997, Shipan and Volden 2008). Additionally, international organizations may function as "teachers of norms" or "transmission belts" by disseminating information about growing international norms (Finnemore 1993, Greenhill 2010*b*, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Nye and Keohane 1989, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999).

Finally, international actors may promote the adoption of certain policies through coercion. In particular, international actors may offer a benefit for adoption or threaten punishment for lack of compliance. Coercion can take various forms, including direct punishment for noncompliance, such as sanctions, indirect punishment, such as the promise of less cooperation, the removal of future benefits, and the promise of rewards for good behavior. Pevehouse (2005) outlines international coercive strategies as "carrots and sticks," which represent the combined offers of rewards and punishments to induce compliance.

In general, states are affected in some way by international factors to adopt policies favored by the international community. However, there is no consensus on the relative role of normative convergence, in which domestic actors internalize the norm versus international coercion, in which the state adopts the policy to avoid punishment or reap the benefits of compliance with little to no normative acceptance. The relative roles of normative beliefs and coercion are complex as different actors may adopt policies for different reasons. For example, the bandwagoning model argues that norms gain precedence on the international stage as a result of NGO campaigning and the adoption of the norm by a few important states (Finnemore and

Sikkink 1998). While these original norm-accepting states adopted the norm due to the states' (or IGOs') inherent belief in its justness, as more states adopt the norm, the motivations for adoption become less clear (Hyde 2011, N.d.). Thus, there exists great heterogeneity among states regarding the role of domestic and international factors and the influence of normative persuasion and coercion on domestic policymaking.

Women, Peace, and Security - A Rising Norm

While there are many norms and policies that international actors seek to promote domestically, this study particularly examines the diffusion of gender reforms due to their increasing salience. However, the patterns of diffusion discussed are highly relevant to other policies that are favored and promoted by the international community, are relatively new and increasing in salience, and challenge behavior practiced within a broad range of states. In this way, gender reforms represent a particularly strong case as their recent securitiziation greatly increased their salience, but also face strong resistance as they challenge fundamental societal relations.

While women's rights have long been promoted by advocates, a notable shift occurred at the turn of the 21st century when women's rights began to be emphasized as crucial for international peace and security (Anderlini 2007, Caprioli 2005, Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Goldstein 2003, Hudson 2009, Hudson et al. 2013, Jansson and Eduards 2016, Koch and Fulton 2011, Melander 2005*a*,*b*, Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). Despite the increased interest in gender reforms, variation remains in which states adopt women's rights policies. While many states have welcomed the adoption of gender reforms, others have rejected these policies. Several models are invoked to explain the diffusion of gender reforms. While these frameworks share common themes, they differ in the primary causal pathways. Importantly, no single framework explains gender reform diffusion across all states (Krook 2009).

Some scholars emphasize that states adopt gender reforms in an effort to appear modernized and to gain greater favor with the international community (Montoya 2013). Bush (2011) explains how political gender quotas are closely tied to conceptions of modernization

and democracy. Similarly, McLeod (2011) argues that Serbia adopted several women's rights policies to demonstrate its legitimacy and modernity. Other scholars point to the role of NGOs in the diffusion of gender reforms (Irvine 2013). For example, Htun and Weldon (2012) argue that feminist mobilization domestically and transnationally is critical for the adoption of policies combating violence against women. Finally, several models focus on domestic sources of norm diffusion (Cortell and Davis 2000, Mazur and Stetson 2010). Democracy is often linked with the adoption of gender reforms. For example, True (2016) and Hughes et al. (2015) find that democracy promotes the adoption of NAPs for UNSCR 1325 and political gender quotas. Similarly, women's participation in politics also may increase the adoption of gender reforms due to substantive representation of female constituents (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Celis and Childs 2012, Koch and Fulton 2011, Pitkin 1967).[3] Finally, conflict and post-conflict states are especially prone to adopt gender reforms (Acharya 2004, Basini and Ryan 2016, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015, Krook 2006, Tripp 2015, True and Mintrom 2001).

While previous studies have provided many important improvements in our understanding of the diffusion of gender reform, several shortcomings are present. First, many focus on the adoption of one type of policy, which obscures points of comparison and results in contradictory findings. Second, many studies do not consider the interactive effects which may occur between international and domestic diffusion pathways. That said, Hughes et al. (2015) present a major advancement by considering how transnational and domestic women's movements interact and surprisingly find a negative interaction, underscoring the need for more investigation. Third, these studies remain agnostic about when certain diffusion pathways are more likely to promote the adoption of gender reforms. For example, why in some cases does it appear that international actors are more important for norm diffusion, while other studies demonstrate the primacy of domestic actors. Many studies recognize the contextual dependency of some diffusion mechanisms, but do not empirically test how certain structural and institutional attributes may condition which diffusion pathway will be primary.

[3]However, the direct link between women's representation and gender reform is unclear.

The Role of International Actors in Gender Reform

While previous theories on the diffusion of gender reform often acknowledge that conflict plays a key role in promoting or degrading women's rights, the exact mechanism underlying this relationship remains unclear. This paper proposes that violent conflict conditions which types of diffusion pathways — domestic or international — will be the most prominent leading to gender reform. While this paper does not claim that there is one single explanation for gender reform, it seeks to identify diffusion patterns, specifically by examining how international actors leverage material incentives to promote gender reform and how country context moderates the relative influence of domestic and international actors. While all states are somewhat susceptible to material incentives, the degree of susceptibility differs greatly across states.

The adoption of gender reform incurs costs on a state and therefore, given limited resources, states must prioritize gender reforms sufficiently to warrant committing their resources to it. These costs are manifested in a number of ways. First, and most directly, gender reforms require resources to be drafted, adopted, and implemented. For example, to adopt and implement a law on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), experts must be consulted, time must be spent drafting and passing the law, and resources must be spent to inform police, justice officials, and citizens, to investigate possible infractions, and to persecute perpetrators. Therefore, gender reforms require the commitment of time, funds, and personnel.

Additionally, gender reforms may carry normative, cultural, social, and political costs that may lead certain states to reject their adoption. First, states may reject gender reforms if they contrast the society's culture or social norms. This is most likely to occur in societies which hold deeply patriarchal values that are embedded in their culture and social institutions, such as religious beliefs. Leaders and politicians may bear large costs for adopting gender reforms in the form of criticism, lost support, possible loss of office, and social unrest.[4] As a result, some societies and leaders may view gender reforms as violating and undermining their culture,

[4]For example, after a political gender quota was implemented in the Indian state of Nagaland in February 2017, riots and protests occurred, leading to property destruction, troop deployments, and two deaths. See Feliz, Solomon, 2017, "Tribes in India Demand an End to Local Gender Quotas, Sparking Deadly Riots" *Time* http://time.com/4659204/nagaland-india-gender-quota/

religion, or identity, increasing their willingness to resist international and domestic pressure in favor of these reforms. Similarly, politicians may be reluctant to adopt gender reforms if they threaten their political power. In other words, if politicians and leaders came to power in a gender inequitable state, they may fear that gender reforms, and the resultant increased women's rights, may decrease their support and increase the pool of potential challengers for political power (Krook 2016).[5]

Therefore, the adoption of gender reforms may trigger costs for states in terms of resources, social and cultural authority, and political competitiveness. As a result, to adopt gender reforms two conditions must be present. First, states must have the physical resources to draft, adopt, and implement gender reforms. Second, state leaders must have the political will to adopt them. The leaders must be prepared for the consequences of adopting these reforms, including popular backlash, criticism, increased political competition, and potentially the loss of power. International actors can provide the crucial resources to offset these potential costs.

While international influence is manifested in several ways, international actors gain the greatest influence by offering material incentives in exchange for adopting desired policies. On one hand, they may promise direct "payments" to the state in return for the adoption of gender reforms. For example, several foreign aid distributors, including the U.S., Sweden, and the IMF offer economic aid to countries that propose to commit it to women's rights programs. Further, states may receive more indirect material incentives, such as the promise of greater economic cooperation and investment in the future (Hashimoto 2012). Similarly, as gender equality becomes an increasingly salient topic, states, their public, IGOs, NGOs, and businesses may withhold investment from states accused of violating women's rights.[6] In other words, third parties may offer both the promise of increased investment, aid, and cooperation

[5]However, it is important to note that not all male politicians reject gender quotas and that gender quotas, at times, have worsened gender inequalities (Krook 2016). This underscores important questions of when and under what conditions there will be resistance and/or counterintuitive outcomes, as discussed in this project.

[6]For example, clothing factories in Guatemala and Mexico have been increasingly criticized by consumers and NGOs for discriminatory practices against women, including forced pregnancy tests, birth control, and sexual harassment. A long history exists of third party actors invoking poor women's rights as justification for punitive action. For example, scholars argue that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were partly justified among the American and Western public by rhetoric which emphasized women's suffering under the previous regimes.

in the future in exchange for the adoption of gender reform and the threat of withdrawing those material benefits if the state does not comply. On the other hand, international actors may also offer the necessary resources, assistance, and expertise to adopt and implement gender reform policies, negating the costs that would otherwise be borne by the state. Therefore, third parties can promote the adoption of gender reforms through offering direct and indirect material incentives ranging from immediate assistance in policy adoption to the promise of medium and long-term benefits in the form of greater investment, aid, and cooperation (Bearce and Tirone 2010, Curtice and Reinhardt N.d., Hyde 2011, N.d., Stone 2011, von Borzyskowski and Vabulas N.d.).

One particularly strong form of direct international coercion occurs when UN peacekeeping missions are present as they often undertake agenda-setting and direct participation in policy-making to advocate for liberal reforms. Bush (2011) argues that peacekeeping missions increase the likelihood of political gender quota adoption in developing countries as the country hopes to leverage the resources and influence of the peacekeeping mission to demonstrate its level of democratization and modernity. Similarly, peacekeeping missions influence the adoption of security sector gender reforms in post-conflict states (Huber and Karim 2018). Finally, several studies trace how peacekeeping missions support a number of gender reforms in post-conflict states by providing critical resources and international support for women's rights initiatives (Bacon 2015, Karim and Beardsley 2016, McLeod 2011, Olsson 2001).

However, short of a UN peacekeeping mission, international influence can be exerted through the presence of UN personnel, technical advisers and experts, and funding. While various IGOs have adopted and promoted the WPS agenda, the UN remains at the forefront of the women's rights agenda as the first major organization to recognize women's rights as a security concern and for its continued prioritization of gender equality. Specifically, the UN may promote gender reforms by providing expertise regarding gender issues and policy development, disseminating information regarding the benefits of gender equality, training government officials, assisting in implementation, monitoring and evaluating the progress of gender reforms,

and providing funds and other resources to support adoption and implementation.[7] Therefore, as UN presence increases, the state may be more likely to adopt gender reforms due to increased international pressure and resources.

International Hypothesis 1: *As UN presence increases in a state, the state is more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Additionally, international actors may also retain agenda-setting power through financial relationships, such as foreign aid. Donor countries and institutions often use foreign aid as a carrot (or stick) to persuade the recipient country to adopt certain reforms, including gender reforms (Bush 2011, Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015). For example, the U.S. foreign aid agency, USAID, has grants earmarked for women's rights initiatives. Therefore, as a state receives greater amounts of foreign aid, it will become more dependent upon donor states and more sensitive to international pressure for gender reforms. However, this effect is likely to be magnified when the donor is associated with liberalism and women's rights. In other words, donors with high levels of gender equality are likely to encourage recipient states to adopt gender reforms.

International Hypothesis 2b: *Conditional upon a state's foreign aid donors adopting gender reforms, as a state's dependence on foreign aid increases, states are more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Further, IGOs that prioritize women's rights may connect compliance on gender reform with several material benefits that result from membership, participation, and cooperation in the IGO (Pevehouse 2005). For example, EU member states adopted violence against women's laws in response to demands by the EU for compliance with EU standards of SGBV legal frameworks (Montoya 2013, Polack and Hafner-Burton 2000). As above, it is likely that IGOs will be especially likely to pressure for gender reforms and be willing to tie continued benefits with compliance on women's rights policies as the members which make up the IGO become more committed to women's rights (Greenhill 2010*a*).

[7]For example, UN Women, the UN agency charged with promoting gender equality, had a budget of 690 million dollars in 2014 and 880 million dollars in 2016 to support gender reforms internationally (UN Women 2016).This represents a significant increase from the budget of its predecessor, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, in 1982 of 4 million dollars (UNIFEM 2008). In addition, other UN agencies, such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UN Children Fund also support gender reform programs.

International Hypothesis 3b: *As the average level of gender equality of member states of an IGO increases, each individual member state is more likely to adopt gender reforms.*

Finally, many scholars argue that non-state actors play a vital role in promoting the adoption of gender reforms cross-nationally (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Paxton, Green and Hughes 2008, True and Mintrom 2001). Since 1970, women's international NGOs (WINGOs) have expanded exponentially in both number and membership to produce dense networks (Hughes et al. 2015, Berkovitch 1999). WINGOs are vital to uncovering violations of women's rights, garnering domestic support, and calling international attention to gender equality in certain countries. Importantly, unlike domestic women's movements, which are subject to similar resource constraints as the government and may possess limited power in relation to the government, WINGOs have independent resources and support (Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015).[8] Therefore, as WINGO presence in a state increases, there may be more international pressure on the ground and assistance offered to adopt reforms.

International Hypothesis 5: *As the presence of international women's rights organizations increases, states are more likely to adopt gender reform.*

Conflict: Opening Doors for Gender Reform

While all states face resource constraints, states that are currently experiencing conflict or have recently experienced conflict are especially likely to be sensitive to resource limitations and therefore, are more likely to adopt gender reforms in response to material incentives. Conflict is very draining on resources as a state must siphon funds into its fighting capacity and infrastructure repair, which may limit the resources available for other sectors or gender reforms. Moreover, after conflict, resources must be devoted to the rebuilding process as the country struggles to implement DDR, repair infrastructure, resume regular social service provision, and reform and rebuild the government. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) calculate that the costs of armed conflict in a low-income country average about 64.2 billion dollars. Further, after Liberia's civil war, donor flows to Liberia represented up to 771% of government spending and

[8] Also, note that WINGOs and domestic women's organizations may have different policy agendas

39% of Liberia's GDP (Bacon 2015). In contrast, while non-conflict states experience similar resource limitations and also face trade-offs regarding how to spend their limited resources, since they have not experienced a violent shock,[9] they may be able to consider a broader range of reforms on which to spend resources.

Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states may have more severe resource limitations, which may lead them to be highly dependent upon international donors, trade partners, and organizations to augment their resources. Similarly, conflict-affected states are eager to rebuild to prevent further conflict and instability. Therefore, conflict and post-conflict states are highly susceptible to the material incentives of international actors who may offer reconstruction assistance, foreign aid, or investment in exchange for the adoption of gender reforms due to their immediate needs to stabilize and rebuild and their medium- and long-term need for economic growth and stability. Further, while international actors promote gender reform cross-nationally, special attention is paid to conflict and post-conflict states since UNSCR 1325 outlines them as most urgently needing gender reform.

In addition to the greater sensitivity to material incentives, the conflict and post-conflict environment shifts political will to favor gender reform by altering the needs and perspectives of the government, the security sector, and the population. Specifically, the experience of conflict may shift gender roles to grant women more access to political, economic, and security oriented duties, exacerbate women's insecurities, and damage the government's reputation.

First, the experience of conflict may challenge traditional gender roles. Gender roles are most directly challenged by women's participation in the conflict as combatants, which highlights their agency to act as political agents (Sjoberg 2007, 2018).[10] However, women's other experiences during and after conflict may also challenge traditional gender roles in less dramatic ways. For example, during conflict when able-bodied men may be absent, women often have to fill traditionally male roles, such as economic laborers, mediators of interpersonal con-

[9] However, states may experience other types of shocks, such as natural disasters.

[10] For example, Karim (2016) found that after the Liberian civil war, Liberians were more comfortable around and evaluated the competency of Liberian female police officers higher than foreign female peacekeepers because they had witnessed Liberian female fighters' competency during the war.

flicts, and community leaders (Ahikire, Madanda and Ampaire 2012, Carpenter 2005, Hoduck 2016). Further, women may mobilize as part of a peace movement.[11] Women may be able to leverage these mobilization efforts and their status as the new "leaders" of their families and communities to gain political office (Berry 2015, Thomas and Adams 2010). For example, Tripp (2015) argues that after civil wars in Africa, women increase their formal and informal political participation.

Second, although conflict may challenge gender roles to empower women in some ways, it also increases women's vulnerability as they may be displaced from their homes, disconnected from their communities, and are economically and physically vulnerable (Bennoune 2007). This insecurity is predominantly expressed through increased threat of SGBV due to rape by combatants or peacekeepers, spousal frustration, or displacement (Cohen and Nordås 2014, Karim 2017, Karim and Beardsley 2016, Manjoo and McRaith 2011, Nordås and Rustad 2013). Therefore, the government may feel obligated to address women's unique insecurity through gender reforms. Finally, during and after conflict, the population may distrust the government, especially if it is accused of abusing civilians. The government may undertake gender reforms in the hope of leveraging gendered stereotypes that women are less corrupt, violent, and militant to decrease its perceived hypermasculinity and distance itself from its behavior during the conflict (Bush 2011, Karim 2016, McLeod 2011).

However, while conflict may provide an opportunity for gender reform, it is not sufficient to ensure greater gender equality as conflict, militarization, and patriarchy can be mutually reinforcing (Enloe 1989, 2000, Goldstein 2003, Hudson et al. 2013). The theory presented here does not necessarily contradict this perspective. For example, as acknowledged above, conflict can increase women's insecurity by exposing them to physical and sexual violence. Instead, this theory expands upon this scholarship by considering developments in the WPS norm in the past fifteen years, which may challenge traditional ideas regarding conflict and gender. Specifically, while previously the WPS norm was underdeveloped and had little support, many

[11]For example, in Liberia, women launched a nonviolent peace campaign, which called for more women's participation in peacemaking. Similar movements include the Woman's Peace Party in the USA, Mothers Against Silence in Israel, Women in Black in Israel, and the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina.

international and domestic actors now understand that conflict and gender inequality are linked and therefore, specifically target conflict countries for women's rights campaigns, as encouraged by UNSCR 1325.

Conflict primes the state for gender reform by altering the domestic context to create a cultural and political opening for gender reform and increasing the state's dependence on foreign aid, investment, and assistance. International actors then offer material incentives, both in the form of direct benefits, such as increased aid, cooperation, and investment, and the resources needed to draft, adopt, and implement the policy. Further, post-conflict states *in particular* may place a high priority on rebuilding their international reputation as legitimate, capable, and non-abusive, and therefore, they may be especially keen to comply with international demands for rights-based reforms (Bush 2011, McLeod 2011). Additionally, post-conflict states face high demands on their resources as they attempt to rebuild their infrastructure, making them highly dependent upon foreign investment and aid. Finally, post-conflict states often suffer from economic stagnation and desire to attract investment, trade, and production (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In contrast, during conflict, states may prioritize survival and victory more than international pressure or reputation. This is likely to be especially true for gender reforms since active conflict states often become highly militarized and are less concerned with and sympathetic to demands for gender equality (Enloe 1989, Goldstein 2003).

Conflict Hypothesis 1: *Post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender reforms than non-conflict states.*

Conflict Hypothesis 2: *Post-conflict states should be more likely to adopt gender reforms conditional upon the presence of international factors than non-conflict states.*

Conflict Hypothesis 3: *Post-Conflict states should be the most affected by international factors in favor of gender reforms.*

Research Design

To test the theoretical expectations above, a unique cross-national dataset on the adoption of gender reform between 1970 and 2016 was created.[12] This dataset includes information on

[12]Robustness checks have also limits the time frame to 1988.

the year of adoption of several gender equality reforms. These include the creation of gender machinery within the government whose responsibility it is to promote women's rights and gender equality domestically, the criminalization of several forms of violence against women, the adoption of a legislative gender quota, and the creation of a unit in the security sector to address gendered crimes.[13] The coding rules of these variables can be found in the Appendix.[14]

For each reform, a separate dataset was created which contains country-year observations from 1970 until the year in which the reform was adopted at which point the country drops out of the dataset. While some of these laws can be reformed, repealed, or adopted multiple times, the primary analysis only considers the initial adoption of the policy. There are several reasons for this. First, when a policy is first adopted, the state may bear several costs unique to the first adoption, such as the resources needed to draft and campaign for the policy and initial cultural backlash. It is reasonable to believe that once a policy has been adopted for the first time, the process through which it is adopted again and the costs which must be paid are significantly altered. Second, while it is possible for these laws to be repealed, it is extremely unlikely and is a rare occurrence in the data. Finally, the dataset was limited to countries which are not members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as OECD states generally have higher levels of gender equality, earlier adoption of gender reforms, and a lower incidence of conflict.[15]

[13]Additional reforms in the dataset, but whose results are not presented here, include the legalizing of abortion and the conditions under which an abortion is legal, the outlawing of child marriage, the adoption of a National Action Plan to promote gender equality (including NAPs for UNSCR 1325), and reforms to outlaw economic discrmination against women.

[14]Data on the adoption of these laws was gathered from a number of sources. Primary sources include IGOs, such as the UN (especially UNICEF, UN Women, and the UN Population Fund), the WHO, and NATO, NGOs, such as Girls Not Brides, Stop Violence Against Women, and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, news reports and think tanks (including the Pew Research Center and the Center for Democratic Control of the Armed forces), and scholarly datasets, including the Quota Adoption and Reform over Time (QAROT) Dataset from Hughes et al. (2017) and the Women in Parliament Dataset by Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008).

[15]However, robustness checks will include OECD countries.

Dependent Variables

Several dependent variables are examined in this analysis.[16] All of the dependent variables reflect legal, programmatic, or organizational changes made by a national government or its institutions to promote either women's rights or gender reform. First, two types of violence against women laws are examined, including laws that explicitly criminalize intimate partner violence (IPV) and laws against sexual harassment either in the workplace or more generally.[17]. Next, *Government Machinery* examines the creation of government offices that may promote women's rights.[18] Next, the analysis considers the creation of a legislative gender quota, or a legally mandated minimum level of representation for women within the legislative branch (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton Zetterberg 2017).[19] Finally, gender reforms in the security sector are examined. In this analysis, security sector gender reform is primarily examined as the creation of a gendered unit within the security sector, defined as an all-female unit or a unit that is tasked with a gendered type of security, such as domestic violence, for the first time in the police or military.[20]

Since the data represents an unbalanced panel containing discrete country-years[21] and the theory focuses on time until a reform is adopted, event history analysis is the most appropriate form of modeling (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). While there are several models which can be used, the primary analysis presented here uses logistic regression. Logistic regression was chosen rather than Cox Proportional Hazard models due to important time trends that alter the effects of the independent variables over time.[22] In other words, since the promotion of women's rights and the adoption of these reforms vary over the decades, we should expect that the effects of the variables will also vary, which violates the assumptions of the Cox Proportional Hazard

[16]Summary statistics for all variables used in this analysis can be found in the Appendix.

[17]These variables only considered laws that explicitly criminalized these forms of violence rather than laws which are either silent on the legality of violence against women or imply illegality under another statute

[18]This can include offices and departments that operate within another ministry (even if that ministry is not primarily tasked with women's rights).

[19]This variable excludes voluntary party quotas.

[20]This excludes non-governmental associations.

[21]Since the adoption of laws and policies by legislatures or through other government processes is often recorded yearly, the data is organized into years rather than more continuous time units.

[22]However, Cox Proportional Hazard Models are used as a robustness check and the results remain consistent.

model. In contrast, with logistic regression, time trends can be explicitly modeled to avoid biasing the results. The time dependency of each model depends on the dependent variable tested and as a result, time trends are modeled as linear, cubic, or quadratic depending on the dependent variable.

Independent Variables

Several sets of independent variables are used in this analysis. The first independent variable indicates the conflict status of the state. This variable is a categorical variable in which a state is coded as 0 if it is not experiencing a civil conflict and has not experienced a civil conflict within the past five to ten years, 1 if the state is experiencing an active civil conflict, and 2 if a state has experienced a civil conflict within the past five years (if the conflict experienced less than 1,000 battle deaths) or ten years (if the conflict experienced 1,000 or more battle deaths), but is not currently fighting an active conflict.[23] Conflict was defined according to the UCDP/PRIO Dataset as more than 25 battle deaths occurring between the government forces and a non-state actor within the territory of the state in the state-year.[24] Military coups were excluded from the analysis.[25] These variables are lagged by one year. In the full dataset, around 19.5% of observations are active conflict state-years and 11.1% are post-conflict years.[26]

The second set of independent variables measure international influence within the state-year. The first *Security Council Neighbors* proxies for the level of UN pressure and influence within a state as a proportion of a state's closest ten neighboring states currently have a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council or have had a seat one year before or after the current year.[27] As demonstrated by Mikulsacheck (2016), when African states are elected to the UN Security Council, the size and budget of UN peace operations in civil war states within

[23]If a state is within the ten year period after one conflict when it begins a new conflict or fighting is renewed, it returns to being coded as an active conflict

[24]Alternative measures of post-conflict, namely post-conflict as ending five years after a conflict ends or as a permanent state, are in the robustness checks.

[25]However, the results remain consistent when military coups are included.

[26]Controls for various characteristics of the conflict, including intensity, termination, and whether the conflict occurred in a previously post-conflict state, are included in the appendix.

[27]Permanent security council members were excluded as their influence is constant and therefore, they are less likely to react to changes on the security council.

that same region increases.[28] In other words, when a state's neighbors are represented on the Security Council, that state is more likely to receive increased services and influence from the United Nations. While Mikulsacheck (2016) only examines the provision and deployment of peacekeeping services, it is also reasonable to expect that other types of influence would manifest as temporary members of the Security Council attempt to leverage their short-term power and influence within the UN to benefit and stabilize their region. This effect is moreover magnified by the increased securitization of women's rights which has placed women's rights, especially women's rights in conflict states, on the Security Council's agenda. Importantly, since the regional distribution of non-permanent seats on the security council is determined by a formula devised in 1963, this variable can be considered relatively exogenous to current levels of conflict and gender equality within a state and region, decreasing concerns of engdogeneity from which other measures of UN influence within a state suffer.[30]

Further, *Export Context* was included, which accounts for the average fertility rate of a state's trade partners. Data on exports comes from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics Database. According to the "California Effect," importing countries may be able to leverage trade relationships to transmit their higher standards to exporting states with lower standards (Vogel 1995). Several studies have demonstrated that states which have greater export ties to states with higher levels of human rights are more likely to in turn increase their internal respect for human rights (Cao 2012, Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash 2006, Greenhill, Mosley, and Prakash 2009). Fertility rates are one indicator of a state's level of gender equality as it indicates the strength of traditional norms of women as child bearers/caretakers and proxies for a woman's participation in the public sphere. In other words, as the fertility rate increases, gender equality generally decreases.[31] Therefore, we should expect there to be an inverse relationship between

[28]It is important to note that to most effectively test this relationship, instrumental variable analysis should be conducted. However, since this would require the use of Ordinary Least Squares regression rather than event history analysis, in this analysis it is used as an independent variable rather than an instrumental variable.[29] However, in future tests, this could be changed.

[30]However, as a robustness check, other measures of UN influence, including the amount of United Nations aid given, World Bank Aid disbursed, whether there was a peacekeeping mission deployed to the state, and the number of UN civilian staff employed within in each country is used.

[31]This is only one of many indicators of gender equality, with other common indicators including women's legislative participation, secondary school gender ratios, and male-female labor force ratios. This variable was

the average fertility rate of a state's donors and gender reform adoption.

Next, to account for the pressure that IGOs can exert on states, *IGO Context* records the average level of gender equality among the member states of IGOs to which the state is a member in the year, weighted by the centrality of each member state. This variable was calculated in a similar fashion to Greenhill (2015). First, for each IGO to which a state is member, the average fertility rate of the IGO's member-states is calculated. This is then weighted by the number of states which belong to the IGO to account for the relative direct connections between IGO members.[32] Next, the average fertility rate of states across *all* IGOs to which a state is a member in the year is calculated. An additional variable to consider a state's context is the average fertility rate of a state's culturally proximate neighbors, including states with a shared geography, language, religion, and colonial history. While this variable is not included in the primary analysis due to multicollinearity concerns, it is included as a robustness check and the results remain consistent.

Further, to account for WINGOs to pressure a state to adopt gender reforms, a count of the number of WINGOs in the state in the year was included. This measure was created using data from Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) and Cole (2012) which varies between 0 and 114.[33]

Finally, to account for a domestic source of pressure for gender reform, women's political leadership, the proportion of the legislature that is female as recorded by Hughes, Green, and Paxton (2006) and the World Bank (2016) is included.[34] Proponents of substantive repre-

also measured using these alternative measures as a robustness check.

[32]Specifically, IGOs which have many members are weighted less than IGOs which have fewer members since as the number of members decrease, the more direct the connection between members in the IGO become. For a description of the weighting scheme, see Greenhill (2015).

[33]While the Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015) is gathered from 1970 to 2013, it is gathered in five year intervals. Therefore, interpolation was used to fill in the missing years and extrapolation was used to update the data through 2016. Additionally, if data was missing for certain country-years from the Hughes, Krook and Paxton (2015), it was supplemented with the Cole (2012) data. While this is not ideal as the two datasets use slightly different methods to count the number of WINGOs, they have a very high level of correlation and therefore, are capturing the same relative number of WINGOs.

[34]Additional operationalizations of women's political leadership used as robustness checks include whether the state has a female head of state and the percentage of executive ministers which are female. These are not included in the main analysis as there is relatively little variation, especially when considering female heads of state, and a large amount of missing data with regards to female ministers.

sentation argue that female legislators promote pro-women policies and therefore, as women's representation in the legislature increases, states should be more likely to adopt gender reforms (Bashevkin 2014, Lakshmi et al. 2011, True 2016, Hughes et al. 2015).

All of the independent variables are lagged by one year to account for endogeneity. To account for the conditional nature between a state's conflict status and the international and domestic factors on the successful adoption of reform, in every model, the state's conflict status is factored to create two dummy variables for whether the state is experiencing an active conflict or is a post-conflict state (with non-conflict states as the excluded category) and this factored indicator is then interacted with each of the independent variables.

Control Variables

Several control variables are included. All controls are lagged by one year. First, to account for a state's level of democratization and its respect of political rights and civil liberties, the *Freedom House* measures of a civil liberties and political rights within a country is considered. Freedom House creates seven-level categorical measures of a state's political rights and civil liberties, not including women's rights, which is averaged for this analysis. A coding of 1 indicates a state that has high respect of civil rights and political rights, whereas a coding of 7 indicates a less free society. A state's respect for other forms of civil rights and liberties may be a strong indication of whether they are similarly likely to respect women's rights. Additionally, states with a stronger respect of rights and liberties are also likely to be more strongly integrated into the international community, and therefore, more likely to respond positively to international pressure to adopt gender reforms.

GDP per capita measures the the state's gross domestic product per capita. States which are wealthier are more capable of adopting gender reforms due to increased budgetary resources. Further, wealthy states often experience increased gender equality. *GDP per capita* is gathered from the World Bank and lagged by one year and log transformed.

Additionally, to account for the existing level of gender equality within a state, the average

fertility rate in the state-year is included as a control. As discussed above, while there are multiple indicators of gender equality which all suffer from strengths and weaknesses, for this analysis, fertility rates are the most accurate and reliable indicator as fertility rates have been consistently tracked for many decades, unlike other measures of women's rights.[35]

Finally, other controls were included as robustness checks, but are not shown in the results below, including the state's dependence on oil reserves and several features of the state's potential conflict, including whether there were female combatants, the extent of conflict-related sexual violence, the intensity, the deployment and length of a UN peacekeeping mission, and the outcome, including whether the winner was a rebel or government, whether there was a formal peace agreement, and whether that peace agreement considered gendered issues. The results remain consistent with the inclusion of these variables.

Results

While several patterns appear in the results, it appears that each gender reform is affected by different factors. For the sake of space, only two tables are printed below and the remaining three tables can be found in the Appendix. Each table tests a different gender reform and contains three models: the first model includes full independent and control variables, but does not include interaction terms; the second model interacts both active conflict status and post-conflict status with each of the independent variables; the third model only interacts post-conflict status with the independent variables.[36]

Table 1 examines the adoption of intimate partner violence laws. First, among non-conflict states, *Export Context* and *Percent Legislative Female* have statistically significant relationships with the adoption of IPV laws in the expected direction. In other words, as a state's export recipients become more gender equitable (and their fertility rates decrease) and as more women participate in the legislature, the state becomes more likely to adopt IPV laws. In post-conflict states, we see some limited evidence that international factors may be affecting the adoption

[35]However, alternative measures of gender equality are considered and the results remain consistent.
[36]Active states were recoded as "non-post-conflict" for these tests.

Table 1: Discrete Event History Model: Intimate Partner Violence Reform

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.14 (0.36)	0.10 (3.56)	
Post-Conflict	0.33 (0.33)	−6.37 (4.15)	−5.65 (3.86)
Security Council Neighbors	−0.75 (1.55)	−0.97 (2.02)	−2.29 (1.86)
Export Context	−0.84** (0.34)	−1.22*** (0.45)	−0.75** (0.37)
IGO Context	−0.44 (0.39)	−0.52 (0.46)	−0.72* (0.40)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.30*** (0.09)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.32*** (0.10)
GDP per Capita	0.08 (0.13)	0.07 (0.14)	0.11 (0.13)
Fertility	−0.36*** (0.12)	−0.43*** (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.12)
Time	0.15 (0.22)	0.16 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)
Time^2	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)
Time^3	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−8.36 (5.95)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		1.47** (0.65)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−1.52* (0.81)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.002 (0.01)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.07* (0.04)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		6.71* (3.97)	8.21** (3.90)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−0.27 (0.75)	−0.84 (0.70)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		1.79* (0.93)	2.11** (0.89)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Constant	−0.03 (2.37)	2.01 (2.79)	0.65 (2.48)
Observations	2,806	2,806	2,806
Log Likelihood	−300.88	−289.09	−295.46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	629.75	626.17	626.93

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

of these laws in a different way than non-conflict states. First, *Security Council Neighbors* has a significant positive relationship with the adoption of domestic violence laws as expected. Second, *IGO Context* also has a significant relationship with adoption, however it is in the opposite direction than predicted. In other words, it appears that as post-conflict states share more IGO memberships with gender equitable states, they are significantly less likely to adopt IPV laws. Finally, among active conflict states, while women's representation in the legislature is positively related to the adoption of IPV laws, *Export Context* appears to discourage intimate partner laws in active conflict states. Finally, in active conflict states, shared IGO memberships with gender equitable states increases the likelihood of the adoption of IPV laws.

Table 2 analyses the adoption of sexual harassment laws. Once again, we see that *Export Context* is negatively associated with the adoption of sexual harassment laws in non-conflict states. Additionally, as WINGO presence increases in non-conflict states, these states become more likely to adopt sexual harassment laws. In Model 2, several relationships appear with post-conflict states. First, *IGO Context*, as expected, is negatively associated with the adoption of sexual harassment laws, whereas *WINGO* presence and women's representation in the legislature are both positively associated with the adoption of these laws. However, in Model 3, these relationships in post-conflict states weaken and only *IGO Context* remains significant. Finally, among active conflict states, only WINGO presence is significantly and positively related to the adoption of sexual harassment laws. Overall, it appears that WINGOs play a more important role in the adoption of sexual harassment laws than intimate partner violence laws, while *Export Context* remains consistently significant.

The next set of results, which can be seen in the Appendix, examines the creation of machinery dedicated to gender equality within the government. Interestingly, the results vary somewhat from the creation of a gender ministry. First, *Export Context* is once again negatively associated with the creation of gender machinery within non-conflict states and in post-conflict states. Additionally, in active conflict states, women's representation within the legislature increases the likelihood of gender machinery creation.

The adoption of a legislative gender quota shows some similar patterns to the creation of

Table 2: Discrete Event History Model: Sexual Harassment Reform

	Dependent variable:		
	Sexual Harassment		
	(4)	(5)	(6)
Active Conflict	0.45 (0.35)	−5.12 (4.10)	
Post-Conflict	−0.61 (0.43)	9.87 (7.66)	10.37 (7.53)
Security Council Neighbors	−1.90 (1.70)	−1.49 (1.89)	−1.70 (1.73)
Export Context	−1.86*** (0.44)	−2.00*** (0.50)	−1.91*** (0.45)
IGO Context	−0.49 (0.42)	−0.58 (0.50)	−0.29 (0.43)
WINGOs	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.26** (0.10)	−0.26*** (0.10)
GDP per Capita	−0.06 (0.15)	−0.05 (0.15)	−0.08 (0.14)
Fertility	−0.17 (0.14)	−0.23* (0.14)	−0.17 (0.14)
Time	0.01 (0.20)	0.08 (0.21)	0.06 (0.20)
Time^2	0.002 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)
Time^3	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		1.36 (5.04)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		0.71 (0.84)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		0.31 (0.76)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.03* (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.08 (0.05)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−11.23 (8.33)	−10.84 (8.31)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−1.52 (1.93)	−1.55 (1.92)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		−2.36* (1.23)	−2.40** (1.20)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		0.04* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.06* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Constant	5.18** (2.42)	5.95** (2.69)	4.60* (2.42)
Observations	2,988	2,988	2,988
Log Likelihood	−296.01	−288.81	−292.74
Akaike Inf. Crit.	620.01	625.62	621.49

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

government machinery (seen in Table 7 in the Appendix). First, *Export Context* is significantly, negatively associated with the adoption of gender quotas in non-conflict states. Second, once again, in active conflict states, women's legislative representation significantly increases the likelihood of gender quota adoption. Finally, in post-conflict states, as a state's shared IGO member-states become more equitable, the likelihood of gender quota adoption increases.

Finally, with the creation of a security sector gender unit, among non-conflict states, *WINGOs* significantly increase the likelihood of the creation of a gender unit, whereas women's representation in the legislature, decreases the likelihood (as can be seen in Appendix Table 8). In contrast, in active conflict states, *WINGOs* is negative and significant and there is no relationship between WINGOs and the creation of these units in post-conflict states. Finally, in active conflict states, *Export Context* is also significantly related to the creation of these units in the expected direction.

Overall, relatively few consistent patterns emerge from the results. The most consistent relationship is between *Export Context* and the adoption of various gender reforms. In other words, it appears that states which export to other states which have higher levels of women's rights, or low fertility rates, are more likely to adopt gender reforms. This relationship appeared across all conflict types. Second, women's legislative representation, especially in non-conflict and active conflict states, also appears to be relatively consistently related to the adoption of gender reform. This conforms to theories of descriptive and substantive representation, demonstrating that women in political power are associated with higher levels of "women-friendly" polices. Among the remaining independent variables, *Security Council Neighbors*, *IGO Context*, and *WINGOs*, the relationships appear to be more tenuous and inconsistent.

What does this imply for women's rights after conflict? One possible explanation is that while conflict may empower women, this does not happen through formal changes in the law. Increasingly, studies have shown women's political participation increases after conflict (Tripp 2015, Tripp and Hudson 2015, Bush 2011, Tir N.d.). The findings above of a lack of relationship between conflict and the adoption of gender reforms is therefore rather surprising. One explanation for the contrasting findings is that if conflict does provide opportunities for women

to gain rights, that process is happening "on the ground" informally rather than in the government through the adoption of formal laws and policies. For example, maybe women are joining the government in larger numbers after conflict and therefore, the government does not feel the need to adopt gender reform. Additionally, the government may simply lack the capacity to adopt large gender reform laws. Similarly, there is some anecdotal evidence that women in post-conflict societies form informal support groups to address gender based violence without government intervention and therefore, maybe there is less pressure for formal gender based violence laws if women are "taking care of it" on their own. Further, policymakers may be aware that international actors support the adoption of these policies and due to concerns of neo-imperialism may actively reject adopting similar policies. Thus, while these policymakers may advocate for gender reform, they may not adopt the policies favored by international actors explicitly. One way to probe this alternative theory is to examine whether international and domestic factors affect indicators of women's rights "on the ground."

To do this, models were run which examine the influence of the primary international actors, specifically the UN, Export relationships, and IGO memberships on several indicators of women's rights across non-conflict and post-conflict states.[37] Using Ordinary Least Squares regression with country-year fixed effects, which largely replicate Difference-in-Differences models, I examined whether the interactive relationship between post-conflict states and international actors proposed above appears when examining several indicators of women's rights, rather than the adoption of women's rights reforms. These include the percent of the legislature that is female and two indices of gender equality from the Varieties of Democracy project: Political Empowerment index which examines whether women have access to all chambers of the legislature and participate in civil society and the Gendered Power Distribution which is a five level ordinal variable examining the distribution of power between men and women ranging from men having a near monopoly on political power to equal distributions of power between men and women.[38] While largely the same independent variables are used, there are two changes to

[37]Active conflict states were excluded due to previous work which demonstrates that women's rights decrease during conflict.

[38]The sample was also altered to 1985 to 2016.The use of OLS with non-continuous dependent variables is

note. First, *Security Council Neighbor* is replaced with *World Bank Aid*. As the World Bank is a UN administered body, its aid can be considered an extension of UN influence. Further, using the aid data, we can gain greater and more accurate information on the relative size of the influence of the UN within developing countries.[39] Next, to account for both the influence of international and domestic women's rights organizations, an indicator from the Varieties of Democracy project which examines women's participation in civil society organizations (CSOs) and CSOs prioritization of women's rights, replaces the previous *WINGOs* variable.[40]

The results presented in Table 3 present some evidence that women's rights do generally increase in post-conflict states, conditional upon the presence of international actors. Model 7 tests the relationship between international actors, conflict status, and women's legislative representation. As can be seen, female representation increases in post-conflict states when the country receives World Bank Aid, has increasingly gender equitable trading partners, and has strong women's civil society participation, as can be seen in Figure 1, which plots the relationships between World Bank Aid, Conflict-status, and women's legislative representation. It should be noted that in non-conflict states, international actors also often appear to have positive impacts on gender equality, however the relative effect of these actors is larger in post-conflict states. With the two indices of women's political empowerment and power distribution, we see similar patterns emerge. Once again, the presence of international actors generally increases women's rights specifically in post-conflict states. In particular, while in non-conflict states receiving World Bank aid and having more equitable IGO member-states increases women's political empowerment, gender equitable trade partners has a negative relationship with women's political empowerment. The positive effect of international actors on political empowerment, especially World Bank Aid, is magnified in post-conflict states and gender equitable trade partners exert a positive influence on political empowerment in post-

acceptable given that the sample size is sufficiently large. Howver, the results are robust to the use of logistic regression and an ordered probit.

[39] *Security Council Neighbor was used in the previous sample to examine a relatively exogenous shock to alleviate concerns of endogeneity. However, the Difference-in-Differences design used here already addresses those concerns to some extent.*

[40] The results do not change significantly if the original WINGOs variable is included.

Table 3: OLS Results: Conflict and Gender Equality

	Dependent variable:		
y	Legislature Percent	Political Empowerment	Gender Power Index
	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post-Conflict	3.79* (2.30)	0.05** (0.02)	0.40*** (0.15)
World Bank Aid	−0.02 (0.02)	0.0003* (0.0002)	−0.0005 (0.001)
Export Context	−10.78*** (2.62)	0.11*** (0.03)	−0.55*** (0.17)
IGO Context	2.90*** (0.98)	−0.04*** (0.01)	0.12* (0.06)
Female CSOs	1.08*** (0.29)		0.30*** (0.02)
Freedom House	0.50*** (0.11)	−0.02*** (0.001)	−0.04*** (0.01)
GDP per Capita	−0.51* (0.26)	−0.02*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.02)
Muslim Majority	0.27 (1.07)	0.02** (0.01)	−0.10* (0.06)
Legislative Gender Quota	4.50*** (0.31)		
Post-Conflict:World Bank Aid	0.07*** (0.02)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.002 (0.001)
Post-Conflict:Export Context	−1.69*** (0.44)	−0.02*** (0.005)	0.03 (0.03)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context	−0.11 (0.55)	0.004 (0.01)	−0.14*** (0.04)
Post-Conflict:Female CSOs	1.02*** (0.33)		0.06*** (0.02)
Constant	64.11*** (11.45)	0.50*** (0.12)	2.81*** (0.76)
Observations	3,446	3,537	3,702
R^2	0.75	0.92	0.89
Adjusted R^2	0.74	0.92	0.89
Residual Std. Error	4.69 (df = 3266)	0.05 (df = 3359)	0.32 (df = 3522)
F Statistic	54.66*** (df = 179; 3266)	231.19*** (df = 177; 3359)	161.30*** (df = 179; 3522)
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01



conflict states in contrast to non-conflict states. Further, on the gendered power index, we once again see that while certain international and domestic actors often have a positive influence in non-conflict states, this influence is magnified in post-conflict states, especially the influence of shared IGO memberships and women's civil society participation.

Overall, these exploratory models provide some initial evidence that international actors do have some success at promoting women's rights, especially in post-conflict states, but their effect may be limited at changing individual behavior rather than convincing governments to adopt formal women's rights laws or policies.

Conclusion

In the past twenty years, women's rights have been increasingly connected to conflict as scholars and international actors have recognized that women and gender equality play an important role conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. As a result, international third party actors

seek to encourage states to adopt women's rights reforms through material incentives. Conflict and post-conflict states have greater sensitivity of material incentives and greater will power to adopt these reforms as a result of the conflict, amplifying the impact of these incentives.

This paper demonstrates while that conflict and post-conflict states are not necessarily more likely to adopt various women's rights reforms in response to increased pressure from international actors, these actors do appear to significantly increase women's rights on the ground in post-conflict countries relatively more than in non-conflict countries. This may indicate that international third party actors are not capable of or willing to pressure other governments for women's rights reform, but that active participation of international actors in aid programming, civil society organizations, and trade relationships may lead to the diffusion of norms and behaviors that improve women's rights informally.

To further test the possible causal mechanisms between international actors, exposure to conflict, and women's behavior, this project will next explore subnational variation in women's rights in Uganda to examine whether women living in districts that were more exposed to conflict *and* received international aid are more likely to present improved indicators of women's rights than women living in other districts. Additionally, while international actors in general may not influence the adoption of gender reform, future work will examine whether some international or domestic conditions may be necessary to gender reform, such as women's inclusion in peace negotiations. Finally, not all international actors may be equally likely to prioritize gender reform or to pressure states to adopt gender policies. Therefore, future work should examine which international actors have made commitments to women's rights and power relations among different international actors.

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Appendix

For a full set of robustness checks, please contact the author for the online Appendix.

Full Set of Adoption Models Tables

Table 4: Discrete Event History Model: Intimate Partner Violence Reform

	Dependent variable:		
	Intimate Partner Violence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.14 (0.36)	0.10 (3.56)	
Post-Conflict	0.33 (0.33)	−6.37 (4.15)	−5.65 (3.86)
Security Council Neighbors	−0.75 (1.55)	−0.97 (2.02)	−2.29 (1.86)
Export Context	−0.84** (0.34)	−1.22*** (0.45)	−0.75** (0.37)
IGO Context	−0.44 (0.39)	−0.52 (0.46)	−0.72* (0.40)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	0.06*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.30*** (0.09)	−0.31*** (0.10)	−0.32*** (0.10)
GDP per Capita	0.08 (0.13)	0.07 (0.14)	0.11 (0.13)
Fertility	−0.36*** (0.12)	−0.43*** (0.13)	−0.34*** (0.12)
Time	0.15 (0.22)	0.16 (0.22)	0.15 (0.22)
Time^2	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)
Time^3	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−8.36 (5.95)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		1.47** (0.65)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−1.52* (0.81)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.002 (0.01)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.07* (0.04)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		6.71* (3.97)	8.21** (3.90)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−0.27 (0.75)	−0.84 (0.70)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		1.79* (0.93)	2.11** (0.89)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		−0.01 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.07** (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Constant	−0.03 (2.37)	2.01 (2.79)	0.65 (2.48)
Observations	2,806	2,806	2,806
Log Likelihood	−300.88	−289.09	−295.46
Akaike Inf. Crit.	629.75	626.17	626.93

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 5: Discrete Event History Model: Sexual Harassment Reform

	Dependent variable:		
	Sexual Harassment		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.45 (0.35)	−5.12 (4.10)	
Post-Conflict	−0.61 (0.43)	9.87 (7.66)	10.37 (7.53)
Security Council Neighbors	−1.90 (1.70)	−1.49 (1.89)	−1.70 (1.73)
Export Context	−1.86*** (0.44)	−2.00*** (0.50)	−1.91*** (0.45)
IGO Context	−0.49 (0.42)	−0.58 (0.50)	−0.29 (0.43)
WINGOs	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	0.03* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.28*** (0.10)	−0.26** (0.10)	−0.26*** (0.10)
GDP per Capita	−0.06 (0.15)	−0.05 (0.15)	−0.08 (0.14)
Fertility	−0.17 (0.14)	−0.23* (0.14)	−0.17 (0.14)
Time	0.01 (0.20)	0.08 (0.21)	0.06 (0.20)
Time^2	0.002 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)	−0.001 (0.01)
Time^3	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)	−0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		1.36 (5.04)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		0.71 (0.84)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		0.31 (0.76)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.03* (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.08 (0.05)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−11.23 (8.33)	−10.84 (8.31)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−1.52 (1.93)	−1.55 (1.92)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		−2.36* (1.23)	−2.40** (1.20)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		0.04* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.06* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Constant	5.18** (2.42)	5.95** (2.69)	4.60* (2.42)
Observations	2,988	2,988	2,988
Log Likelihood	−296.01	−288.81	−292.74
Akaike Inf. Crit.	620.01	625.62	621.49

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 6: Discrete Event History Model: Creation of Gender Machinery within Government

	Dependent variable:		
	Gender Machinery		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	0.13 (0.32)	−3.37 (3.65)	
Post-Conflict	0.11 (0.35)	2.20 (3.87)	2.29 (3.81)
Security Council Neighbors	0.04 (1.51)	−0.94 (1.85)	−0.43 (1.60)
Export Context	−1.04*** (0.37)	−0.75* (0.40)	−0.87** (0.39)
IGO Context	−0.52 (0.37)	−0.63 (0.42)	−0.56 (0.38)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	−0.01 (0.02)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.0000 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.33*** (0.09)	−0.36*** (0.09)	−0.34*** (0.09)
GDP per Capita	−0.10 (0.13)	−0.12 (0.14)	−0.10 (0.14)
Fertility	0.07 (0.12)	0.05 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Time	1.61*** (0.50)	1.48*** (0.50)	1.51*** (0.50)
Time^2	−0.16*** (0.04)	−0.15*** (0.04)	−0.15*** (0.04)
Time^3	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01*** (0.002)
Time^4	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	−0.0001*** (0.0000)	−0.0001*** (0.0000)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		1.94 (3.70)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		−0.64 (0.67)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		1.22 (0.90)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		0.01 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.14** (0.07)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		6.30 (5.27)	5.79 (5.20)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−1.70* (0.90)	−1.61* (0.89)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		0.87 (1.01)	0.77 (0.99)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		−0.03 (0.06)	−0.04 (0.06)
Constant	−0.25 (2.42)	−0.07 (2.61)	−0.38 (2.49)
Observations	1,513	1,513	1,513
Log Likelihood	−281.76	−276.37	−279.22
Akaike Inf. Crit.	593.52	602.75	596.43

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 7: Discrete Event History Model: Adoption of a Legislative Gender Quota

	Dependent variable:		
	Legislative Gender Quota		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.07 (0.40)	−1.40 (3.81)	
Post-Conflict	0.01 (0.43)	17.14** (7.85)	16.97** (7.72)
Security Council Neighbors	0.83 (1.73)	−0.40 (2.09)	0.95 (1.80)
Export Context	−0.90** (0.41)	−1.18** (0.50)	−0.83** (0.42)
IGO Context	−0.49 (0.45)	−0.09 (0.52)	−0.28 (0.46)
WINGOs	0.01 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
% Female Legislature	−0.02 (0.02)	−0.04 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.03 (0.10)	−0.003 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.10)
GDP per Capita	−0.22 (0.15)	−0.27 (0.16)	−0.23 (0.15)
Fertility	−0.24* (0.15)	−0.32** (0.16)	−0.25* (0.15)
Time	0.09 (0.21)	0.09 (0.21)	0.11 (0.21)
Time^2	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.002 (0.01)	−0.003 (0.01)
Time^3	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)	0.0000 (0.0001)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		5.18 (4.12)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		0.94 (0.76)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		−0.59 (0.87)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		−0.03 (0.02)	
Active Conflict:% Female Legislature		0.11** (0.05)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−1.66 (6.33)	−3.09 (6.24)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−1.49 (1.56)	−1.94 (1.55)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		−3.10** (1.31)	−2.63** (1.25)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		−0.04 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.04)
Post-Conflict:% Female Legislature		−0.13 (0.10)	−0.16 (0.10)
Constant	2.09 (2.51)	2.10 (2.86)	1.01 (2.58)
Observations	3,257	3,257	3,257
Log Likelihood	−261.98	−252.13	−257.40
Akaike Inf. Crit.	551.96	552.25	550.81

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Table 8: Discrete Event History Model: Creation of Gender Unit within Security Institutions

	Dependent variable:		
	Security Sector Gender Unit		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Active Conflict	−0.14 (0.38)	5.55 (3.69)	
Post-Conflict	0.54 (0.35)	0.21 (3.24)	−1.31 (3.13)
Security Council Neighbors	−4.01** (1.97)	−3.34 (2.33)	−3.23 (2.10)
Export Context	−0.76* (0.42)	−0.23 (0.49)	−0.60 (0.46)
IGO Context	0.52 (0.40)	0.45 (0.46)	0.36 (0.42)
WINGOs	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)
Percent Legislature Female	−0.03 (0.02)	−0.05* (0.03)	−0.04* (0.02)
Freedom House	−0.34*** (0.11)	−0.41*** (0.11)	−0.36*** (0.11)
GDP per Capita	−0.45*** (0.16)	−0.44*** (0.17)	−0.43*** (0.17)
Fertility	−0.06 (0.14)	−0.08 (0.14)	−0.06 (0.14)
Time	−0.43 (0.37)	−0.49 (0.38)	−0.47 (0.37)
Time^2	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Time^3	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)
Time^4	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)
Active Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		1.13 (5.46)	
Active Conflict:Export Context		−1.81** (0.80)	
Active Conflict:IGO Context		0.24 (0.82)	
Active Conflict:WINGOs		−0.03* (0.02)	
Active Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.05 (0.05)	
Post-Conflict:Security Council Neighbors		−4.85 (6.34)	−4.80 (6.26)
Post-Conflict:Export Context		−1.10 (0.73)	−0.70 (0.71)
Post-Conflict:IGO Context		1.15 (0.85)	1.15 (0.83)
Post-Conflict:WINGOs		−0.02 (0.02)	−0.01 (0.02)
Post-Conflict:Percent Legislature Female		0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)
Constant	2.92 (2.51)	1.53 (2.80)	2.97 (2.61)
Observations	3,107	3,107	3,107
Log Likelihood	−276.80	−270.27	−274.83
Akaike Inf. Crit.	583.59	590.55	587.66

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
State-Clustered Standard Errors

Gender Reform Dataset Variable Definitions and Sources

SSR Gender Unit: A dichotomous indicator of whether a unit was created in either the national police or military force which is either 1) an all-female unit or 2) created to address gendered crimes, such as domestic violence, regardless of whether it all-female or a mixed gender unit. Sources often include news paper reports, Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces gender reform country reports, and UN Women country reports.

NAP UNSCR 1325: This variable indicates whether the state adopted a National Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. It does not include statements in support of UNSCR 1325, but which do not include a country-specific plan for implementation. The main source is PeaceWomen.

Gender Machinery: This variable indicates whether there exists within the government a body responsible for promoting women's rights within the countries and gender mainstreaming government policy. This can include offices and departments housed within a larger ministry (such as the Ministry of Health or Labor) or a special committee attached to the executive. An alternative coding of this variable only includes high-level offices and when there is a specialized gender ministry, rather than gender falling under the scope of another ministry. Sources include the UN National Mechanisms document (http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/documents/National-Mechanisms-Web.pdf).

Legislative Gender Quota: This dichotomous variable indicates that country has adopted a gender quota as part of its constitution or secondary law. This variable only includes mandated legislative quotas or reserved seats and excludes party quotas. This variable comes from Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg (2017) and was updated from 2015 to 2016.

Domestic Violence: This variable indicates whether the state has adopted a law against intimate partner violence and domestic violence. The definition used to identify an adequate law against intimate partner violence comes from the UN as a law which "includes a range of sexually, psychologically and physically coercive acts used against adult and adolescent women by a current or former intimate partner, without her consent" (UN General Assembly 2006, 37). The data refer to instances where domestic, family or intimate partner violence is specifically criminalized or where provisions for protection orders are in place (UN Women 2012). Primary sources include the UN Women Handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women (2012) and Violence Against Women Dataset (2013), the Social Institutions and Gender Index, and Stop Violence Against Women. The UN Violence Against Women Dataset was used as the primary source and if contradictory information was found from other sources, this was specifically noted within the data.

Child Marriage: This variable indicates whether the minimum of age for marriage is eighteen for both men and women. Alternative codings distinguish whether there is any minimum age for marriage, but it falls below eighteen and and minimum age of eighteen. Additionally, while the primary coding used in this analysis does not consider whether there are allowed exceptions to the minimum age law (for example, in many countries while the minimum age of marriage may be eighteen, individuals can be married younger if they have parental permission or the permission of the courts), alternative codings take this into account. Primary sources include Pew Research Center, Girls Not Brides, the Right to Education Project, and Equality Now.

Marital Rape: This variable indicates whether there is a law that specifically criminalized marital rape. Marital rape, also called spousal rape, is non-consensual sex where the

perpetrator is the victim's spouse. Although general rape laws (except where exemption of a spouse is explicitly stated) do not preclude a spouse from being prosecuted, the data refer to instances where the law explicitly criminalizes marital rape, without qualifications, for example by providing that sexual assault provisions apply irrespective of the nature of the relationship between the perpetrator and complainant; or stating that no marriage or other relationship shall constitute a defence to a charge of sexual assault under the legislation(UN DESA-DAW 2009a, 26). In other instances, a marital (or equivalent) relationship may be explicitly cited in the law as an aggravating factor. Explicit criminalization of marital rape is recommended as best practice by, among others, the Council of Europe (Council of Europe 2009c). To be coded as one, the state had to have a law that explicitly criminalizes marital rape or specified that spouses aren't exempt from general laws against rape (in other words, having a general law on rape without an explicit statement that the law applies to spouses or a court decision that ensures this, does not count as successful adoption). Primary sources include the UN handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women.

Sexual Harassment: This variable is defined as any law that prohibits sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is defined as "Unwelcome sexually determined behaviour, in both horizontal and vertical relationships, including in employment (including the informal employment sector), education, receipt of goods and services, sporting activities, and property transactions" (UN DESA-DAW 2009a, 28). The law may be specific to the economic sector or general. The country must have in place laws that prohibit sexual harassment under civil or criminal law. Primary sources include the UN handbook for National Action Plans on Violence Against Women, the Social Institutions and Gender Index, and Stop Violence Against Women.

Liberal Abortion Law: This variable identifies whether the state has legalized abortion beyond when abortion is needed to save the mother. This includes abortion in cases of rape or incest, preservation of the womans health (physical and mental), feotal impairment, socioeconomic grounds, and without restriction. Primary sources include UN country reports from the UN Population Fund, the Pew Research Center, and Harvard's Abortion Law Archive.

LGBTQ Reform: This variable records the year in which homosexual activity for both males and females was decriminalized. The primary sources include Aengus Carroll's "State Sponsored Homophobia 2016: A World Survey of Sexual Orientation Laws: Criminalisation, Protection and Recognition" 11th Edition, Library of Congress, "Laws on Homosexuality in African Nations," and the ILGA.

Table 9: Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Intimate Partner Violence Law	5,660	0.237	0.425	0	1
Sexual Harassment Law	5,542	0.217	0.412	0	1
Marital Rape Law	5,691	0.097	0.296	0	1
Gender Ministry	5,589	0.232	0.422	0	1
Gender Machinery	5,610	0.518	0.500	0	1
Legislative Gender Quota	5,843	0.158	0.365	0	1
Gender Security Unit	5,819	0.023	0.151	0	1
Female Security Association	5,819	0.006	0.076	0	1
Homosexuality Decriminalized	5,619	0.442	0.497	0	1
Conflict Status	5,825	0.420	0.684	0	2
Security Council Neighbors	5,662	0.681	0.466	0	1
Export Context	5,846	3.707	0.789	1.923	5.393
IGO Context	5,669	3.760	0.516	2.048	5.067
WINGOs	5,329	25.104	20.961	0	114
% Female Legislature	5,024	10.629	9.202	0.000	63.800
Freedom House	5,464	4.547	1.734	1.000	7.000
GDP per Capita	5,230	7.043	1.357	3.948	11.391
Fertility	5,839	4.410	1.938	1.085	8.713